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NO 14

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 23

JULY-DEC. 1928

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART XXIII

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Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

PART XXIII.

CHAPTER I.—ARABIA.

[E 3308/1/91]

No. 1.

Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 61.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, July 1, 1928.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs has written protesting strongly against language used by Noori Pasha, Iraq Minister for Defence, in a recent statement in Parliament regarding budget of his Ministry, in course of which he stated that money voted for defence of Iraq against Nejd attacks will probably be needed towards the end of the summer.

Hejaz Government regard this statement as evidence of unfriendly feeling of Iraq Government. They ask for an official denial that Noori Pasha expressed the views of Iraq Government or of His Majesty's Government, and state that if this is not forthcoming they will find it difficult, in face of strong feeling aroused, to be bound by temporary agreement concluded between the King and Sir G. Clayton.

I informed Minister for Foreign Affairs, who called on me this morning, that I had not seen the text of the speech. I gathered from newspaper comments that Noori Pasha's statement was not intended in any way to be provocative; it was not, moreover, a statement of Iraq policy but an attempt on Minister's part to justify to Parliament the increase in his budget. I found it impossible to believe he, Damluji, really thought that statement of an Iraq Minister could in these circumstances be taken as an expression of His Majesty's Government's view. Damluji himself appeared to take a reasonable view, but insisted that a statement such as Noori Pasha's could only have a deplorable effect, and pressed strongly for an assurance from His Majesty's Government and from Iraq that the statement does not express their real views.

(Repeated to Bagdad.)

[E 3332/484/91]

No. 2.

Mr. Stonehewer-Bird to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 3.)

(No. 87.)

Sir,

Jeddah, June 7, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz for the period the 1st to 31st May, 1928.

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2. Copies of this report are being sent to Cairo, Jerusalem (2), Jerusalem for transmission to the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Trans-jordan, Bagdad, Aden, Beirut, Damascus, Simla, Khartum through Port Sudan, Singapore, Lagos (2).

I have, &c.

F. H. W. STONEHEWER-BIRD.

Enclosure in No. 2.

Jeddah Report for Period May 1 to May 31, 1928.

SIR GILBERT CLAYTON'S mission arrived in Jeddah on the 2nd May, the anniversary of his arrival last year to negotiate the Jeddah treaty. H.M.S. "Dahlia," as in 1927, effected the transport of the mission from Port Sudan. The Foreign Secretary, his assistant and the Kaimakam greeted Sir Gilbert on board the sloop. A guard of honour was drawn up on the quay. All arrangements for the mission's comfort were admirably carried out.

2. It was not until the morning of the 2nd May that any definite news of Ibn Saud's movements were forthcoming. It was then learnt that he had reached Medina, would pass through Jeddah on his way to Mecca on the 5th, and return definitely to Jeddah on the 7th. It was agreed in these circumstances that H.M.S. "Dahlia" should await the King's state entry into the town, and should fire a Royal salute in his honour. This programme was adhered to; the King entered Jeddah on the morning of the 7th; the mission and the agency were received by His Majesty in the morning and the foreign consuls in the afternoon. A banquet, to which the officers of H.M.S. "Dahlia" were invited, was held that evening.

3. The King remained in Jeddah for fourteen days, and devoted his whole time to the mission. No definite agreement was reached, and it was decided to suspend the negotiations and to resume them in some two months' time. On the 22nd May an official communiqué was published simultaneously in Jeddah and in London, the terms of the Jeddah version of which were as follows:—

The following communiqué has been received from the Press Department:—

Negotiations between His Majesty the King and his advisers and the British mission, headed by General Sir Gilbert Clayton, at Jeddah, commenced on 18.11.1346 (the 8th May, 1928), to adjust outstanding questions between Nejd and Iraq and Nejd and Transjordan.

Progress was made in many of the questions under discussion. In view, however, of the approach of the pilgrim season, the negotiations were stopped, and the British mission thought it best to take advantage of this opportunity to return to London to report progress to the British Government, returning at the earliest suitable moment to resume negotiations.

Worthy of remark in this connexion is the spirit of sincerity and the true desire for an understanding which prevailed during the negotiations, and the earnest endeavours of both parties to solve the difficulties and to secure good relations between the three neighbouring countries.

4. Sir Gilbert Clayton, Mr. Antonius and Flight-Lieutenant Moore left Jeddah for Port Sudan in H.M.S. "Dahlia" on the 25th May. Mr. Cornwallis and Captain Glubb left for Egypt on the 22nd May.

5. As reported last month, the mission from the Imam was awaiting the King's arrival to commence conversations. Ibn Saud, however, seems to have found little or no time for the Yemenis. The Italian consul was granted an audience, in the course of which not only Italian recognition, but also Yemen relations with Nejd, were discussed. Little progress was made with regard to recognition. Ibn Saud maintaining the position that recognition must be unconditional, the Italian consul seeking for a formula whereby Italy may recognise Ibn Saud without offending the Imam. Speaking of his relations with the Yemen, the King stated that he desired to be on friendly terms with the Imam. He had not the intention imputed to him of annexing Hodeida, which he recognised as being indispensable to the Yemen; Medi, on the other hand, he did not regard as belonging to the Yemen. It is most improbable that the Imam's mission will accomplish anything or that it will even pave the way for a definite understanding, but the continual exchange of complimentary missions has perhaps served to prevent active hostilities.

6. Another question which has been engaging the King's attention since his return to the Hejaz is that of the concession granted to the Red Sea Petroleum Company in the Farsan Islands. Ibn Saud has received and studied the report of his delegate, Sherif Adnan, and also the letter embodying the considered views of the company. He appears to have concluded that the best solution is to set aside the present concession and draw up fresh terms which will not be open to misinterpretation. A letter in this sense has been addressed by Dr. Damluji to the company's headquarters in Cairo, suggesting that delegates be sent to discuss the terms with Ibn Saud in Jeddah.

7. The number of pilgrims from overseas fell short, as was feared, of 100,000; but, owing to a larger Egyptian pilgrimage than had been hoped for, numbers reached 96,000. The total was thus less than last year's (by some 40,000). How far this decrease in numbers is due to alarmist reports in the British and Iraq press it is difficult to say; but it may be stated confidently that the two categories of pilgrims who were chiefly responsible for the decrease were not affected by rumours of disturbances. The comparatively small size of the Javanese and Malay pilgrimage (roughly 26,000 less than last year) is recognised as being due to the state of the rubber market and the resultant lack of funds of prospective Hajis. Intending Indian pilgrims may have been deterred by alarmist reports from undertaking the Haj this year; their numbers show a decrease on last year's total of roughly 14,000.

8. The number of North African pilgrims was again small. This is as well, as more trouble has been caused by a handful of truculent Tunisians and Algerians than by the thousands of Javanese. The fault lies largely with the authorities in Tunis, who appear light-heartedly to have handed over some 700 of their pilgrims to a vague Italian whose commercial notepaper blazons to the world the proud fact that he is a company with a capital of 30,000 fr. This individual chartered the steamship "Maltana," a small cargo boat flying the British flag. In order to attract passengers he issued tickets at an absurdly low rate, carefully hiding from the pilgrims the information that canal dues and quarantine dues were not included. On arrival at Jeddah the pilgrims refused to pay, while the local authorities refused to allow the pilgrims to disembark until the charterer, who was on board, or the captain had handed over the amount of the dues. The charterer professed to have no money either in Jeddah or in Tunis. Eventually, after forty-eight hours' wrangling, during which time the charterer rightly went in fear of his life, the pilgrims were induced to pay, as therein lay their only hope of being allowed to land. As the "Maltana" sails under the British flag, this agency was dragged into the dispute.

9. It was a disappointment to hear early in the season that, in spite of the very strongly worded protests of all holders of this post against the gross mismanagement of the pilgrim traffic by Messrs. Nemazee's, this incompetent firm was still carrying on. The worst fears were justified. It was learnt that Nemazee was bankrupt, and that one of his ships was seized in India. Messrs. Turner Morrison, whose tickets and those of Nemazee's were issued as interchangeable, repudiated the arrangement from the 2nd May, and are endeavouring to make the effect of their repudiation retroactive. The ships appear to have passed out of Nemazee's control into that of Shirazi, a tea merchant. When this news was received one of the ships had been in port for some seven weeks, had few stores left, little coal and no money. Another, which had proceeded to Port Sudan to coal, had no money to pay and no credit, and was detained there. The third ship had insufficient coal with which to proceed to Bombay. The masters of the ships are now in communication with the new owners, and it is hoped that they will be in a position to embark pilgrims and proceed to India without undue delay after the Haj. If Nemazee's, or rather Shiraz's, arrangements do not further break down, all Indian pilgrims other than Shustari ticket holders should be evacuated by the middle of July. Shustari have again succeeded in bringing over 6,000 pilgrims, and have only two ships available for their transport. Three voyages will therefore be necessary, and it is foreseen that fines in respect of detention will again have to be levied.

10. The total number of Malays who performed the Haj this year was only 4,400, and no difficulty will be experienced in evacuating them.

11. Among distinguished pilgrims this season was Sheikh Omer-bin-Awad, the Sultan of Mokalla, who arrived in Jeddah on the 19th May. He was officially met by a representative of the Government and of this agency, and a guard of honour was provided for him on the quay. He has been entertained during his stay in the Hejaz as a Royal guest, all arrangements for his housing and transport being made

by the Government. He is accompanied by a photographer. He insisted, indeed, on being photographed in "Ihram" with members of the agency staff, a most unorthodox procedure.

12. The embroidered portion of the Kiswa prepared in India to complete the covering of the Kaaba woven in Mecca in substitution for the Egyptian Mahmal arrived in Jeddah on the 18th May on the steamship "Englestan." The party in charge of this "Indian Mahmal" consisted, among others, of Abdul Qader Qusuri and Daud Ghaznavi.

13. Arrangements for transporting pilgrims by car to Mecca and Medina have on the whole been satisfactory from the point of view of the pilgrims, though owners are less well satisfied. Competition has kept prices down, and only rarely has the full Government rate been charged. There have been signs of restiveness among the camel men on several occasions. A rumour was, indeed, current that Ibn Saud had been obliged to decide on a further limitation of the number of cars authorised to carry pilgrims in order to content the camel men. Another solution was, however, found, an addition of £1 being made to the charge for camel hire from Mecca to Arafat.

14. Two Soviet pilgrim ships arrived in Jeddah during the month. On the later arrival was Naum Belkin, on his way, it is understood, to Shiraz, where he is proceeding on a commercial mission. On the first ship was one Husseinoff, charged with the duty of putting into order the affairs of the so-called Russo-Turkish Trading Society, a concern set up to deal with the merchandise discharged from the "Tomp." More flour and sugar were brought by the Soviet ships, but, although a special price was quoted and special terms offered, no sales have as yet been completed. Husseinoff is to be allowed by the Government three weeks in which to finish his work, after which he must leave.

15. The number of slaves who took refuge in this agency during the period under review was five, all of whom have been repatriated to the Sudan.

[E 3383/80/91]

No. 3.

Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Sloops, to Admiralty.—(Communicated to Foreign Office July 5, 1928.)

(Unnumbered.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

ZEIDI troops have counter-attacked Suleik, but have been repulsed by local tribesmen. My meeting with Italian ship "A 210," which is at Hodeidah in readiness to evacuate Italian community if necessary, was very cordial. Scrupulously correct attitude adopted by British Aden authorities towards Italian representations there throughout dispute with the Imam of the Yemen over raids into the protectorate is appreciated by the Italian authorities.

[E 3391/80/91]

No. 4.

Memorandum communicated by Italian Ambassador, July 6.

(Translation.)

ON the 27th June last the Imam Yahia telegraphed to the Governor of Eritrea, emphasising his pacific intentions and drawing attention to the attitude of prudence and patience of which he had given proof; he complained that his conduct had not been appreciated by the English, who had continued to carry out air raids over the Yemen, terrorising the population, killing unarmed persons and destroying the houses of peaceful inhabitants. The Imam concludes his message with the following words:—

"I cherish the hope that the English will modify their attitude and will try to reach a direct understanding with us without any intermediaries. Notwithstanding our indignation and our consciousness of our own power, we will continue to maintain our present policy and attitude of prudence. We are informing your Excellency of the situation in accordance with the spirit of close friendship which exists between us, and we feel sure that your Excellency will believe our declarations."

Italian Embassy, London, July 5, 1928.

[E 3463/2068/91]

No. 5.

Sir G. Clayton to Colonial Office.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, July 11.)

Sir,

July 10, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to refer to Colonial Office letter of the 17th April, 1928, relating to the negotiations which I was appointed to conduct with His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies, and to submit my report on the progress and the results of my mission.

2. I left London on the 19th April, accompanied by Flight-Lieutenant G. M. Moore, M.C., and arrived in Alexandria on the 24th April. I was met by Mr. G. Antonius, C.B.E., Assistant Secretary to the Palestine Government, and proceeded on the same day to Cairo, where I was met by Mr. B. H. Bourdillon, C.M.G., counsellor to the Residency in Bagdad, Mr. K. Cornwallis, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior in Iraq, and Captain J. B. Glubb, O.B.E., M.C., Administrative Inspector in the Iraq Government Service.

3. I spent two days in Cairo, during which I had the advantage of conversation with Lord Lloyd, and also with Mr. Bourdillon, who had been specially deputed by the High Commissioner for Iraq to acquaint me more fully with his views on the subject-matter of the negotiations. Mr. Bourdillon left for Bagdad on the 26th April, and on the same day I left for Port Said with Captain Glubb and Flight-Lieutenant Moore and embarked on the steamship "Chindwin" for Port Sudan. Mr. Cornwallis and Mr. Antonius joined the "Chindwin" at Suez, as did also Mr. A. Antippa, of the Palestine Service, who had been lent as stenographer to the mission.

4. The mission reached Port Sudan on the afternoon of the 30th April and sailed at noon on the following day on board H.M.S. "Dahlia" (Commander H. Cotton, R.N.), arriving at Jeddah at 10 A.M. on the 2nd May. On arrival, I was informed that the King had been delayed in Buraida and could not reach Jeddah till the end of that week. His Majesty passed through Jeddah on the 5th May on his way to Mecca, where he had to pay the customary ritual visit, and returned to Jeddah on the morning of the 7th. At 10.30 A.M. on that day he received me with the other members of the mission in formal audience, and it was then arranged that negotiations should be opened on the following day.

5. Accordingly, the first meeting took place at 8 A.M. on Tuesday, the 8th May. Negotiations were formally opened at that meeting and continued with little intermission until Sunday, the 20th May. Twelve meetings were held, at which both His Majesty and myself were present, and a detailed summary of the conversations will be found in the enclosed Record of Proceedings (Annexure 1*). Concurrently with my conversations with the King, Mr. Cornwallis held a series of meetings in committee with His Majesty's advisers (see enclosed memorandum and minutes, Annexure 2), at which the subsidiary questions affecting Iraq were discussed. As soon as these were over, a further series of meetings were held by Mr. Antonius in committee with the King's advisers, at which questions affecting Transjordan were dealt with (see enclosed memorandum, Annexure 3).

6. The first question which came up for discussion was, naturally, that of the desert posts and the incidents connected therewith. The King seized the earliest opportunity of defining his attitude, and from that attitude, as defined by him at our first meeting, he never receded. The deadlock to which our conversations carried us may be said virtually to have been reached at the end of the second meeting, when I had communicated to him the views of His Majesty's Government. My first task in this report will be to set forth, as briefly as possible, the main points of the attitude taken up by the King, together with an outline of the course which I adopted to meet his arguments.

7. It will be remembered that the immediate cause of the present dispute was the construction by the Iraq Government of a post at Busaiya, which is a water-point in the desert, at a distance of some 75 miles from the Iraq-Nejd frontier and 55 miles from the nearest point in the neutral zone. On various grounds the King objected to the construction of that post, and in support of his objection invoked article 3 of the first Protocol of Uqair, which reads as follows:—

"The two Governments mutually agree not to use the watering-places and wells situated in the vicinity of the border for any military purpose, such as building forts on them, and not to concentrate troops in their vicinity."

* Annexures not printed.

[19083]

B 3

The Iraq Government, on the other hand, rejected Ibn Saud's contention, and held that the above clause could not by any reasonable interpretation be regarded as applying to Busaiya.

8. In order fully to appreciate the King's attitude on this point, it will be necessary to relate his version of the circumstances in which the first Protocol of Uqair was drawn up. This protocol was signed at Uqair on the 2nd December, 1922, as an appendix to the Muhammara Convention of May 1922, in which provision was made for the fixing of a frontier between Iraq and Nejd. Ibn Saud alleges that his delegates at Muhammara had signed the convention in error; that he (Ibn Saud) had steadfastly refused to ratify it on the ground that a hard-and-fast frontier in mid-desert would be contrary to all the established usages of nomadic life; that he had repeatedly pointed out at the time that such a frontier, with its inevitable corollaries in the form of posts and fortifications in the open desert, would be repugnant to his tribes; and that he had finally given his assent only when Sir Percy Cox had offered six months later at Uqair to insert a clause containing such guarantees as would meet his essential objections. Thus it was, according to Ibn Saud, that article 3 of the Protocol of Uqair came into being. He maintains that it was only because of his firm belief that that article was intended to prevent the erection of posts anywhere in the open desert on either side of the border that he consented to accept the frontier and ratify the convention.

9. I took the line that His Majesty's Government did not accept, and could not admit, his interpretation of article 3 of the Uqair Protocol; that they regarded the distance of Busaiya from the frontier to be such that it could not reasonably be held to lie "in the vicinity of the frontier"; and that they were bound to uphold the principle that the Iraq Government, as well as the Nejd Government, were at liberty to take such administrative measures within their own territory as seemed to them necessary for the better supervision of the desert. Throughout the conversations I abstained from embarking too far upon a discussion of the merits or demerits of the posts at Busaiya and elsewhere. I preferred to take my stand on the unassailable ground of a fixed principle, namely, that in the absence of any specific undertaking to the contrary, the sovereign right of each Government to take such internal measures as it thought necessary was one which His Majesty's Government were determined to uphold.

10. Eventually, I came to the conclusion that not only was Ibn Saud unwilling on grounds of general policy to give way on the question of the posts, but also that he was precluded from doing so by the attitude of his people. I used every means of persuasion and pressure at my disposal, and when these failed, I decided to recommend, as an alternative to rupture, that the negotiations be suspended. The advent of the pilgrimage celebrations which were requiring the King's presence at Mecca for over a month made it necessary to bring our conversations to a close in any case. Ibn Saud accepted my suggestion, and he also agreed to a formal exchange of letters (see Annexure 4) in which a peaceful *modus vivendi* was laid down between Iraq and Nejd for the duration of the period of suspension. He insisted, however, on one stipulation, namely, that, in view of the fact that he had to return to Nejd by the middle of August, and that he was pledged to communicate the result of his negotiations to his people on his return, our conversations would have to be resumed or definitely broken off by that date.

11. Before a decision can be reached as to whether or not conversations should be resumed, due consideration should be given to the three points put forward by Ibn Saud as a basis for a settlement. The first relates to the posts themselves. To the last, Ibn Saud maintained that the demolition of the posts at Busaiya, Salman and Shabaika and the withdrawal of their garrisons were a *sine qua non* for the restoration of peace on the border. He argued that the habits and the mentality of the nomad tribes were such that the erection of a post at a water-point in the desert, even if built for peaceful purposes, was equivalent in their minds to a denial, or, at any rate, a serious restriction of access to the water. He gave me to understand in the most friendly but explicit terms that, if the posts were maintained, he would have to decline all responsibility for the maintenance of peace. His tone was never offensive or minatory, but was consistently firm. He kept repeating that it was precisely the question of desert fortifications which had dictated his refusal to ratify the Muhammara Convention, until Sir Percy Cox had offered him a guarantee against the construction of posts in the desert. He stated on more than one occasion that if doubt were cast on the validity of his interpretation of article 3 of the Protocol of Uqair, he would beg His Majesty's Government to search among their records of

what took place at the Conference of Uqair in order to verify the accuracy of his contention. He declared that he, for his part, was prepared to offer his records for inspection.

12. The second relates to the incursions into Nejd of cars and aeroplanes from Iraq. The King contended that the mere crossing of the frontier by forces from Iraq was a breach of his sovereignty as recognised in the Treaty of Jeddah and a violation of article 6 of the Bahra Agreement.* He argued that the action of the cars and aeroplanes had so inflamed his people that even those whom he had detailed to punish the authors of the attack on Busaiya had turned on him and loudly demanded reprisals. It was then, and only then, that a movement began which led to the concentration of some 60,000 men from all tribes, even the most law-abiding, for a retaliatory attack on Iraq, which only with the greatest trouble he had succeeded in preventing. He demanded an explicit assurance in writing from His Majesty's Government to the effect that article 6 included Imperial as well as Iraqi forces.

13. The third relates to the question of the surrender of fugitives from justice. Ibn Saud holds that discipline cannot be effectively enforced in the open desert so long as culprits are at liberty to cross the frontier and take refuge in an adjoining territory where his forces are precluded (by article 6 of the Bahra Agreement) from pursuing them. He had always felt, and now more than ever, that it was essential for the proper enforcement of discipline that the Governments of Iraq and Nejd should mutually undertake to surrender fugitives from justice, and he pressed that an agreement to that effect should be the condition of any settlement.

14. I am unable to tell with any certainty to what extent Ibn Saud's account of the origin of article 3 tallies with the facts. His version of what had taken place at Uqair was detailed and circumstantial, and left me with the impression that he may have genuinely understood the provisions of article 3 to entail a wider application than is warranted by the facts. On the other hand, it may be that his version is only in part correct, and that, being made wise by recent events on the frontier, he has amplified it in an endeavour to strengthen his case before His Majesty's Government and his position towards his own people.

15. On one point, however, Ibn Saud appears to have some justification for his somewhat sweeping interpretation of the phrase "in the vicinity of the frontier." In the Arabic text, the corresponding phrase is "ala atraf al-hudud," and I am informed on reliable authority that this Arabic expression is capable of a wider application than its English counterpart. "Ala atraf" means, literally, "on the sides of" or "at the extremities of"; and I am credibly informed that, to the Arab reader who has no English, the phrase might and probably would convey a wide connotation than can reasonably be read into the English phrase. It should be noted, moreover, that no provision is made in the Muhammara Convention or in either of the two protocols, for priority to be given to the English text, in cases of divergence between the English and the Arabic versions.

16. My own conclusions are that, whatever justification Ibn Saud may have for insisting on his interpretation of article 3, it is, nevertheless, essential that the principle to which I have referred in paragraph 9 above should be upheld. I am not convinced that the permanent security of the south-western confines of Iraq can best be ensured by a chain of far-flung posts in the open desert, or that the task of defending Iraq will eventually be most easily and economically performed by the construction of a system of posts, the mere presence of which is bound to give rise to effervescence in Nejd. The fact cannot be overlooked that, even since the conclusion of the Bahra Agreement in November 1925, there has been a remarkable absence of raids from Nejd into Iraq, and that it was precisely the construction of the post at Busaiya that excited the Nejd tribes to break the peace. Nevertheless, I have no doubt that on the principle of the sovereign right of the Iraq Government to take whatever defensive measures it may think fit, no concession whatever should be made.

17. On the other hand, I am of opinion that it would be neither fair nor expedient to ignore altogether the arguments put forward by Ibn Saud or to under-rate the difficulties of his position. His account of the genesis of article 3 of the Protocol of Uqair and of the meaning which it has always conveyed to his mind seems to me to bear the mark of genuineness. The loose rendering of the phrase "in the vicinity of the frontier," for which there exist exact Arabic equivalents, has served only to lend justification to his reading of the clause in question. It is a matter for regret that no records are available other than those kept by Ibn Saud, of the

* Article 6 of the Bahra Agreement reads: "The forces of Iraq and Nejd may not cross the common frontier in the pursuit of offenders except with the consent of both Governments."

proceedings of Uqair. In the absence of any such record and of any authoritative check on the accuracy or inaccuracy of Ibn Saud's account, it would, I submit, be unfair to reject it as altogether unacceptable. It would also be inexpedient, since it would be regarded by Ibn Saud as an arbitrary dismissal of the case which he has put forward, and which cannot in fairness be said to be wholly unjustified.

18. I venture therefore to recommend that due consideration be given to the possibility of replying to Ibn Saud on lines which, while safeguarding the point of principle and upholding the sovereign rights of the Iraq Government, might yet contain some concession of a nature to allay the effervescence prevailing in Nejd and to encourage him in his efforts to keep the peace. I am of opinion, that, just as we have a duty towards Iraq in maintaining the prestige and the interests of the ruler and Government of that country, so we owe it to Ibn Saud, who has hitherto displayed a scrupulous respect for treaties and a remarkable determination to keep to his pledged word, to go as far towards easing the difficult situation he is in as is compatible with the maintenance of a fixed principle. If it be found possible to offer him some concession, not on the principle of the right to construct posts but on the actual programme of their location and construction, then I believe that it would be in the best interests of all the parties concerned to aim at a settlement on those lines.

19. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that the bare rejection of Ibn Saud's representations might make it impossible for him to continue to exercise a moderating influence on his tribes. Without accepting all his statements at their face value, I feel that, unless he is offered some tangible concession which might enable him to continue his efforts for peace on the border, there is a risk of the situation in Nejd getting out of hand. I have no means by which I can gauge with any accuracy the magnitude of this risk and of its consequences, but that it exists I do not doubt, any more than I doubt this adverse effect on Ibn Saud himself of what might seem to him to be a wholesale rejection of his representations.

20. I have hitherto confined myself to those representations of Ibn Saud which relate to article 3 of the Protocol of Uqair. There were two other points which he put forward as being essential to any lasting settlement, and to which I have already referred in paragraphs 12 and 13 above. The first, which relates to the definition of article 6 of the Bahra Agreement, presents no difficulty. It was generally understood, at the time of the conclusion of the Bahra Agreement, that the term "forces" which occurs in article 6 applied to all the regular forces of either Government. Ibn Saud's request for an assurance that the term must be held, as far as Iraq is concerned, to include Imperial as well as Iraqi forces is therefore a proper one. But I venture to recommend, since the question has arisen in this form, that the opportunity be seized of obtaining a similar assurance on Ibn Saud's part as to the precise meaning of the term when applied to the forces of Nejd. It is a matter of common knowledge that Ibn Saud does not maintain a regular standing army, and that he relies, for the purposes of military action, on the armed contingents of Ikhwan, which his tribes are able from time to time to supply. I think it advisable, in order to preclude the possibility of equivocation on his part in the future, to obtain from him an acceptable definition of what must be held to constitute the "forces" of Nejd, similar to that which he asks for from Iraq.

21. A clear misunderstanding on this point is the more desirable in view of the attitude which I took up when replying to Ibn Saud's protest against the violation of his frontier by aeroplanes and armoured cars. In this connexion, I refused to recognise the affair at Busaiya as a raid within the meaning of the Bahra Agreement, but maintained that it was a premeditated attack by armed tribesmen who belonged to the very elements which constituted the fighting forces of Nejd, on an official post within the territory of a friendly State; and that this attack amounted in itself to a violation of the provisions of article 6 of the Bahra Agreement, and had led to a situation in which His Majesty's Government were forced to take adequate measures for the defence of Iraq.

22. The other point (see paragraph 13 above) relates to the surrender of refugee offenders. This is not a new theme, and reference to my report on the negotiations at Bahra will show that Ibn Saud's request had been rejected in deference to the views of the Iraq Government. I have been given to understand, however, that the Iraq Government would be willing to reconsider their attitude on this matter.

23. The exchange of notes laying down the agreed terms of suspension of conversations was nearly prevented by an unfortunate development four days previous to my departure. Draft notes had been agreed upon in conversation and Ibn Saud had left for Mecca, but before they could be officially exchanged I received an

indignant letter from Ibn Saud dated the 22nd May, supplemented by a verbal statement conveyed to me by his advisers. The gist of these communications was to the effect that Ibn Saud had just received a detailed and circumstantial report informing him that on the 25th or 26th April eight armoured cars had visited Aiwij and tried to persuade tribes to migrate into Iraq; that a few days later three aeroplanes had flown over Lina and dropped bombs; and that on or about the same date other aeroplanes had flown over the Bashuk area.

24. Ibn Saud's letter of the 22nd May is attached to this report (Annexure 7), but in his verbal protest, which was couched in much stronger terms, he stated that:—

- (a.) He wished His Majesty's Government to enquire fully into the causes of the incursion which had taken place after peaceful conversations had been agreed upon and even after my departure from London, and to fix the blame upon those responsible.
- (b.) He did not wish it thought that mere compensation would satisfy him.
- (c.) He reserved all his rights until a satisfactory explanation had been furnished.
- (d.) He made this communication verbally, as he did not wish to embarrass me more than he could help.

25. It was obvious that Ibn Saud was incensed to such a degree as to make it certain that, unless he received some satisfaction, he would refuse to sign the conditions of suspension, and thus involve a definite rupture. I therefore wrote to him on the same day (see my letter of the 22nd May, Annexure 7) agreeing that any such incidents as those of which he complained would be contrary to the spirit of our negotiations, and promising to report the matter without delay with a view to obtaining explanations and further information. In the meantime, I telegraphed to the High Commissioner at Bagdad to request a statement of the facts (see my telegram No. 69 of the 22nd May, Annexure 7). On the following day I received a reply from Sir Henry Dobbs, from which it appeared that, although no bombs had been dropped and explanations of the action taken were given in detail, the frontier had in fact been crossed on the occasions mentioned (see Sir H. Dobbs's telegram No. 925 of the 23rd May, Annexure 7). Ibn Saud's main complaint, to the effect that his frontier had been violated afresh, even after peaceful negotiations had been mutually agreed upon, was thus shown to be based on fact, and, in view of his extreme indignation and the critical nature of the situation thereby created, I was convinced that to put forward the High Commissioner's explanation and arguments at that moment would be worse than useless and would probably make a rupture inevitable. I therefore added nothing further to my letter of the 23rd May, which at least had the result of easing the situation sufficiently to secure Ibn Saud's signature to the conditions of suspension (see my unnumbered telegram, Annexure 7).

26. Ibn Saud will doubtless raise the question again when we resume conversations, and I shall have to give him an answer. I suggest, in that event, furnishing him with the explanations supplied by the High Commissioner of Iraq. These explanations, however, are not likely to satisfy him, and in all the circumstances I am of opinion that it would be proper, and most certainly politic, to accompany them by a suitably worded expression of regret.

27. During the course of our conversations I made it clear to Ibn Saud that the Iraq Government would require to be compensated for the lives and property destroyed in the attack on Busaiya Post, and would also expect that the loss of life and live-stock occasioned to Iraq tribesmen by the subsequent raids should be made good in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Bahra Agreement. His Majesty did not make any direct reply to this statement, and I did not think it advisable to pursue the question pending settlement of the main point of difference; but his advisers made it quite clear that the Nejd Government proposed to submit a heavy counter-claim in respect of losses suffered by Nejd tribesmen during the course of the operations carried out by the Royal Air Force.

28. I shall now proceed to report on the progress made in the discussion of the subsidiary questions. In paragraphs 14 to 24 of your letter under reference, mention is made of seven questions affecting the relations of Ibn Saud with His Majesty's Government. The first relates to Italy's new position in Arabia. On that subject I had a long conversation with the King, which is summarised in the Record of Proceedings (Annexure 2, minutes of ninth meeting), and more fully reported in the despatch which I shall have the honour to address to you separately.

29. The second relates to the position of the Shereefian rulers of Iraq and Transjordan and their traditional hostility to Ibn Saud. This question, which has

long been a thorn in the latter's side, was frequently touched upon by him in our conversations. At the very first meeting I had with him, he gave bitter expression to his conviction that the scheming hand of King Feisal could be detected behind the present trouble, and that the dropping of warning notices and bombs had been cleverly prompted by the King of Iraq, who was a past-master in the art of alienating Arab tribes and undermining his (Ibn Saud's) ascendancy over them. I felt it necessary, there and then, to interrupt the King and give him a polite hint that, while I was always ready to lend a sympathetic ear to his grievances, I was not prepared to listen to aspersions on King Feisal's character, which seemed to me to exceed the bounds of legitimate criticism. I also gave him to understand, on more than one occasion, that the attitude and policy of His Majesty's Government towards himself were in no way influenced by the personal feelings of King Feisal and the Amir Abdullah. Whatever the effect of my words may have been, I failed to see any indication of a change in Ibn Saud's attitude, or in his conviction that the Hashimite brothers were at the bottom of all his tribulations with His Majesty's Government.

30. The next four questions, namely, those relating to—

- (i) the activities of Bolshevik agents in the Hejaz,
- (ii) the Hejaz Railway,
- (iii) the abolition of Capitulations in the Hejaz,
- (iv) the Haramain Waqfa,

were not brought up by Ibn Saud or by his advisers for discussion, and I abstained from taking the initiative of broaching them. From a perusal of the files at the British Agency, it was clear that Mr. Stonehewer-Bird had all the required information at his disposal and was in a position to deal with the questions if and when they were raised by Ibn Saud.

31. The seventh question, which formed the subject of paragraphs 20 to 24 of your letter under reference relates to the appointment of an arbitrator to adjudicate upon past raids across the Nejd-Transjordan frontier, and of a permanent raids officer to supervise the occurrence of future raids. This question was discussed at my seventh meeting with the King (see Annexure 2, minutes of seventh meeting). His Majesty informed me that he was still in favour of the appointment of a British arbitrator, but that for various reasons he felt compelled to insist on certain conditions prior to the appointment of the arbitrator. On my suggestion, it was agreed that the matter be fully discussed between his advisers and Mr. Antonius in committee. A series of committee meetings then took place of which the proceedings are summarised in the memorandum drawn up by Mr. Antonius (see Annexure 3).

32. As will be seen from that memorandum, Ibn Saud is now pressing for the laying down of terms of reference designed to define the powers and duties of the arbitrator. His proposals seem to me to be on the whole fair and acceptable, and in this view I am supported by Lord Plumer and the British Resident at Amman with whom I discussed the matter fully during my brief stay in Jerusalem. But there is one clause in the terms of reference which appears to me to be unacceptable, namely, clause 5, which purports to exclude from the purview of the arbitration all past claims which were not officially registered at the time or soon after the occurrence of the raid. I am of opinion, and Lord Plumer concurs, that the adoption of this clause would mean that one of the two parties (in this case, Transjordan), is to be deprived of a fair hearing on grounds of the omission of a formality which was not specifically laid down in the Hadda Agreement, and which would amount to an improper restriction of the discretion of the arbitrator, who should alone decide whether a particular claim is worthy of being heard.

33. The King pressed insistently for the adoption of that clause, and his advisers informed Mr. Antonius that, unless it were inserted, he could not see his way to assent to the proposed arbitration. I refused to give way on that point, and in view of the King's insistence it was not possible to arrive at a final agreement on the terms of the proposed arbitration.

34. I would recommend, as a possible way out of the difficulty, that I should be authorised to inform His Majesty that, although His Majesty's Government cannot admit a condition of that nature which they regard as unnecessary and improper, they are prepared to give him an assurance to the effect that his views on that point would be fully communicated to the arbitrator. I would also recommend that the agreement to be arrived at prior to the appointment of the arbitrator should be recorded, not in a separate instrument as Ibn Saud proposes, but in an exchange of

notes. If this is approved, I should propose to address identical notes to the two Governments stating the conditions on which the arbitrator is to be appointed and asking each Government to inform me of its willingness to accept those conditions and abide by the terms of the adjudication.

35. The cognate question of the appointment of a permanent raids officer was discussed at the following meeting (see Annexure 2, minutes of eighth meeting). I explained to the King the reasons why it had not been found practicable to adopt his former proposal. He saw the force of my explanations and declared himself in favour of postponing the consideration of this question until the proposed arbitration had materialised and effected a liquidation of past raids.

36. In a second letter from you bearing the same number and date as your letter under reference, mention is made of two other questions. The first relates to the attack committed in February last by Ruwala tribesmen, led by Farhan-bin-Mashur, on certain sections of the Bani Sahkr tribes. In compliance with your instructions I informed Ibn Saud that His Majesty's Government appreciated his attitude on that point and hoped that he would effect a settlement fully compensating the Bani Sahkr tribes for their losses. Before I left Jeddah, however, I received a verbal message from the King, who was then at Mecca, to the effect that news had just been received of a series of raids committed by Transjordan tribes on tribes in the Wadi Sirhan who were subject to him. I was not in a position to confirm or contradict the news, nor was I able when I visited Jerusalem ten days later to obtain any confirmation. I am given to understand, however, that news has since been received from Transjordan which tends to confirm the accuracy of Ibn Saud's information. If that is so, perhaps you will think it fit to convey to Ibn Saud an assurance that the Transjordan Government will take prompt and adequate measures to deal with the situation created by the raids on his tribes.

37. The second question relates to the air-route along the south-western coast of the Persian Gulf and the supply of British pilots and mechanics to organise and operate Ibn Saud's air service. On this question I made no attempt to approach Ibn Saud. No settlement in regard to the main object of my mission having been arrived at, I did not judge it desirable to broach the question, even tentatively.

38. In your letter No. 59092/28 of the 18th April, mention is made of a proposal put forward by the High Commissioner for Iraq, for a revised interpretation of article 5 of the Bahra Agreement. This matter was discussed at Jeddah and Ibn Saud signified his agreement to the principle of the revised interpretation as proposed by the High Commissioner for Iraq and concurred in by the High Commissioner for Transjordan. In view, however, of the deadlock on the main question, it was not possible to secure Ibn Saud's final assent to this proposal.

39. On his side, the King put forward a proposal for the conclusion of a *bon voisinage* agreement, which was fully discussed between his advisers and the Iraq delegates. Similar discussions took place on the subject of the proposed extradition agreement, on the basis of the draft brought by Mr. Cornwallis and approved by the Council of Ministers in Bagdad. The proceedings and the progress made with regard to both agreements are fully reported in Annexure 2, while the texts of the relevant drafts will be found in Annexures 5 and 6. I am of opinion that the conclusion of two such agreements would be a distinct step forward in the direction of improving the relations between Iraq and Nejd. I would also recommend that efforts be made to obtain the assent of the Transjordan Government to the conclusion of two similar agreements between Transjordan and Nejd. Lord Plumer, with whom I discussed this matter in Jerusalem, declared himself thoroughly in favour of my proposal.

40. In the absence, however, of an amicable settlement on the major question of the posts, I do not anticipate that Ibn Saud would consent at this stage to the conclusion of either of the proposed agreements. But this contingency need not deter the Iraq Government from drawing up their own proposals in the light of Mr. Cornwallis's report to them: so that, in the event of my mission being sent out to resume negotiations with Ibn Saud, I might find it possible to carry discussions a stage further towards finality.

41. One other question was brought up by Ibn Saud, namely, the appointment of accredited Nejd representatives in the mandated territories of Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan. His Majesty gave me to understand that he was dissatisfied with the growing number of contentious disputes, mostly of a trivial nature, which arose between Nejd trading caravans and petty officials in Transjordan and Palestine. He also felt the need of a tactful and reliable person to represent him and defend his interests before the Governments of Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan. Another

reason which had prompted this proposal on His Majesty's part was his dissatisfaction with the delays which often took place in the exchange of letters and messages. He proposed that a fully accredited representative should be appointed by him to Bagdad, and another to Jerusalem. The latter's credentials would cover both Palestine and Transjordan.

42. On this question, too, I am of opinion that the adoption of Ibn Saud's proposals would be a step in the right direction. I am informed by Mr. Antonius that the High Commissioner for Palestine is prepared to assent to the appointment of a Nejd representative in Jerusalem. It would be desirable that the views of the Iraq Government on this matter be ascertained at an early opportunity. The appointment of a Nejd representative in Bagdad would entail the prior recognition by Iraq of Ibn Saud as King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its dependencies, and there is reason to believe that King Feisal would not readily assent to the granting of such recognition. It cannot be denied, on the other hand, that the formal recognition of the *de facto* sovereign of an adjoining country with which Iraq is in friendly treaty relations cannot be indefinitely withheld without prejudice to good relations between the two countries, and it is a matter for consideration whether the present crisis does not afford a suitable opportunity to grant Ibn Saud the recognition on which he not unnaturally lays great stress. In this connexion I would point out that Ibn Saud's proposal for the conclusion of a *bon voisinage* agreement will stand or fall according as the desired recognition is granted, or withheld.

43. On the 20th May, the King proceeded to Mecca after a formal farewell meeting at the Mission House on the afternoon of that day. His principal advisers remained in Jeddah, where two or three meetings were held daily with them. On the 22nd May, Mr. Cornwallis and Captain Glubb sailed for Egypt where they returned to Bagdad by air. On the 25th May, I sailed from Jeddah on board H.M.S. "Dahlia" for Port Sudan, with Mr. Antonius and Flight-Lieutenant Moore, and on the morning of our arrival in Port Sudan, I left for Cairo by the overland route. On the day of my arrival in Cairo (the 31st May), I proceeded to Jerusalem where I conferred with the High Commissioner and the British Resident, Amman, on the matters affecting Transjordan. After a stay of two days in Jerusalem, I proceeded with Mr. Antonius and Flight-Lieutenant Moore to Port Said where we embarked on the P. and O. steamship "Naldera."

44. I cannot close this report without expressing the gratitude of myself and the members of the mission to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Nejd and to the officials of his Government for their unvarying courtesy and consideration. Our conversations were conducted throughout in an atmosphere of amity and mutual confidence, and everything possible was done for our comfort and convenience.

Mr. Stonehewer-Bird and his staff gave us every help and I should like especially to mention Mr. Seagar and Mr. Thacker of the consular staff, on whom the presence of the mission threw considerable extra work.

The presence of Mr. Cornwallis and Captain Glubb was of great assistance. Their knowledge of local conditions in Iraq was always at my disposal and I feel that it is of value for the future that they should have had the opportunity of making personal acquaintance with Ibn Saud and his advisers.

The course of the conversations was not such as to afford a favourable opportunity of discussing questions immediately concerning the Air Ministry, so that Flight-Lieutenant Moore's services were not utilised to the full. At the same time, I found his knowledge and experience of desert conditions and tribal matters in Iraq of great value.

I have to thank the Palestine Government for lending the services of Mr. A. Antippa as clerk to the mission. He was both efficient and indefatigable and performed his somewhat arduous duties to my entire satisfaction in conditions of some discomfort and inconvenience.

I can only say of Mr. George Antonius that, as on previous missions of a similar character, his unique knowledge of Arab psychology, his sound judgment and his unrivalled linguistic qualifications were placed unsparingly at my disposal. His services have been invaluable not only in the conduct of the conversations, both with Ibn Saud and his advisers, but in the preparation of this report.

I have, &c.

G. F. CLAYTON.

[E 3412/1/91]

No. 6.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Stonehewer-Bird (Jeddah).

(No. 34.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, July 11, 1928.

YOUR telegram No. 61 of 1st July: Protest of Hejazi Minister for Foreign Affairs against speech by Nuri Pasha.

You may inform Dr. Damluji of the true nature of the statement made by Nuri Pasha, as indicated in Bagdad telegram to you No 112 S. You should point out that the statement was made solely in order to show the Iraq Parliament that it might perhaps be necessary to spend the full sum voted for defence if the negotiations at Jeddah unfortunately failed to produce the favourable effects hoped for. The very fact that expenditure on defence measures has been suspended is clear evidence of the desire of the Iraq Government for an amicable understanding.

[E 3496/677/91]

No. 7.

Mr. Stonehewer-Bird to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 13.)

(No. 93.)

Sir,

Jeddah, June 16, 1928.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 60 of 20th April, I have the honour to send herewith a second list of local notabilities.

2. No circulation of this despatch and its enclosures is being made from this post.

I have, &c.

F. H. W. STONEHEWER-BIRD.

Enclosure in No. 7.

Biographical Notes.

Sherif Sharaf Adnan.

Member of the Sherifian family at Mecca to which King Hussein belongs, but of the rival Dhawi Zeid section which was last in power in 1827. Has spent the greater part of his life in Constantinople. Arrived in the Hejaz after the fall of Mecca and became one of the advisers to the Emir Feisal. Deputed by Ibn Saud to go to Jizan in November 1927 to hear the dispute between the Idrissi and the Red Sea Petroleum Company over the Farsan Island concession—a task rather beyond him. Grizzled and doddering. (June 1928.)

Sherif Sharaf.

A member of the same faction of the Sherifian family as Sherif Sharaf Adnan, but has always lived in Mecca. Appears to have received from Ibn Saud the appointment of Financial Minister to the Hejaz on the strength of his anti-Hashimite fervour. No political influence. (June 1928.)

[E 3497/2806/91]

No. 8.

Mr. Stonehewer-Bird to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 13.)

(No. 94.)

Sir,

Jeddah, June 16, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to refer to Cairo despatch No. 409 of the 19th ultimo on the subject of two Egyptian missions to this country.

2. The first mission, under the leadership of Hamed-el-Bassel Pasha, came to the Hejaz, I understand, at the instigation of Hafiz Wahba. The latter, as has been previously reported, has been striving to regain prestige and favour with Ibn Saud. The object of the visit of these Egyptians appears to have been to pave the way for a rapprochement between the two countries.

3. The delegation has been well received. At a banquet given by the King to important pilgrims of all nationalities, Abdurrahman Azzam made a speech in which he sang the praises of Ibn Saud, and in which he expressed the hope that relations between the two countries would in future be of the closest and most friendly. The Egyptian people, he declared, were whole-heartedly pro-Ibn Saud. Ibn Saud, in his reply, pleaded for unity among all Moslem peoples. Abdurrahman Azzam's speech, as reported in the "Um-el-Qura," is transmitted herewith.

4. The second mission, under Kamel-el-Khoshem Bey, was concerned with the question of water supply for Mecca, and the utilisation for this purpose of Ain Zubeida. I have been told, though I cannot vouch for the accuracy of the information, that the Egyptian Government have agreed to carry out the work at their own expense, and that the funds saved by the non-despatch of the Mahmal will be devoted to this purpose.

5. Philby has been sent to Egypt by the King apparently in connexion with urban improvements in Mecca. The object of his visit was first given as being in connexion with the Mecca water supply and the purchase of the necessary machinery, but I am now informed that he is to find an engineer for the installation of electric light in Mecca.

6. A copy of this despatch and its enclosure is being addressed to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Egypt.

I have, &c.

F. H. W. STONEHEWER-BIRD.

Enclosure in No. 8.

Speech by Abdurrahman Bey Azzam.

Your Majesty,

THE happiness of Kings is dependent on the satisfaction of the Creator, and on their attracting the hearts of the people to them and gaining their love.

Kings formerly kept apart from the people, being afraid of them, and maintained bodyguards around them to avoid contact with the people.

When establishing their kingdoms in the height of their power, Kings kept apart from their people through pride and disdain. Again, when their power began to decline and when they became weak they avoided their people, being afraid of their anger. Nowadays they mix with them because they are afraid of them. But your Majesty mixes with the people in the height of your power, not fearing them, but following the Islamic rule. In reviving this tradition you have earned the thanks of Moslems, and we wish that other Kings would follow your good example. Undoubtedly such a course will bring back to Islam the age of its former brilliance and to the Arabs their great glory.

Your Majesty, the kingdom you established in Arabia is based on religion, and religion is the foundation of nations, especially in Arabia and amongst the Arabs, who cannot rise except through religion. There is no doubt that the kingdom your Majesty has established in the Arabian Peninsula, protected by religion and reinforced by the power of nationality, is thus a mighty country. We consider that this young country in the Arabian Peninsula is but the beginning of an era of deliverance for the Arabs and the Moslems, and of their freedom from weakness and subjection.

The rough nation of the Arabian Peninsula is the one which will carry the message once more to the civilised countries to save them from the depths of abasement. Whatever differences may exist on their points of view between the Moslems, the political hopes in their hearts and in those of the Arabs are centred in this young country under your Majesty.

Thus, although there is a small difference of opinion between us, let us suppose that the other side is in the right, for we ought to admit everything to your Majesty because the hopes of the Moslems and of the Arabs are laid on you, and because that peninsula, whose population is about 10 millions, is the one which will make those hopes a reality.

We trust that the former position may be restored, and that Egypt will again have its share in the making of the Holy Cover. The difference in views about such a matter should not be a cause for separation between Egypt and the Hejaz. The result of such a dispute would only be to give the stranger an opportunity to have power over us.

Your Majesty, I am a man who is known to have mixed with the people, and I am therefore qualified to judge the spirit of the Egyptian people. I can assure your Majesty that the Egyptians are glad because of your noble actions, and that a small difference of opinion will in no way affect the love which the Egyptians bear to you.

It gives us pleasure to note that for the first time in history the Hejaz has woven a cover for the Kaaba, although to the loss of the Egyptians.

We are glad because this action proves that the Arabs can do in one year what others could not do in many.

The Powers know that the Arab nation is one body in which every member can replace the other, and that all work in harmony together.

[E 3454/80/91]

No. 9.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to M. Bordonaro.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, July 13, 1928.

ON the 5th July you were so good as to communicate to this Department a memorandum giving the substance of a telegram received by the Governor of Eritrea from the Imam Yahia. Your Excellency added that M. Mussolini hoped that His Majesty's Government would be able to see their way to enter into negotiations with the Imam for a peaceful settlement of the frontier dispute.

2. I can at once assure you that His Majesty's Government have at all times been and are still anxious to reach an amicable understanding in connexion with their differences with the Imam, but, as will be readily understood, no settlement will be acceptable to them which does not take account of their obligations to the tribes in the Aden Protectorate. His Majesty's Government have on several occasions sent representatives to discuss the questions at issue with representatives of the Imam, and so recently as April last the Acting Resident at Aden visited Taiz for this purpose. On receiving the Acting Resident's report on these discussions His Majesty's Government caused the Imam to be informed that they were prepared to conclude a treaty providing for recognition by His Majesty's Government of the Imam's independence and for recognition by the Imam of the frontier between the Yemen and the Aden Protectorate, subject to the cession of certain territory to the Imam, and the truce was extended in order to give the Imam time to consider this proposal. The Imam, in reply, referred the Acting Resident to his officer at Taiz, who at the same time asked for a further extension of the truce. This request was acceded to on condition that, as an earnest of good faith, the town of Dhala was evacuated. The Imam refused to comply with this condition, and His Majesty's Government had therefore no alternative to the termination of the truce. His Majesty's Government will be prepared to enter into negotiations at any time, but, in view of the fact that the repeated and protracted efforts in the past have been entirely fruitless, they must insist upon first having some definite evidence that the Imam is prepared to recognise their position in the protectorate.

3. In pursuance of their desire to reach a settlement, the Acting Resident at Aden has now been instructed by telegram to inform the Imam that His Majesty's Government are still anxious to effect an amicable understanding of their differences with him; that no settlement would, however, be acceptable to them which does not take account of their obligations to the tribes in the protectorate; and that they are willing to grant him a truce on the same terms as have previously been intimated to him, a summary of which is given in the preceding paragraph. A solution of the present difficulties on these lines would be a source of much satisfaction to His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 3566/80/91]

No. 10.

Mr. Stonehewer-Bird to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 17.)

(No. 101.)

Sir,

Jeddah, June 26, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to report that the mission from the Imam Yahya to Ibn Saud, to which reference has been made in recent monthly reports, left Jeddah by Italian ship for the Yemen via Massowah on the 23rd instant.

2. In striking contrast to their reception on arrival in Mecca was the order of their departure. No representative of Ibn Saud or member of the Government went on board to bid them farewell. They were provided with second-class tickets and they took away with them no presents from the King.

3. Throughout the period of their stay in the Hejaz they were kept from all outside contact; even a representative of the Italian consulate sent to Mecca to greet them on arrival was unable to gain admission.

4. On their arrival in Jeddah the Italian consul expressed a desire to visit the mission. A time was fixed, but, on my colleague presenting himself at their quarters, the soldier on guard refused admittance on the score that the Yemenis were not at home. On my colleague stating that he knew this to be untrue, the guard gave vent to unseemly mirth. An apology was demanded by Dr. Cosano and readily accorded by Ibn Saud, who offered to place the offending soldier at his disposal to be dealt with as he thought fit, and gave instructions that the mission should be permitted to call at the Italian consulate immediately. They did so accompanied by a local official, whose presence effectually prevented the discussion of any matters of interest.

5. It seems fairly well established that the mission was fruitless, and that no agreement or understanding was reached on any of the points discussed.

6. Their departure coincided, I am informed on good authority, with the despatch of a fully armed force of some 500 men and a dozen machine guns to Asir. Whether Ibn Saud intends these men to stiffen his defensive forces in the south, or whether he wishes to take advantage of Zaranik disaffection to strike a blow at the Imam, it is not possible to state on the information available. There are reasons, however, why Ibn Saud might well think that the present moment not ill-chosen for a diversion in the south.

7. In the event of his being unable in his negotiations with Sir Gilbert Clayton to reach a solution calculated to satisfy his tribes, it would be useful for him to be in a position to divert their attention to matters of more immediate importance in the south and to provide them with an alternative raiding ground. The anxiety which he has recently displayed for Italian recognition may well arise out of his desire to be quite sure of his ground in that direction before moving against the Imam. I understand that he has received assurances that, in the event of a conflict between himself and the Imam, no Italian forces would assist the latter. He would, however, feel more confident if with these assurances he had obtained Italian recognition.

8. Copies of this despatch are being addressed to His Majesty's High Commissioners for Egypt and Iraq and to the Political Resident, Aden.

I have, &c.

F. H. W. STONEHEWER-BIRD.

[E 3661/484/91]

No. 11.

Mr. Stonehewer-Bird to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 105.)

Sir,

Jeddah, July 1, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz for the period the 1st to 30th June, 1928.

2. Copies of this report are being sent to Cairo, Jerusalem (2), Jerusalem for transmission to the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Trans-jordan, Bagdad, Aden, Beirut, Damascus, Simla, Khartum through Port Sudan, Singapore, Lagos (2).

I have, &c.

F. H. W. STONEHEWER-BIRD.

Enclosure in No. 11.

Jeddah Report, Period June 1-30, 1928.

THE Yemeni Mission referred to in paragraph 5 of last month's report left Jeddah on the 23rd instant. In striking contrast to their arrival in Mecca, when they were accorded a ceremonial reception and a special banquet was given in their honour, was their departure as second-class passengers on an Italian steamer, when not a member of the Hejaz Government was present to bid them farewell. They left also without presents. It is easy to deduce from this that the mission was a complete failure. The members of the mission were strictly isolated at Mecca; a member of my Italian colleague's staff sent to Mecca to greet them on their arrival was denied admission. The Italian consul did, however, eventually succeed in meeting them on the eve of their departure. It was arranged with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that he should call upon them at 3 P.M., but on arrival he was informed by the soldier on guard outside their house that they were not at home. On my Italian colleague's stating that he knew this to be false, the sentry gave way to unseemly mirth. In high dudgeon Dr. Cesano returned, demanded and received a prompt apology from the Mecca Foreign Office. The offending soldier was placed at his disposal to be beaten should he think fit in the precincts of the Italian consulate. This offer was declined. The mission was taken round to see Dr. Cesano by a local representative of the Government, whose presence effectually prevented any discussion of interest, though it was abundantly clear that the Yemenis were thoroughly disgruntled. On the day of their departure a report was received from a reliable source that a small force of 500 men fully armed had left Mecca for Asia with a quantity of ammunition and a dozen machine guns. This expedition, it is believed, may well be a reply to a request for assistance said to have been received by Ibn Saud from the Zaranik. The King may feel that the time is ripe for striking a blow at the Imam. Such a policy might, from his point of view, have much to recommend it, especially in the event of an unsuccessful issue to the Clayton conversations, as a means of diverting the attention of turbulent spirits in the north.

2. The Hejaz Government has during the past month protested against Transjordan in that from the 4th to the 20th May, at a period when conversations with Sir Gilbert Clayton were being held, several raids were perpetrated in Nejd territory. The return of the loot, the punishment of the offenders, and the payment of blood money is demanded. A speech by Noori Pasha, Minister of Defence in Iraq, has also called forth a strong protest. As reported in newspapers which have reached Jeddah, Noori Pasha, in the course of his statement on the budget of his Ministry, appears in his desire to justify increased expenditure on defence forces to have made somewhat unfortunate references to the Nejd peril, and to have stated that although sums voted for defence against the Wahabis were not yet expended, they might be necessary in the summer. The Hejaz Government have asked for an assurance that Noori Pasha's statement does not represent the views of His Majesty's Government or of Iraq.

3. The King is anxious for the early return of Sir Gilbert Clayton, as he is unable to postpone his departure for Nejd later than the 15th August. He had promised his sheikhs to return at that time and to explain to them the results of his conversations with the mission. Moreover, the death of his father, the Imam Abdurrahman, makes his presence in Nejd desirable at the earliest possible date. The Imam Abdurrahman died at Riyadh on the 2nd June, though the news of his death did not reach Mecca until the 12th June. Telegrams of condolence were received from His Majesty King Feisal of Iraq, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Egypt, and Sir Gilbert Clayton, among many others.

4. The King is leaving Mecca early in July to take up his residence at Taif. Conversations with the Clayton Mission on its return to the Hejaz will be held at Taif. Telephonic and telegraphic communication will be assured with Jeddah. Taif offers advantages over Jeddah as a venue for the negotiations, especially if Philby, whose presence is most undesirable, is unable to take up his residence there.

5. Philby paid a short visit to Egypt during last month at the King's expense. The object of his visit was to secure the services of a competent electrical engineer for the installation of a lighting set in the King's palace at Mecca. An Egyptian mission has been studying the possibilities of improving the water supply at Mecca, and some agreement seems to have been reached.

[19083]

6. The pilgrimage was successful this year, especially as regards the low mortality among pilgrims. Credit must be given to the Hejaz authorities, whose arrangements were far in advance of those of last year. Motor ambulances, well provided with water, were employed to pick up stragglers and sufferers from heat exhaustion or sunstroke. Many lives were saved in this way. The disposal of the dead and of sacrificial animals was also effected more competently this year. Sanitary conditions in Mecca and Jeddah still leave much to be desired, but the state of the houses and streets is largely due to the filthy habits of pilgrims themselves. There are some 1,400 Indian pilgrims lying in the streets awaiting shipment. The majority are, as usual, Nemazee ticket-holders. Fines for detention of pilgrims over twenty-five days became leviable as from the 29th June, and have been claimed from the shipping agents concerned for distribution among the pilgrims. A meeting was held by the leading pilgrims detained, and a resolution was passed to submit for the consideration of the Government of India certain changes in the present regulations. The pilgrims are chiefly concerned to procure the introduction of compulsory deposits, thus avoiding a repetition of this year's experience, when over a thousand Indian pilgrims remained three weeks in Jeddah unable to leave, while an India-bound ship of another line remained empty in port.

7. The two Soviet ships which brought pilgrims to Jeddah have left, one with the pilgrims, the other, the "Tobolsk," for Hodeida, Aden and the Persian Gulf. The "Tobolsk" discharged at Jeddah 1,399 sacks of flour and 2,000 sacks of sugar, and at Hodeida 1,000 sacks of flour and 700 sacks of sugar. The cargo discharged at Jeddah has not yet been disposed of. Belkin, who with Astakhof and two others landed at Hodeida, has proceeded to Sanaa on a commercial mission. Belkin was not permitted to land at Jeddah; the others were allowed to land and to remain ashore a few days. Hakimoff, the Soviet agent and consul-general, is leaving shortly, and will be replaced by Nasir Turaculoff, regarding whom no information is at present available.

8. The Egyptian Mission under Bassel Pasha was well received by the King. The main question discussed appears to have been the purpose to which the sum (roughly £60,000) which in the past accompanied the Mahmal should be devoted. The Egyptians, it is understood, proposed to devote the money to the building and staffing of hospitals in Mecca and Jeddah. Agreement was, however, not reached, as the Egyptians, naturally enough, desired to retain the management of the hospitals so founded, whereas, Ibn Saud apparently held out for Hejaz Government control. There is reason to believe, on the other hand, that a proportion of the money saved by the non-despatch of the Mahmal will be devoted to the Mecca water-supply scheme, to which the Egyptian technical mission, referred to in paragraph 5 above, have been studying.

9. The Sultan of Shehr and Mokalla left for Egypt on the 11th June, the Begum of Junagadh left for India on the 13th June, and the Sultan of Perak left for Singapore on the 30th June. They all expressed their gratification at the courtesy and help afforded them by the Hejaz Government, though the Sultan was inclined to feel that not enough fuss was made of him. His Highness would have had an even better welcome from the King had he not thought fit to bombard most of the leading Hadramis with telegrams announcing his arrival, and had left arrangements for his accommodation to the Hejaz Government.

10. Hafiz Wahba, in spite of his successful pose as Ibn Saud's mouthpiece in Cairo, has fallen from grace. He has been relegated from the position of Assistant Viceroy to that of Minister of Education. In this post he will presumably have under his control the three or four elementary schools in Jeddah, Mecca and Medina. The fall of Hafiz is regrettable. He was the only man in the Hejaz who did not fear to speak openly and to give good if sometimes unpalatable advice to the King. He has been a good friend to the Agency in his position as Assistant Viceroy, and many questions have with his help been settled which would otherwise have necessitated official representations. But excess of good living at Cairo has made him fat and sleepy, and the lean and fanatical Yussuf Yassin has to a large extent usurped his place in the good graces of the King.

11. Dr. Damluji has been appointed Hejaz delegate to the Haifa Conference. He will leave, accompanied by two technical experts, as soon as the date of the conference has been fixed. During his absence Yussuf Yassin will, it is to be feared, act as Minister for Foreign Affairs.

12. The Commandant of Troops in Jeddah, Abdulla Bey, a native of Mosul, has been relieved of his command and will be replaced by a Syrian. The Syrians,

owing probably to the increased influence of Yussuf Yassin, are once again filling important posts.

13. A commission consisting of Roy, the British workshop engineer, Treherne, the Condensor engineer, Hayne, Sharqieh Limited's mechanic, and a German pilot until recently in charge of the municipal ice plant, was appointed to examine and report on the state of the Hejaz aeroplanes, which have remained in their sheds since the departure of Squadron-Leader Noakes in May 1926. Before the commission had furnished a report, before even the opinion of the other members had been taken, the German pilot flew one of the planes round Jeddah. The flight and landing were accomplished without mishap.

14. The number of slaves manumitted during the month under review was eight. All of these were of unknown African origin and were sent by Italian ship to Massowa.

[E 3663/1/91]

No. 12.

Mr. Stoneheuer-Bird to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 107.)

Sir,

Jeddah, July 4, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to transmit, with reference to my telegram No. 61 of the 1st instant, a translation of Dr. Damluji's letter protesting against the language used by the Iraq Minister for Defence in a recent statement in Parliament.

2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs came to see me on the 1st instant to discuss this letter. I told him that I could not help feeling that the Hejaz Government were taking a most exaggerated view of the importance of Noori Pasha's statement. How could he, Damluji, possibly pretend to believe that an Iraq Minister could get up in the Iraq Parliament and make a statement representing His Majesty's Government's views? Moreover, I gathered from newspaper reports which I had seen that his speech was not intended as a statement of Iraq policy. He was merely concerned with justifying to Parliament the expenditure voted for his Ministry. I pointed out to Dr. Damluji that, having no Parliament and being answerable to nobody, the Hejaz Government had the almost unique advantage of being able to spend what they liked on defence without their expenditure or their deliberations being known to the public. If he, however, were Defence Minister and answerable to a Hejaz Parliament, did he really think he could justify expenditure this year without referring in his statement to Iraq-Nejd relations? I agreed with him that Noori Pasha's statement was unfortunate at this juncture, but I failed to agree that it was provocative either in fact or in intention. As the King had no other means of communicating with His Majesty's Government or with Iraq, I had no choice but to despatch on His Majesty's behalf telegrams embodying the protest, but I was loth to do so as I was convinced that His Majesty's Government would feel that a very exaggerated view was being taken of the importance of the offending statement.

3. I had the impression that Dr. Damluji secretly agreed with me. Yussuf Yassin was, however, present at the interview, and the King was evidently worked up. Damluji consequently pressed me to telegraph to you asking for assurances from His Majesty's Government and Iraq that Noori Pasha did not express the views of either Government, as, if such assurances were not forthcoming, the Hejaz Government would find it difficult, in face of the general resentment aroused, to feel themselves bound by the verbal agreement recently made between the King and Sir Gilbert Clayton.

4. A copy of this despatch and its enclosure is being addressed to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq.

I have, &c.

F. H. W. STONEHEWER-BIRD.

Enclosure in No. 12.

Dr. Damluji to Mr. Stonehewer-Bird.

(Translation.)
(After Compliments.)

Jeddah, June 27, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that I read in the newspapers the declarations made in the Iraq Parliament during the course of the discussions on the budget of his Ministry by Noori Pasha Essaid, formerly Minister for Defence in the Iraq Government. He said that the funds allotted by Royal decree to the Ministry for Defence were for the purposes of defence of the Iraq frontiers against the Nejd people and for paying allowances to Sheikh Mahruth-el-Hazal. He added that, although these funds had not been spent, it was expected that it would be necessary to spend them at the end of the present summer.

Your Excellency will doubtless realise that the statements of Noori Pasha, if they express the views of the Iraq Government, do not give evidence of good intentions on the part of the Iraq Government. They indicate rather evil intentions, despite the mutual peaceful endeavours exerted in a friendly and amicable spirit during the Jeddah negotiations for settling the questions in dispute.

What can be the value of the peaceful negotiations and international treaties if bad intentions govern the minds of those who are responsible for the upholding of international treaties and maintaining amicable relations between neighbouring countries?

In view of the hostile spirit and desire for separation with which these declarations are full, my Government must strongly protest against Noori Pasha and the Iraq Government, and request from your Excellency to inform us of the real intentions of the Iraq Government. If her intentions are as declared by Noori Pasha in the name of his Government, it is a matter to be strongly regretted, as peaceful endeavours will be in vain and the good wealth be wasted.

If no official denial of these declarations is made and no definite assurance given to my Government to the effect that what was said by Noori Pasha does not represent the real views of the Iraq Government and the friendly British Government, my Government will be obliged to say that it will be very difficult to be bound by the temporary agreement concluded between His Majesty my Lord the King and General Clayton.

I await your Excellency's reply in this connexion.

With respects,

ABDULLAH DAMLUJI,

Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[E 3710/2068/91]

No. 13.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 26.)

Sir,

Downing Street, July 25, 1928.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to transmit to you, for the information of Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain, copy of a despatch to Sir G. Clayton, on the subject of the resumed negotiations with Ibn Saud.

I am, &c.

S. H. WILSON.

Enclosure in No. 13.

Colonial Office to Sir G. Clayton.

Sir,

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Amery to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th July reporting on the progress and the results of your recent mission to Jeddah to negotiate a settlement of outstanding questions with His Majesty King Ibn Saud. The circumstances which led to the suspension of your conversations with King Ibn Saud last May as a result of a deadlock on the question of the advanced desert posts in Iraq, have been considered by His Majesty's Government in consultation with the Government of Iraq. It has been decided that the interrupted

conversations should be resumed as soon as possible, and that the conduct of the resumed negotiations should be entrusted to you, a duty which it is understood that you are prepared to undertake.

In communicating to you the instructions contained in this letter, in the sense of which the concurrence of the Iraq Government and, where necessary, that of the Government of Transjordan has been obtained, I am to explain that these are intended for your general guidance only, and that there is no desire on the part of His Majesty's Government to interfere with your discretion in regard to the precise form or manner in which the various decisions reached should be communicated to Ibn Saud.

2. In regard to the major question at issue, namely, that of the advanced posts in Iraq, you should inform King Ibn Saud that His Majesty's Government regret that they are unable to make any concession of principle. Subject to their treaty engagements, which, in the considered opinion of His Majesty's Government, have in no way been infringed in the present case, the Iraq Government have every right to make what arrangements they please for the administration of their tribes and of their desert areas, and His Majesty's Government cannot accept any interference with this right, the maintenance of which they regard as essentially a British interest. You should, however, explain to King Ibn Saud that the actual system of administration to be adopted for this purpose has not yet been determined, and it is proposed immediately to consider a reorganisation of the present system.

The present intention of the Iraq Government is to retain three advanced posts only, apart from such posts as may be required for the protection of the transdesert route and of a pipe-line, if and when constructed, and apart also from posts so remote from the frontier as clearly to be of no interest to King Ibn Saud. Into these two categories would fall the existing posts at Rutba, Ain Wiza and Muhaiwir, to none of which King Ibn Saud is understood to take exception.

The advanced posts which the Iraq Government at present intend to retain will provisionally be located at Salman, Busaiyah and Shabicha, although the Iraq Government must reserve liberty to vary these locations if this is considered desirable hereafter. In the case of Shabicha, it is not proposed at present, unless the situation on the frontier becomes threatening, to proceed with the erection of permanent structures.

3. You should inform King Ibn Saud that you are authorised to communicate to him the assurance of His Majesty's Government and of the Iraq Government that these advanced posts are not designed for offensive purposes, and that Nejd tribes will suffer no interference with customary rights of watering, grazing and peaceful movement at any of the points where advanced posts may be established. Those Governments realise that friendly co-operation with His Majesty is a necessary condition of the satisfactory administration of the tribal areas and the maintenance of peace in the desert, and to this end they would suggest for his serious consideration the appointment of frontier representatives on each side of the border who could confer together in the case of raids or other frontier incidents, and could apprise each other, as also their own Governments, of any happening likely to disturb the tribes and thus the peace of the border. Furthermore, in order that His Majesty may be in a position to satisfy himself that any advanced posts maintained by the Iraq Government are not used for offensive purposes, and that there is no interference with any Nejd tribes in their legitimate pursuits, the Iraq Government would welcome periodical visits to the posts by his frontier representative. You should make it clear to His Majesty that the Iraq frontier representative would not necessarily be a British official. In regard to the question of the type of garrison contemplated for the advanced posts, I am to enclose for your information and guidance copies of a telegram addressed to the High Commissioner for Iraq on the 16th July, and of his reply.*

4. In the earlier paragraphs of your report you have recorded in some detail the views expressed by King Ibn Saud as to the meaning and intention of the disputed words "in the vicinity of the border" used in article 3 of the Uqair Protocol, and you very rightly pointed out that, although His Majesty's interpretation of the words in question may find some support in the Arabic text of the article, that interpretation is one which had never been contemplated and cannot be accepted by His Majesty's Government. Clearly the phrase stands in need of more precise definition and, in order to remove the present ambiguity and thus eliminate the possibility of

* Not printed.

further dispute by the adoption of an agreed definition, His Majesty's Government would suggest that the phrase should be accepted as meaning within 25 miles of the frontier. In proposing this definition to King Ibn Saud you should make it clear that His Majesty's Government regard as excluded from the scope of article 3 of the Uqair Protocol any posts which may be required in connexion with the protection of the transdesert route and pipe-line (if constructed), to which as an essentially British interest His Majesty is understood to have no objection in principle.

5. As regards the question raised in paragraph 12 of your report, namely, that of the intention and effect of article 6 of the Bahra Agreement, I am to authorise you to inform King Ibn Saud in writing that His Majesty's Government regard this article as applying to British as well as Iraqi forces. You may also assure His Majesty that His Majesty's Government intend to observe the stipulations of this article, and that British forces will not cross the common frontier in pursuit of offenders. In the case, however, of an organised attack on a township or post—as opposed to a mere tribal raid—or in the event of a series of raids with which His Majesty proves himself unable or unwilling to deal, His Majesty's Government must reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they think fit. When communicating this assurance to King Ibn Saud you should, as suggested in paragraph 20 of your report, take the opportunity of inviting King Ibn Saud to explain the meaning which he attaches to the term "forces" in article 6 when applied to the forces of Nejd. His Majesty's Government agree that it is advisable, in order to preclude the possibility either of genuine misunderstanding or of equivocation on his part in the future that an acceptable definition of what must be held to constitute the "forces" of Nejd should be obtained from King Ibn Saud.

6. In your report you refer to the displeasure evinced by King Ibn Saud on learning that British aeroplanes and armoured cars had crossed the Nejd frontier after he himself had expressed his willingness to meet a representative of His Majesty's Government, and (in paragraph 26) you suggest that when communicating to him the explanation of the incidents in question furnished by the High Commissioner for Iraq in his telegrams of the 23rd and the 26th May (copies of which are enclosed for convenience of reference),* you should accompany them with a suitably worded expression of regret. As you are aware, one of the incidents of which King Ibn Saud complained related to an operation undertaken with the object, which was successfully achieved, of preventing a raid by Iraqi tribesmen into Nejd territory. In regard to this incident, while His Majesty's Government recognise that it constituted a technical breach of the Bahra Agreement, they feel that the prevention of a raid at so critical a moment was of such advantage to both parties as to justify the exceptional action taken. The other incidents related to the crossing of the common frontier by aeroplanes and armoured cars engaged upon reconnaissance duties. As you are now aware, on these occasions no bombs were dropped in Nejd territory. In view of the circumstances existing at the time, and of the justifiable uncertainty then felt as to the ability of King Ibn Saud to re-establish effective control over his tribes, His Majesty's Government consider that any relaxation of precautions at that time would have been unjustified and inconsistent with their responsibility for the defence of Iraq. In these circumstances they consider that the local authorities were justified in continuing reconnaissance across the Nejd frontier until they were satisfied that the meeting between King Ibn Saud and yourself would in fact take place, and that His Majesty would be successful in preventing the serious raid which was then threatened and re-establishing some measure of effective control over his recalcitrant tribes.

His Majesty's Government therefore consider it desirable that the explanation conveyed to King Ibn Saud in regard to these incidents should not take the form of an admission that the action in question was unjustified. Such an admission would, in the circumstances set out above, in their opinion, be uncalled for, nor can it be overlooked in this connexion that an explanation so worded as to admit of being regarded as an admission of error on the part of His Majesty's Government and the Iraq Government would be likely to encourage a demand on the part of King Ibn Saud for the payment of damages. If, therefore, King Ibn Saud raises the question again on your return to the Hejaz, you should acquaint him with the true facts, as reported in Sir H. Dobbs's telegrams of the 23rd and the 26th May, and should explain to him that in the absence of the definite assurance from His Majesty for which His Majesty's Government had asked in regard to the prevention of further raids, and in view of the disquieting and conflicting reports which reached Iraq

* Not printed.

at the time of the conference at Buraidah, the continuance of active reconnaissance as a precautionary measure was considered to be necessary. You may add that His Majesty's Government would not, in view of the terms of article 6 of the Bahra Agreement, have sanctioned these measures but for the critical conditions which then obtained on the frontier. As already indicated in paragraph 5 of this letter, His Majesty's Government regard this article as applying to British as well as to Iraqi forces, and intend to observe its stipulations. The reconnaissances were in fact suspended immediately reassuring information as to the situation was received, and His Majesty's Government much regret that the action taken should have proved a cause of embarrassment to King Ibn Saud.

7. From paragraph 27 of your report it is observed that King Ibn Saud proposes to prefer a claim to compensation in respect of losses suffered by Nejd tribesmen in the course of the operations carried out by the Royal Air Force. His Majesty's Government cannot regard any such claim as admissible, and you should do your utmost to resist a claim of this nature if presented, and to obtain full compensation for the Iraq Government both on account of the attack upon the post at Busaiyah and on account of subsequent raids upon Iraqi tribes. If, however, you are satisfied that there is no possibility of securing both compensation from Ibn Saud for the Busaiyah incident, and at the same time the withdrawal of his claim in respect of bombing operations in Nejd territory, and that insistence on this would have the effect of endangering a settlement, you are authorised in the last resort to acquiesce in an arrangement whereby the claim of the Iraq Government for compensation in respect of the attack on Busaiyah would be set off against King Ibn Saud's claim for bombing operations, and these two claims would then be allowed to cancel out, while the remaining and financially more important Iraq claims in respect of subsequent raids would be referred to the special tribunal contemplated in article 2 of the Bahra Agreement.

8. In paragraphs 31 to 36 of your report you have recorded the results of your discussions with King Ibn Saud and of subsequent conferences at Jerusalem on questions arising out of past raids across the Nejd-Transjordan frontier. You are authorised to inform King Ibn Saud, as is proposed in paragraph 34 of your report, that, although His Majesty's Government cannot admit a condition such as that proposed in clause 5 of the draft terms of reference to the arbitrator who is to adjudicate upon past raids, they are prepared to give him an assurance to the effect that the arbitrator will be fully informed of his view that all past claims which were not officially registered at the time of the raid, or soon after, should be excluded from the purview of the arbitrator. You are also authorised to adopt the procedure proposed in your report (paragraph 34) for obtaining the agreement, which will be a necessary preliminary to the appointment of the arbitrator. You have been informed of the views of His Highness the Amir of Transjordan in regard to the draft terms of reference to the arbitrator, and it is understood that you will bear them in mind when framing the notes which you propose to address to the Hejaz and Transjordan Governments, setting out for their acceptance the conditions on which the arbitrator is to be appointed. As regards the proposal at the end of paragraph 36 of your report, you may assure King Ibn Saud that the Transjordan Government are taking prompt and adequate measures to deal with the situation created by recent raids carried out by Transjordan tribes on tribes who are subject to him. The High Commissioner for Transjordan has been requested to furnish you with full particulars of the action already taken by the Transjordan Government in the matter. He has represented that it is important that King Ibn Saud should take similar action in regard to the attack made by the Rualla tribe on the Beni Sakhr tribe in February last. When communicating to His Majesty the proposed assurance on behalf of the Transjordan Government you will no doubt obtain a similar undertaking from him and, if possible, a statement of the action already taken by him to deal with the situation created by the raid of February last.

9. Subject to an acceptable arrangement in the matter of the advanced posts, His Majesty's Government trust that you will do your utmost to secure a satisfactory conclusion to the negotiations for a *bon voisinage* agreement and an extradition agreement between Iraq and Nejd, which were in progress when your conversations with King Ibn Saud were temporarily suspended. In the interval, the Iraq Government will doubtless have had an opportunity of considering the report of their own representative at Jeddah on the questions raised in those negotiations, and will now be in a position, where necessity exists, to put forward revised proposals.

You are authorised to inform King Ibn Saud that His Majesty's Government

view with favour the proposal for the conclusion of similar agreements between Transjordan and Nejd, and are prepared to advise the Transjordan Government to enter into such agreements subject to the settlement in due course of satisfactory drafts.

10. In paragraphs 41 and 42 of your report you refer to the desire of King Ibn Saud to appoint accredited Nejd representatives in Bagdad and Jerusalem. This proposal has been communicated to the Iraq Government, who have expressed their willingness, subject, of course, to an acceptable arrangement in the matter of the posts, to receive accredited representatives of King Ibn Saud and to accord to His Majesty the formal recognition of his régime in the Hejaz which the reception of his representative would entail. They would, moreover, desire to reciprocate the arrangement by appointing an accredited Iraqi representative in the Hejaz. It is not clear whether for the purposes of representation abroad King Ibn Saud regards the Hejaz and Nejd as separate kingdoms or as one State, and, consequently, whether he would wish to appoint to Iraq and to receive from King Feisal two accredited representatives or one. If the question of representation is raised in your conversations you should ascertain the wishes of King Ibn Saud in this matter, and also in which of his towns he would wish the accredited representative or representatives of Iraq to reside, bearing in mind that the Iraq Government desire to be represented at Riyadh.

The similar proposal for the appointment of an accredited Nejd representative at Jerusalem, whose credentials would cover both Palestine and Transjordan, has been communicated to the Governments of those territories who have expressed their willingness to accept such a representative, and the Transjordan Government, who have not hitherto done so, have agreed to accord to His Majesty formal recognition of his régime in the Hejaz provided that King Ibn Saud for his part will recognise the independent Government of Transjordan under the rule of His Highness the Amir, which formally will come into being on the ratification of the agreement between His Britannic Majesty and His Highness the Amir, signed at Jerusalem on the 20th February, 1928.

11. A separate letter will be addressed to you in regard to the arrangements for your return to the Hejaz, and in regard to the composition of your mission.

I am, &c.

J. E. SHUCKBURGH.

[E 3775/2068/91]

No. 14.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 30.)

(Secret.)

Sir,

Downing Street, July 30, 1928.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Amery to transmit to you, to be laid before Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain, the accompanying copy of a report by Sir Gilbert Clayton on the relations between Ibn Saud and the Italian Government and between Ibn Saud and the Imam of the Yemen.

2. Copies of this report are being communicated to the India Office, Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry, and also to the Resident at Aden.

I am, &c.

T. I. K. LLOYD.

Enclosure in No. 14.

Sir G. Clayton to Mr. Amery.

(Secret.)

Sir,

Colonial Office, July 16, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to report the substance of a long conversation which I had with His Majesty the King of the Hejaz during my recent visit to Jeddah on the subject of Italian policy and activities in the Red Sea. The King had evinced a desire to give expression to his views, and I thought it advisable to accede to his wishes and to devote one of our interviews to this purpose.

2. I opened the conversation by reminding Ibn Saud that, in a letter sent to Lord Lloyd through Sheikh Hafez Wahba, he had expressed anxiety at the turn

events were taking in relation to Italian activities in Arabia and the Red Sea, and had asked His Majesty's Government for a statement of their views. I then informed him that, on the receipt of his letter, His Majesty's Government had made friendly representations to the Italian Government in accordance with the spirit of the understanding arrived at in Rome in February 1927, with which His Majesty was acquainted, and that the Italian Government had replied with assurances which had fully satisfied His Majesty's Government that they were carrying out the spirit of that understanding.

3. Ibn Saud replied at some length, and seized an opportunity, for which he had evidently been waiting, to expound his views on Italian policy and on the kindred question of the Yemen. His statement was interesting and valuable, and I was struck by his evident frankness.

4. The position, according to Ibn Saud, is that he has no aggressive designs on the Yemen, but is suspicious of the Imam's intentions and disturbed by the fear that Italy may have some secret pact of a nature to bring about her armed intervention in any conflict that may arise between him and the Imam. He dwelt at some length on the pacific nature of his attitude, and gave me the following interesting sketch of the lines on which he would be willing to conclude a settlement of the vexed question of Asir between himself and the Imam. The main points of a settlement would be—

- (a.) That he would leave the Imam in possession of Hodeida, to which he recognised the Imam's clear right.
- (b.) That he would insist on Naidi being included in the Idrisi's territory, as being the natural port for Sabia and the interior of Asir.
- (c.) That he would insist on the inclusion of the Province of Najran within his own (*i.e.*, Ibn Saud's) dominions, as being a traditional part of his forefathers' realm.
- (d.) That he would agree to the fate of the tribes in the border regions being determined by a fair plebiscite, the result of which both parties would previously bind themselves to accept.

5. I replied that I was grateful for this frank and interesting statement of his intentions, which I would convey to His Majesty's Government, who were, as I had previously informed him, anxious to see a state of peace established between the rulers of Arabia, although maintaining that their differences were primarily a matter for settlement between the rulers themselves. I also informed him that, in answer to enquiries from His Majesty's Government, the Italian Government had categorically denied the existence of any secret agreement between themselves and the Imam, and His Majesty's Government were fully satisfied that no such agreement existed. It was inconceivable that a Power like Italy would make such a statement unless it was true.

6. Ibn Saud went on to say that, in spite of Italy's denial of any secret agreement, he could not remain blind to the contrary indications which had come to his notice. He expressed his firm conviction that the policy of His Majesty's Government was based on a genuine desire to avoid interference in the internal affairs of Arabia, and he informed me that, as recently as three days previously, he had given public expression to that conviction before a large concourse of Arab chiefs and delegates at Mecca. He was not satisfied, however, that Italian policy was inspired by the same spirit. Throughout his dealings with Italian representatives he had been struck and disturbed by their apparent desire to tie him down to certain undertakings in regard to questions which he regarded as being for his decision alone. They had even withheld Italian recognition of his kingdom and made it subject to his accepting a stipulation relating to Asir. The Italian consul in Jeddah had been to see him on the previous day and had offered him, on behalf of his Government, official recognition of his kingdom on condition that the Province of Asir be specifically excluded from that recognition. His Majesty had refused the proposal, and had asked the consul to inform the Italian Government that unconditional recognition of his kingdom must be the prelude to any serious discussions between himself and Italy.

7. It was obvious that Ibn Saud had this question very much to heart, and I thought it desirable to allow him to give expression to his views. On the other hand, in view of the delicacy of the question, I had to be careful lest a tacit acceptance of his statement might be misconstrued. I therefore replied, reaffirming the spirit in which His Majesty's Government envisaged this question, and emphasising the complete understanding which existed between them and the Italian Government.

8. The King went on to speak at greater length of his anxiety as to the possible consequences of a conflict between him and the Imam. The Imam's rule in the Yemen was so insecure, not only over his own tribesmen, but also over the Shafe'is and Zaidis in his dominions, that it would be a comparatively easy matter for him (Ibn Saud) to take advantage of the psychological factors of the situation and bring under his sway the greater part of the Yemen by political rather than military action. He had no intention whatever of doing so; but he was anxious lest, in the event of a conflict arising between him and the Imam, the Italian Government might feel bound to come to the assistance of their ally. He asked with animation what his position would be if, being at war with the Imam, he were to hear that Italian warships had arrived at Hodeida.

9. I took care in replying to this delicate question to make it perfectly clear that in no circumstances would there be any question of British intervention, and that it was a cardinal point in the policy of His Majesty's Government not to interfere in the internal affairs of Arabia. I also expressed the opinion that it was most improbable that such a situation could ever arise or that Italy would ever allow herself to be drawn into a conflict between two Arabian rulers. I repeated that the policy of His Majesty's Government was, as I had previously informed His Majesty, one of non-interference and of friendly co-operation with Italy on that basis.

10. The King declared himself fully aware and appreciative of the clear attitude of His Majesty's Government. He added that the statement which he had just made to me was not inspired by any expectations of, still less by any desire for, trouble on his part. What he desired above all was peace. At the same time, he had felt bound to state his position frankly to me, in the first place, because he felt that it was in his own interests that His Majesty's Government should know exactly how he stood, and, secondly, because the friendship existing between our countries made it incumbent on him to state his views fully. He reiterated, and I believe genuinely, his firm belief in the honourable neutrality which His Majesty's Government had maintained in Arabia, and said that he would always make a point of keeping His Majesty's Government informed of the realities of the situation, partly because it was in the interests of both sides to know the truth, and partly for the sake of the old ties of friendship between them. He felt also that, by fully informing His Majesty's Government, he would secure the benefit of their advice and guidance.

11. His Majesty concluded by emphasising the strictly confidential nature of the statement which he had just made to me, and I promised to respect his confidence.

I have, &c.

GILBERT CLAYTON.

[E 3792/3406/91]

No. 15.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Stonehewer-Bird (Jeddah).

(No. 36.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, August 1, 1928.

FOLLOWING for Sir G. Clayton:—

"Sir P. Cox, who has been consulted as to implications of article 3 of Uqair Protocol, states definitely that there was no secret, separate or additional agreement or understanding providing for any interpretation of text beyond that which it obviously conveys. Object of agreement was to define boundary within which on Iraq side Iraqi tribes could graze in security, and across which Nejdian tribes might not raid. Sir P. Cox cannot admit that the words 'in the vicinity of,' either in English or Arabic version, were intended to extend to the distance claimed by Ibn Saud, and states that the words signified to his own mind, and he is sure to that of Ibn Saud at the time, 'within rifle shot' or 'within sight' of tribes using water-holes on frontier. He regards 10 or 15 miles from the frontier as a most liberal estimate.

"Text of Sir P. Cox's letter follows by next bag."

[E 3912/2068/91]

No. 16.

Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received August 8.)

(No. 68.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Jeddah, August 7, 1928.

[OMITTED: Following from Sir G. Clayton:—]

"Negotiations commenced on the 2nd instant with Ibn Saud are now practically completed. Over the question of posts no agreement has been reached.

"He still persists in regarding his interpretation of article 3 of Uqair Protocol as correct. He cannot be brought to accept any other, and persists in his original point of view that the demolition of the posts constitutes the only solution. I have failed to move him, though I brought to bear on him all the inducements and arguments at my disposal. Suwaidi has been no more successful in his interviews with the King and his advisers.

"With regard to extraction [*sic*], *bon voisinage*, recognition and other subsidiary questions, I informed Ibn Saud at the outset that both Iraq and Transjordan were prepared to discuss and conclude agreements and that His Majesty's Government were warmly in favour of conclusion of such agreements, but that it was obviously impossible to conclude them unless a satisfactory settlement of question of posts were to be arrived at first.

"I am informing Ibn Saud that on my return to London I shall report to His Majesty's Government and ask them to send him a formal communication in the sense of what I have verbally expressed to him as being their considered and final opinion. I am giving him to understand that until he receives that communication, the *modus vivendi* which was agreed upon when conversations were suspended last May must remain in force and will not be held by His Majesty's Government to have terminated until their official intimation of its termination shall have reached him. I shall telegraph to you more fully on this point and give you my general appreciation of the situation before I sail.

"I shall arrive in London about the 21st August, leaving for Port Sudan on the 9th August, and there embarking on Bibby Line steamship 'Cheshire' for Marseilles."

[E 3951/2068/91]

No. 17.

Agent, Jeddah, to Lord Cushendun.—(Received August 10.)

(No. 70.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Jeddah, August 9, 1928.

FOLLOWING from Sir G. Clayton:—

"This continues my telegram No. 68 of the 7th August. Nothing has definitely resulted, since in my last interview with Ibn Saud, which I had yesterday, his attitude remained unchanged.

"I am, however, impressed by the absence of any hostile or unfriendly indications on his part, and I feel sure of the genuineness of his desire to avoid grave disturbances on border, and to make every effort to prevent them. He is chiefly influenced by considerations of public opinion and probably believes that a refusal to arrive at an agreement may strengthen his control and thus make a serious outbreak unlikely. I fully realise that Iraq Government must first think of defence of their people and that constant vigilance and perhaps special preparations will be necessary to ensure this. But I consider it essential that terms of suspension agreed upon last May should be observed with utmost strictness until they are definitely terminated in a formal communication to Ibn Saud by His Majesty's Government, as a result of my report when I reach London. Moreover, I am of opinion that even after this termination policy should be to observe strictly the terms of existing agreements and give no cause for complaint to Nejd Government. In this way any trouble that may arise will be due to them and will put Ibn Saud and his Government obviously in the wrong."

"There will almost certainly be effervescence and probably some raids in the autumn season, but I hope they will be treated strictly in accordance with provisions of existing treaties unless they are so serious and continuous as to render abnormal action inevitable or unless a definite attack on Iraq should develop. I believe that with exercise of patience and forbearance there is a reasonable chance of the situation returning to normal in the course of a few months, whereas any provocative action will certainly make matters worse and possibly lead to an explosion.

"I have informed Nejd Government that Iraq Government reserve their rights in regard to compensation for attack on Busaiyah, and that, as regards subsequent raids, they will in due course submit claims to be dealt with in accordance with provisions of Bahra Agreement.

"It seemed to me wiser not to agree upon any joint communiqué, which might commit His Majesty's Government and the Iraq Government. However, the draft notice courteously submitted to me by the Hejaz and Nejd Governments before insertion in the local press is harmless. They trust that any notice of a similar character which may appear in London and Bagdad may be free from provocation and moderate. Suwaidi and his staff leave to-morrow for Suez by Khedivial Mail. I sail this morning for Port Sudan."

[E 3971/3971/91]

No. 18.

Agent, Jeddah, to Lord Cushendun.—(Received August 11.)

(No. 72.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Jeddah, August 10, 1928.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs has addressed to me a letter of protest against meeting of Hejazis reported in the "Iraq" newspaper of the 26th July to have been held in the house of Amir Ali-bin-Nasir. He holds that a breach of article 2 of Treaty of Jeddah is constituted by this meeting, at which inflammatory anti-Nejd speeches were made.

I should be glad of information, and in the meantime have told the Minister for Foreign Affairs that I would ask you to furnish me with an official version of the facts before transmitting his protest.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 148.)

[E 3972/2068/91]

No. 19.

Agent, Jeddah, to Lord Cushendun.—(Received August 11.)

(No. 73.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, August 10, 1928.

COMMUNIQUE referred to in my telegram No. 70 has been published. It is to the effect that, in spite of the goodwill actuating both parties, no final solution was arrived at owing to non-agreement on the subject of the posts, erection of which Nejd Government regard as contrary to the Uqair Protocol. Nevertheless, Government will continue to act towards their neighbours in a spirit of concord and in accordance with treaties in force.

(Repeated to Bagdad and Jerusalem, No. 149.)

[E 4031/4031/91]

No. 20.

Mr. Stonehewer-Bird to Lord Cushendun.—(Received August 14.)

(No. 119.)

Sir,

Jeddah, July 29, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the Royal decree just issued governing the composition and functions of the Legislative Council.

2. The Viceroy is the permanent president. A permanent vice-president will be nominated by the King, and a second vice-president will be elected by the members of the council.

3. The number of members composing the council will be limited by Royal decree, and the period of membership will be two years. Members must be not less

than 25 years of age, be men of education and experience and must not have been convicted of any crime or be bankrupt.

4. The council will deal with the budgets of Government Departments and of municipalities. All concessions, economic and financial schemes and all Government contracts exceeding £200 will be submitted to the council, as will all questions regarding the engagement of foreign employees.

5. The council will be divided into two committees, each of which will study the questions referred to it and submit its recommendations to the final decision of the council.

6. The council will meet daily. Two-thirds of the council constitute a quorum, and decisions will follow the vote of the majority.

7. If the council reject a scheme submitted by the Government, the Viceroy may call upon the council to reverse its decision, and, if it refuses to do so, may refer the question to the King for final decision.

8. Where a scheme submitted by a Government Department is under discussion, the head of the department will be present at the deliberations of the council.

9. The King has the right to dissolve the council or to make changes in the membership at any time.

10. The most interesting clause from the point of view of the foreigner is article (5) (i), which lays down that any Government contract exceeding £200 must be submitted to the council. If adhered to, this decision should go far to ensure that Government contracts are not, as has so often happened lately, the subject of personal arrangements between members of the Government and their friends.

11. I have addressed a copy of this despatch and its enclosure to the Government of India and Singapore.

I have, &c.

F. H. W. STONEHEWER-BIRD.

Enclosure in No. 20.

Organisation of the Legislative Council.

(Translation.)

Article 1. The Legislative Council will be constituted of the number of members to be limited by Royal decree.

Art. 2. The President of the Legislative Council is the Viceroy. A permanent representative of the Viceroy will be appointed by His Majesty. Another representative will be chosen by the council to act in the absence of the first representative.

Art. 3. The period of membership of the Legislative Council will be two years.

Art. 4. Members in the Legislative Council must fulfil the following conditions:—

- (a.) Be not less than 25 years of age.
- (b.) Be men of experience and knowledge.
- (c.) Not have been condemned for any dishonouring thing and not bankrupt.
- (d.) Of good conduct.

Art. 5. The following will be referred to the council by the Government:—

- (a.) Budgets of Government Departments, the municipality and "Ain Zubeida."
- (b.) Licences for economic schemes and schemes of development.
- (c.) Concessions and economic and financial schemes.
- (d.) Expropriations for public utility.
- (e.) Introduction of laws and regulations.
- (f.) Increases in budgets of departments during the year.
- (g.) Unforeseen expenditure in Government Departments amounting to more than £100 and arising during the course of the year.
- (h.) Decisions concerning the employment of foreign employees.
- (i.) Contracts with companies or merchants for the purchase or sale of Government materials if exceeding £200.

Art. 6. The council will be divided into two committees, each of which will study the subjects referred to it by the president and submit its recommendations to a general meeting of the council for final decision.

Art. 7. Two-thirds of the members of the council, together with the president, will constitute a quorum, and decisions will be made on the majority of the votes of those present.

Art. 8. The council will meet daily to consider the questions laid before it.

Art. 9. The council is to draw the attention of the Government to any lapse in the application of the laws and regulations submitted.

Art. 10. If the Government present a scheme to the council, who reject or modify it and the Government do not concur in their action, the Viceroy has the right to return the scheme to the council with an explanation adequate to satisfy the council of the true intention of the Government and of the necessity of the council's changing their decision. If the council still refuse and maintain their former amendments, it will remain for His Majesty the King to make the final decision in the matter.

The council will also refer to His Majesty through its president for his approval any scheme decided by them where two months have elapsed without the issue by decree of the Royal consent.

Art. 11. The chief of the department or his representative must be invited to attend any meeting of the council when a matter relating to that department is under discussion by the council. This rule should always be followed.

Art. 12. A capable secretary for the Legislative Council is to be appointed for organising the clerical work and receiving, arranging and summarising, at least one day before the meeting is held, the agenda drawn up by the president. Clerks will be appointed for the council as necessary.

Art. 13. The King has the right to dissolve the council or to change any one of its members at any time.

Art. 14. These decisions are to replace the section of the fourth division of the fundamental rules relating to the Legislative Council.

[E 4150/3971/91]

No. 21.

Agent, Jeddah, to Lord Cushendun.—(Received August 20.)

(No. 77.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Jeddah, August 19, 1928.

BAGDAD telegram No. 413 to Secretary of State for the Colonies.

I am awaiting your instructions before replying officially to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs's letter of protest. However, I have unofficially communicated to him the High Commissioner's information regarding the meeting. I have further discussed the question of newspaper attacks.

Do His Majesty's Government officially maintain Bagdad thesis that, for the purposes of article 2 of the Treaty of Jeddah, Iraq is not to be regarded as British territory?

Foregoing refers to Bagdad telegram No. 413 to Secretary of State for the Colonies.

[E 4151/2068/91]

No. 22.

Agent, Jeddah, to Lord Cushendun.—(Received August 20.)

(No. 78.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Jeddah, August 19, 1928.

THE hurrying of Iraqi reinforcements to the frontier immediately on termination of the Clayton negotiations, of which the Hejaz Government have received information, is regarded by them as provocative at a time when complete calm reigns and contrary to terms of temporary agreement, and they request me to inform His Majesty's Government that for any unfortunate event which may result, Iraq will be held responsible. In addition, they take exception to the last sentence of the Iraqi Prime Minister's statement in Parliament of 9th August. This, in their opinion, implies that more Arab blood will be shed, for which Ibn Saud will be responsible owing to his failure to appreciate Iraq efforts for peace.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 154.)

[E 4286/484/91]

No. 23

Mr. Stonehewer-Bird to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received August 28.)

(No. 121.)

Sir,

Jeddah, August 3, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz for the period the 1st to the 31st July, 1928.

2. Copies of this report are being sent to Ramleh, Jerusalem (2), Jerusalem for transmission to the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Trans-jordan, Bagdad, Aden, Beirut, Damascus, Simla, Khartum through Port Sudan, Singapore, Lagos (2).

I have, &c.

F. H. W. STONEHEWER-BIRD.

Enclosure in No. 23.

Jeddah Report for the Period July 1 to July 31, 1928.

SIR GILBERT CLAYTON and Mr. Antonius, accompanied by two Iraqi delegates, Tewfiq Bey-es-Suaidi, Minister of Education, and Major Bahaeddin Nuri of the Iraqi army, arrived in Jeddah on the 30th July, having crossed from Port Sudan in H.M.S. "Clematis." Ibn Saud is expected to arrive on the 1st August, and the conversations suspended in May will be resumed at Jeddah. The King had hoped to be able to arrange to hold conversations at Taif, where climatic conditions are incomparably better than those obtaining at Jeddah. At the last moment, however, it was decided that the mission could not be made suitably comfortable at Taif. Few believe this to be the real reason for the King's sudden change of plan. It is generally felt that His Majesty did not wish Sir Gilbert Clayton to see Taif in its present dilapidated condition. Moreover, there has been trouble recently with the Beni Malek, who have been seeking to evade the payment of taxes. For this reason, and possibly because it is a convenient base for operations towards the south, Taif has become a military camp of some magnitude. A recent visitor stated that 5,000 men, fully armed and equipped, had been concentrated there. One of the aeroplanes, of which mention was made in paragraph 13 of last month's report, is destined for Taif, though whether the German pilot, who has till now only circled round Jeddah, will so far risk his life as to fly the machine to Taif is not yet known; nor is it clear who will take charge of the plane if it reaches its destination.

2. There has been during the month a glut of legislation. Royal decrees governing the registration of companies, the distribution of charities, the functions and constitution of the legislative council and the giving of religious instruction in the mosque at Mecca have been published. Under the registration decree, a copy of which is enclosed in Jeddah despatch No. 120 of the 3rd August, companies, both Hejazi and foreign, are obliged to obtain a certificate of registration. Application for this certificate must be made to the newly appointed "Registrar of Companies." Details regarding the formation and composition of a company must be furnished when application is made. The law is, as its framer, Fuad Hamza, proudly remarks, a very modern law. It remains to be seen whether, with the very poor quality machinery at their disposal, the Government will be able to ensure the satisfactory working of this and other modern laws which we may expect from the pen of the indefatigable Fuad.

3. The Royal decree regarding the administration and distribution of charities lays down that all pious foundations and donations, from whatsoever source accruing, shall be administered and distributed by a commission appointed *ad hoc* by the Viceroy. The commission will consist of a president and four members, and will be under the control of the Viceroy. The Auqaf-al-Haramain will also be administered by the commission. In cases where the founder or donor has laid down conditions for the administration of his bequest, these conditions will, if not contrary to Shariah law, be complied with. Representatives charged with the administration of the bequest may, by order of the Viceroy, be attached to the commission for such time as is necessary for the completion of their duties.

4. The object of the regulation regarding teaching in the mosque is to ensure that authorised teachers only give instruction, and that the teaching takes place in the mosque only. The practice whereby tuition was given to limited numbers of students in the private houses of religious teachers is now no longer sanctioned. A protest against this ruling was received from certain Malay students, but no action was taken on the protest. Gatherings of students in private houses for religious instruction are dangerous. There is no control, and the teaching may well be political rather than religious. Thus, a political agitator could and probably did in the past under the cloak of religion gather a small following of converts to his subversive doctrines.

5. The decree defining the functions of the Legislative Assembly is interesting to foreigners in that all Government contracts of more than £200 in value must be submitted to this council for sanction. Theoretically, therefore, heads of departments will no longer have the same free hand in giving contracts to their friends and claiming a substantial share in the resultant profits. A glaring example of this abuse was afforded by the recent supply of 2,500 tons of coal to the Government by Philby. He obtained the contract through the good graces of Dr. Damluji at a price exceeding by eight shillings a ton that which competing firms were prepared to quote. The Amir Feisal is said to have secured a larger share in this illegitimate profit than Damluji thought equitable, and there were indications of a certain coolness between the latter and Philby.

6. Damluji left in July for Haifa with Khalid-el-Hakim, an engineer, to attend as Hejaz-Nejd delegate the Hejaz Railway Conference. His departure on the eve of the resumption of the King's conversations with Sir Gilbert Clayton adds force to the general belief that he is out of favour. The influence of Yussuf Yassin and Fuad Hamza, who, in the absence of Damluji, is Acting Foreign Minister, has increased.

7. Iraq-Nejd relations have again formed the subject of bitter articles in the local press. The speech of Nuri Pasha, Iraq Minister of Defence, aroused special resentment. Nuri Pasha stated in the Iraq Assembly that the sums specially voted for the defence of the southern frontier had not yet been entirely expended, but that the balance might have to be spent in the late summer. The Nejd-Hejaz Government took this statement to mean that the conversations to be resumed by Sir Gilbert Clayton were expected to be without result and that consequently money must be spent in warlike preparations against Nejd. It was explained to them that, far from being provocative, the decision of the Iraq Government not to spend all sums at their disposal but to await the result of the resumed Jeddah conversations was proof of their friendly feeling towards Nejd.

8. The Iraq Government have protested against a raid conducted by Braih Mutair on the Dahamshah, in the course of which seventy-five camels were looted. The Hejaz Government have replied that, as the victims were members of a Nejd tribe, the raid in question was an internal matter not affecting Iraq.

9. The Iraq Government have also protested against the alleged intention of Ibn Musaad to collect taxes from tribesmen settled in the neutral zone, as being contrary to the spirit of the temporary agreement reached with Sir Gilbert Clayton and of article 1 of the Uqair Protocol. The King has replied that he has no news of any intention on the part of his people to depart from the usual procedure in collecting taxes.

10. The pilgrimage may now be said to be over. There remain only a few hundred Indian pilgrims for whose repatriation a ship will be available in a few days' time. The total number of overseas pilgrims is now stated officially to be 100,763, 98,835 of whom landed at Jeddah and the remainder at Yambo. Mortality has been exceptionally low this season. The pilgrimage, though not reaching the figures attained last year, may yet be considered satisfactory. The Government have shown signs of much greater care for the welfare of pilgrims. As against this, however, must be set signs of greater religious intolerance and interference in the performance of special rites by different sects. The Sunnis suffered in the person of Maulvi Mushtaq Ahmed, whose valorous open defence of his beliefs outran his discretion to such an extent that he thought it necessary to declare before an assembled multitude in the mosque at Mecca that all Wahabis were infidels. He was arrested and for some days detained as a common criminal. In view of the religious nature of his offence, it was not possible to make official protest, but it was pointed out to Ibn Saud that the imprisonment and ill-treatment of a religious leader might sensibly affect His Majesty's popularity in India and might result in a diminution

of the number of Sunni pilgrims performing the Haj next season. Possibly, as a result of this friendly intervention and possibly because Ibn Saud felt that sufficient punishment had been meted out, Maulvi Mushtaq Ahmed was removed to more comfortable quarters and shortly released. He was very bitter against the King, but admitted that in a final interview Ibn Saud had listened to him most patiently and had been at pains to show that his beliefs as a Wahabi were not as incompatible with those of the Sunnis as was generally believed. Persian pilgrims have also complained of considerable interference by Nejdīs, official and individual, in their religious performances.

11. Early in the month the Egyptian consul received a personal telephone message from Hafiz Wahba to the effect that the Government had decided not to answer the letters or take any action on the representations of the consuls of those Powers, Italy, Egypt and Persia, who had not recognised Ibn Saud. This somewhat ridiculous decision was actually put into effect for about a fortnight, though the consuls were never officially informed of the fact. While the Egyptian wrote innumerable letters to test the accuracy of Hafiz Wahba's statement, Dr. Cesano preferred to address no communications, hoping that the Government would before long see the error of their ways. Towards the end of the month, Dr. Damluji informed Dr. Cesano that letters addressed by him to the Government would certainly be answered, and that anything which he had heard to the contrary was pure fiction. A day later Hafiz Wahba, who had been despatched to Medina on an official mission and had been out of touch with Mecca, visited the Egyptian consul and confirmed his previous telephonic communication. It is thus quite clear that a decision not to answer letters from the three consuls was in effect taken, but was later reversed.

12. The import and consumption of intoxicating liquor has, since the advent of Ibn Saud, been strictly prohibited for Moslems. The prohibition to import spirits, wines and beer has now been extended to Europeans. There are two possible explanations of this action on the part of the Hejaz Government. It may have been prompted by religious or by political considerations. To extend to foreigners any privilege not extended to Hejazis may savour of "capitulations." The reason given officially is that the special privilege accorded to foreigners to import liquor for their personal consumption had been abused. It was almost as easy to buy whisky as to buy any other commodity in the market, and Moslems had been drinking freely. It was obvious, therefore, that as Moslems could not themselves import, certain Europeans were doing an illicit and most profitable trade in the sale of liquor to natives. Prohibition is a heavy blow to members of the European community. Apart from foreign representatives, to whom the prohibition does not of course extend, Philby, who, by a happy coincidence, received a consignment shortly before the introduction of the measure, can alone supply his friends with their customary "sundowner." Prohibition will to a certain extent destroy the little social life which Jeddah enjoyed. Conscientious members of the community, fearing lest frequent visits to the agency may be regarded merely as indications of a thirst, will stay away; officers of the mercantile marine, knowing that tepid condenser water will be the only form of liquid refreshment available, will be less ready to desert their ships. The more musical members of the European community now fear lest the prohibition to import gramophones may extend to their use. At present Christians who own gramophones may play them, but may not replace them when worn out. Moslems may neither import nor play.

13. The number of slaves manumitted during the month under review was four. Of these, three were of Abyssinian origin and were repatriated via Massowa. The fourth, of Sudanese origin, was sent to Port Sudan.

[E 4378/1/91]

No. 24.

Mr. Stowhewer-Bird to Lord Cushendun.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 126. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, August 10, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, with reference to my telegram No. 75 of yesterday's date, a translation of the official communiqué issued by the Hejaz-Nejd Government on the subject of the recent conversations between Ibn Saud and Sir Gilbert Clayton.

[19083]

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2. As foreseen in Sir Gilbert Clayton's telegram of the 9th August (my telegram No. 70), the tone of the communiqué is moderate and unprovocative.

3. I understand that Mr. Philby and Reuter's agent yesterday telegraphed the text for insertion in the British press. The former, I gather, sent a long wire which probably contained much of his own comment.

4. (Confidential.) Tewfik-es-Suaidi, the Iraq delegate, had during the course of the negotiations long talks with Philby, and from the accounts of those present was most indiscreet. His utterances were duly communicated to the King by Philby, who informed His Majesty that he was drafting a telegram to his newspaper in England embodying the information so obtained.

5. The King instructed Philby not to do so: the mission might thereby be embarrassed. Suaidi throughout his stay here was distressingly outspoken in all company, and those of my colleagues who met him were as amazed at his voluble indiscretion as they were attracted by his jovial personality.

6. I have addressed copies of the communiqué, enclosure in this despatch, to those posts to which the Jeddah monthly report is distributed.

I have, &c.

F. H. W. STONEHEWER-BIRD.

Enclosure in No. 24.

Communiqué from the Press Department.

(Translation.)

NEGOTIATIONS have been resumed between His Majesty the King and his representatives on one part and the British Mission, headed by General Sir Gilbert Clayton, on the other, on the questions the completion of the former discussion of which was postponed until the end of the pilgrimage season.

In spite of a sincere intention to reach a successful conclusion, the question of the demolition of the guard posts built by the Iraq Government and which the Nejd Government considers contrary to the third clause of the Uqair Protocol stood in the way of arriving at a result satisfactory to both parties.

The difference in the points of view of the negotiating parties led to the negotiations being broken off without reaching a final solution.

Notwithstanding the obstacles which prevented the success of the negotiations, His Majesty's Government will continue to deal with her neighbours as dictated by the spirit of concord and in accordance with the texts of the treaties they have concluded.

[E 4297/3971/91]

No. 25.

Lord Cushendun to Mr. Stonehewer-Bird (Jeddah).

(No. 50.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, September 4, 1928.

YOUR telegram No. 77 of 19th August.

In view of note enclosed in your despatch No. 110 of 1927, and of conversation reported in your despatch No. 107 of 1927, Hejaz Government presumably understand that Treaty of Jeddah is not applicable to Iraq. As, however, there appears to be some misapprehension on the point, you should explain this again.

As regards incident reported in your telegram No. 72, you should explain matters to Hejaz Government on lines of Bagdad telegram No. 131 S, emphasising the trivial character of the meeting to which exception has been taken, and pointing out the provocation given by articles in the Hejaz press.

You may, at the same time, inform Hejaz Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government, in view of their desire to promote friendly relations between Iraq and Nejd, will represent to the Iraq Government the desirability of acting in all respects in accordance with the spirit of article 2 of the Treaty of Jeddah. His Majesty's Government do not doubt that the Iraq Government will gladly co-operate, and that the Hejaz Government, for their part, will be equally willing to observe the principle embodied in that article.

[E 4431/218/91]

No. 26.

Agent, Jeddah, to Lord Cushendun.—(Received September 6.)

(No. 81.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, September 5, 1928.

IBN SAUD left for Riyadh yesterday, where he expects to arrive 9th September. (Repeated to Bagdad and Jerusalem, No. 160.)

[E 4437/2068/91]

No. 27.

Foreign Office to Mr. Stonehewer-Bird (Jeddah).

(No. 181.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 6, 1928.

I AM directed by Lord Cushendun to transmit to you herewith a letter addressed to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd by Sir Gilbert Clayton, and to request that you will arrange for its delivery to the King.

2. A copy of the letter is enclosed for your information.

I am, &c.

H. J. SEYMOUR.

Enclosure in No. 27.

Sir G. Clayton to the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd.

Your Majesty,

London, September 5, 1928.

I VENTURE to inform your Majesty of my safe return to England after a pleasant journey, which went far towards restoring me to complete health.

Immediately on my arrival in London I caused your letter to be delivered to His Majesty the King. I also lost no time in reporting the result of my mission to His Majesty's Government, who will, in due course, confirm through the usual official channel the statement of their views which I made verbally to your Majesty.

I seize this opportunity of expressing once more my sincere gratitude for the unvarying kindness and consideration with which I have always been treated by your Majesty. My visits to your Majesty will always remain with me as a very happy memory, and I trust that I may have the privilege of meeting your Majesty yet again in the future.

Expressing sincere wishes for your Majesty's continued good health and prosperity, I remain, &c.

GILBERT CLAYTON.

[E 4337/2068/91]

No. 28.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 7.)

Sir,

Colonial Office, September 7, 1928.

WITH reference to Colonial Office letter of the 25th July last, enclosing a copy of the instructions which were issued to Sir Gilbert Clayton on the 19th July in regard to the conduct of his resumed negotiations with Ibn Saud, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Amery to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of the report on those negotiations which has been received from Sir Gilbert Clayton, together with copies of the annexures thereto.*

2. A further communication on the subject will be addressed to you in due course.

I am, &c.

A. J. HARDING.

* Not printed.

[19083]

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Enclosure in No. 29.

Sir G. Clayton to Mr. Amery.

Sir,

Colonial Office, September 3, 1928.

IN continuation of my report, dated the 10th July, 1928, and with reference to your letter dated the 19th July, 1928, I have the honour to submit a further report on my recent mission to the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies.

2. I left London on the 20th July, 1928, with Mr. G. Antonius, C.B.E., and arrived at Port Sudan on the 30th July, having been joined at Port Said by the Iraq Government delegation, consisting of Taufiq Bey Suwaidi, Minister of Education, and Major Bahauddin Muri of the Iraq army, accompanied by Ahmed Effendi Sarraf as secretary. Mr. E. C. Harvey, of the Palestine Civil Service, also joined the mission at Port Said, as confidential clerk and stenographer.

3. Leaving Port Sudan on the 29th July in H.M.S. "Clematis" (Commander F. Ratsey, R.N.), the mission, together with the Iraq delegation, arrived on the following day at Jeddah, where the usual official reception was accorded by the local authorities.

4. Ibn Saud arrived in Jeddah from Taif, travelling by way of Mecca, on the 1st August, on which day the mission and the Iraq delegation were received separately in formal audience. At this audience I handed to Ibn Saud, with due ceremony, a personal letter from His Majesty the King, which he received with marked gratification and an expression of deep respect and regard. It was then arranged to reopen conversations on the following morning.

5. Accordingly, the first meeting was held at 8.15 A.M. on Thursday, the 2nd August. Three meetings were held in quick succession; but on the following Saturday a sharp attack of fever incapacitated me and kept me in bed for four days. On the fifth day, namely, the 8th August, I was able to attend the fourth and last formal meeting with the King. A full record of the proceedings at those meetings, and of an interview which Mr. Antonius had with the King during my illness, will be found in Annexure 1.* Concurrently with those meetings, a series of conferences were held by Mr. Antonius in committee with the King's advisers, of which an account is attached in Annexure 2.* The members of the Iraq delegation were granted one audience by the King, and held conferences with his advisers. I was kept fully informed by Taufiq Bey Suwaidi of the trend of those discussions, but I have had no written report from him.

6. On the eve of the opening of formal negotiations, Mr. Antonius had a long conversation with the King's advisers, from which it was evident that Ibn Saud had not receded from his attitude in regard to the interpretation of article 3 of the Uqair Protocol and the cognate question of the advanced posts. I decided, therefore, that a decision must be reached on these two cardinal points before the Iraq delegation entered into the discussions. I also came to the conclusion, bearing in mind that direct methods appealed to Ibn Saud, that further discussion and negotiation would serve no useful purpose, and that the proper course was to lay the whole situation before him and to seek a decision of principle on the major point at issue.

7. I therefore informed Ibn Saud, in the course of our first two meetings, of the decisions which His Majesty's Government had reached in regard to the interpretation of article 3 of the Uqair Protocol and the question of the posts, emphasising particularly the close attention which the matter had received in the highest quarters and the full consideration which had been given to his views and arguments, which I had conveyed faithfully and in full to His Majesty's Government.

8. I then explained fully the policy of the Iraq Government, and the assurance which they were prepared to give, in regard to the advanced posts, and dealt in general terms with the various other questions which I was empowered to discuss and negotiate, pointing out that His Majesty's Government and the Iraq Government, though unable to give way on the main principle involved, were prepared to go to great lengths to meet the Hejaz and Nejd Government in various other questions to which Ibn Saud had always expressed himself as attaching great importance.

9. I concluded by urging the King to consider the situation as a whole, and to reflect deeply before deciding to maintain an attitude with which His Majesty's Government could never agree, and which would not only preclude a favourable settlement of such questions as extradition, *bon voisinage*, surrender of offending

* Not printed.

tribesmen and recognition of the Kingdom of the Hejaz and Nejd by Iraq and Trans-jordan, but might even endanger his relations with the British Empire.

10. Ibn Saud replied to this recapitulation of the main features of the situation by a very calm and friendly, but quite unequivocal, statement to the effect that he had given to the whole question careful and mature reflection and was unable to reconsider his attitude. He was convinced that his interpretation of article 3 was based on the spirit of the conversation at Uqair, in spite of anything Sir Percy Cox might now say, and he repeated that he would never have signed the protocol or ratified the Muhammara Convention if he had entertained any doubts on the matter. He deeply regretted to find that His Majesty's Government were now denying the principles on which, in his conviction, the Uqair Protocol had been based.

11. In any case, on the question of the advanced posts, he was now pledged to his people, who would never be content with mere assurances in a matter which they held to be one of life and death to them and in which he shared their views to the full. He was still inspired by unalterable feelings of friendship towards Great Britain and a determination to respect existing agreements; and he was convinced that a policy of co-operation with His Majesty's Government was in the best interests of his country; but in this particular question he was powerless to subscribe to the decision which His Majesty's Government had seen fit to take.

12. I am convinced that Ibn Saud was sincere in this expression of his views. From whatever angle I approached the question, he would put forward arguments which were clear, firm and unequivocal, and strictly consistent with his general attitude as he had defined it at the very outset of our negotiations. On one occasion, he confirmed his statements by one of the most solemn oaths which it is possible for a Moslem to take. I did not consider further argument either advisable or useful at the moment, so I begged the King to reflect once more before giving me his final decision and to accord me another interview on the following day.

13. At our third meeting I made a further effort to induce the King to modify his attitude in regard to the major point at issue, in order to make it possible at least to discuss the other questions with which, hitherto, I had only dealt in general terms. He remained quite unmoved, however, by any arguments or inducements, and I realised that further attempts to shake him would not only be undignified, but might result in introducing an element of irritation and petty dispute into discussions which had been conducted, hitherto, on a calm and entirely friendly plane.

14. I, therefore, informed the King that, to my deep regret, I saw no other course open to me than to terminate our conversations and to return to England. I added that I should report our failure to reach agreement to His Majesty's Government, who would confirm their decision officially through the proper channel. In the meantime, and until the decision of His Majesty's Government reached him in final form, I considered that the terms of our suspension of conversations, agreed upon on the 24th May last, should be held to bind all parties. Ibn Saud signified his agreement to this arrangement, and I deem it vital that it be strictly observed by the Iraq Government and by His Majesty's forces in Iraq.

15. A sharp attack of fever incapacitated me for the next four days, during which Taufiq Bey Suwaidi had an interview with the King and discussions with his advisers. He was unable, however, to bring about any change in Ibn Saud's attitude, and I decided to fix the date of our departure for Thursday, the 9th August, requesting the presence at Jeddah of H.M.S. "Clematis" on that date.

16. During my indisposition the King paid me a personal visit for the purpose of asking after my health, and two days later Mr. Antonius had an interview with him in order to convey my thanks for his kindness and courtesy. During this visit Mr. Antonius had the opportunity of conversation on the questions under discussion, and I also had another interview on the 8th August, the day before our departure.

17. On both these occasions the King, while maintaining his attitude unchanged, gave clear evidence of his sincere desire to avoid any break of his relations with His Majesty's Government, and gave us the very definite impression that he meant to do his utmost to keep his tribesmen under control and to maintain peace on the frontier. I am of opinion that, while he has been somewhat shaken by the, to him, unexpected attitude of His Majesty's Government in the matter of the Uqair Protocol and by their decision in respect of the advanced posts, his long-standing feelings of friendship towards Great Britain remain substantially unchanged, and that he will do his utmost to maintain friendly relations and observe the provisions of existing agreements.

18. He appears convinced that his obligations towards his people in Nejd

render it impossible for him to give way, and it is probable that he hopes, by holding out firmly, to make it clear that he has supported them, thus strengthening his influence to an extent which will enable him to keep them in hand and prevent any serious outbreak.

19. If this is a correct appreciation, there is justifiable hope that the situation may resolve itself in the course of time, provided no untoward incidents on the frontier inflame it afresh.

20. I recommend, therefore, that the policy to be adopted be one of scrupulous observance of existing agreements, and that, above all, no violation of the Nejd frontier be permitted, unless a situation of such gravity should arise as to render abnormal measures unavoidable and entirely justifiable. There will almost certainly be unrest, and possibly a recrudescence of raiding across the frontier in the coming autumn and winter; but the line between raiding and deliberate hostile attack should be kept clearly defined. Constant vigilance and a carefully thought-out defensive organisation will be essential, but I submit that the measures taken should be such as cannot be construed as violating the provisions of existing agreements; otherwise they will inevitably provoke the very danger which they are designed to meet, and may produce a situation which will commit the Iraq Government to indefinite embarrassment and expense.

21. To summarise the questions which I was instructed by the terms of your letter under reference to discuss with Ibn Saud:—

(a.) The major issues of the interpretation of article 3 of the Uqair Protocol and of the advanced posts have been dealt with above.

(b.) The proposed extradition and *bon voisinage* agreements were not discussed in detail with the Hejaz and Nejd Government, either by my mission or by the Iraq delegation, as our instructions laid down clearly that their negotiation and conclusion were conditional upon an acceptable settlement in regard to the question of the posts. I was not reluctant to drop these agreements for the present, as, in view of the distrust and suspicion of the Iraq Government which exists in the minds of the King's advisers, and, indeed, of Ibn Saud himself, I feel that they would serve no useful purpose at this stage, and would probably only be used as a means of supporting future complaint against the Iraq Government of violation of treaty engagements. They are better reserved until such time as an atmosphere of greater friendliness and mutual confidence may prevail.

(c.) For the same reason the questions of recognition of the Hejaz and Nejd Government by Iraq and Transjordan, and of the exchange of representatives, were not carried beyond a general intimation to Ibn Saud that they were susceptible of solutions favourable to him if a satisfactory settlement could be arrived at in regard to the posts. It was obviously undesirable to make for no return concessions which may be of use in the future.

(d.) Ibn Saud did not again allude to his vehement protest against the violation of the Nejd frontier in late April last, at a time when friendly conversations had been agreed upon by all parties, though his advisers raised the question at one of their meetings with Mr. Antonius, who gave them a full explanation of the views of His Majesty's Government (see Annexure 2*). I did not, therefore, deem it either necessary or expedient to raise the question with the King.

(e.) I did not consider that any good purpose would be served, in the circumstances, by entering into what could only have been an acrimonious and unprofitable discussion on the subject of compensation. I therefore contented myself with informing the Hejaz and Nejd Government that the Iraq Government must reserve their right to claim compensation for the destruction of life and property at Busaiya, and would also, in due course, submit a claim (under the provisions of the Bahra Agreement) in respect of lives lost and property looted in the course of the raids subsequent to the attack on that post.

(f.) It was also quite obvious that the time had not come in which it was possible to put forward the proposal for the appointment of frontier representatives with any prospect of securing its acceptance. An arrangement of this nature will require to be evolved gradually, and is contingent upon a return to normal conditions on the frontier.

(g.) The question of raids on the Nejd-Transjordan border was discussed by Mr. Antonius, on my behalf, with the King's advisers, who were fully informed of the measures taken by the Transjordan Government for the punishment of the

* Not printed.

perpetrators and the restoration of loot (see Annexure 2*). The Hejaz and Nejd Government were also asked to furnish, on their side, similar information to the Transjordan Government, which they promised to do on receipt of detailed information which they were expecting to receive in the immediate future.

(h.) With regard to article 6 of the Bahra Agreement, I informed the King at our first meeting of the interpretation placed upon that article by His Majesty's Government. The matter was subsequently raised by the King's advisers in committee with Mr. Antonius, who informed them that His Majesty's Government, while fully prepared to give a formal assurance to the effect that article 6 would be held to apply to Imperial forces in Iraq, were of opinion that it was also desirable that some clear definition of the term "forces," as applying to Nejd, should be simultaneously agreed upon. The King's advisers did not question the fairness of this proposal, but no further reference to this matter was made either by the King or by them.

(i.) The question relating to the proposed arbitration on past raids between Nejd and Transjordan was exhaustively discussed, first in committee between Mr. Antonius and the King's advisers, and subsequently with the King himself at my fourth and last meeting with him. Ibn Saud admitted openly that his insistence on the retention of clause 5 in the proposed terms of arbitration was dictated by his fear lest the large and (as he thinks) unjustified claims submitted by the Transjordan Government to the Jericho Tribunal might mislead the arbitrator into an unfair verdict. I pointed out to him that there was every reasonable guarantee that that would not be the case, and I parted from him on the understanding that he would await the receipt of a formal proposal from His Majesty's Government. I attach the draft of a note (see Annexure 3*) which I suggest should be addressed in identical terms to the Nejd and the Transjordan Governments, in which I have embodied all the conditions agreed upon by both Governments and inserted an assurance which, while it safeguards the right of the Transjordan Government to a fair hearing, might overcome Ibn Saud's objections, in that it ensures that his views on unregistered or belated claims will be fully brought to the notice of the arbitrator.

22. I seized the opportunity to discuss with Ibn Saud the question of means of communication for official correspondence. The King stated that he realised that the delays which were occasioned were due in part to the absence of quick means of communication in Nejd and in part to the frequency of his movements between the Hejaz and Nejd. With a view to remedying this disability as far as possible, he had recently elaborated an organisation for the speedy transmission by motor car of messages from Jeddah to Riad. He wished, therefore, to request that in future all messages and communications from the mandated territories be sent to him through Jeddah, even during his periods of residence in Nejd. He pointed out that, during his absences in Nejd, his Foreign Affairs advisers and staff remained at Mecca or Jeddah; and he had taken the necessary measures to enable them to forward all communications to him by the quickest possible route.

23. During the course of my visit I took a suitable occasion to present to the King an astronomical telescope and a sporting rifle, on behalf of His Majesty's Government. He was evidently much pleased and interested in these presents and asked me to convey his warm thanks to His Majesty's Government.

24. At 10.30 A.M. on the 9th August the mission paid an official visit of farewell to the King. The interview was merely for the purpose of taking my leave. Ibn Saud was most friendly and cordial, and once more assured me of his sincere desire for the maintenance of good relations and close co-operation with His Majesty's Government.

25. At the close of the interview Ibn Saud handed me a personal letter for delivery to His Majesty the King.

26. The mission embarked, with the usual ceremony, in H.M.S. "Clematis" at 11.30 A.M. on the 9th August and arrived at Port Sudan on the following day, sailing for England in the Bibby steamship "Cheshire" on the 12th August and reaching London on the 21st August, 1928.

27. The Iraq delegation and Mr. E. C. Harvey left Jeddah on the 10th August by Khedivial mail steamer "Taif" for Suez. I cannot close this report without recording my thanks to Taufiq Bey Suwaidi for his assistance and cordial co-operation. It is unfortunate that the Iraq delegation were unable, in the circumstances, to achieve any definite results, but I feel that their mission was not entirely

* Not printed.

fruitless and may pave the way to a greater measure of co-operation and sympathy between the two Governments in the future.

28. At my last formal meeting with him, the King made a statement concerning Mr. H. F. Stonehewer-Bird, His Britannic Majesty's agent and consul at Jeddah, to which I venture to draw your attention (see Annexure 1.* Proceedings of Fourth Meeting). The tribute paid to Mr. Stonehewer-Bird, coming as it does from a sovereign who is not lavish in his expressions of praise, seems to me to be one on which Mr. Stonehewer-Bird deserves to be warmly congratulated.

I have, &c.

GILBERT CLAYTON.

[E 4634/80/91]

No. 29.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 21.)

Sir,

Colonial Office, September 19, 1928.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Amery to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a despatch from the Resident at Aden containing an account of the general impressions received by Mr. J. Loder Park, the American vice-consul at Aden, during his visit to Sanaa. Copies of this despatch are being sent to the India Office, Admiralty, War Office, and Air Ministry also.

2. In the last paragraph of the despatch Sir S. Symes suggests that an expression of appreciation of Mr. Loder Park's good offices should be conveyed to the American Ambassador in London. If the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs considers that the step would be appropriate, Mr. Amery desires to support this suggestion.

I am, &c.

A. J. HARDING.

Enclosure in No. 29.

Sir Stewart Symes to Mr. Amery.

(Secret.)

Sir,

Aden, August 28, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to report that Mr. J. Loder Park, the American consular officer who recently visited Sanaa, has returned to Aden, where he has given me an interesting account of his general impressions and conversations with the Imam.

The arrangements made for his journey from Hodeida to the capital were excellent, and he was very well received by everyone from the Imam downwards, was given every facility to meet notables and to inspect the town.

He was struck by evidences of the extreme poverty of the population in the country through which he travelled. Several persons contrasted their present state with the better conditions which prevailed before the war. There seemed to be general anxiety for improved facilities for trade and commerce, for better relations with us—for anything, in fact, that might tend to ease the present misery. Our recent air operations had caused widespread perturbation at Sanaa and elsewhere. Elaborate bomb-proof shelters had been constructed, and arrangements made by officials and well-to-do persons to leave the towns in the event of an attack by aircraft.

He had long conversation with the Imam and his two chief Ministers, Sayyid Abdalla-el-Amri and Ragheb Bey (a Turk), who constitute the present Government of the country. Their chief preoccupation appeared to be with the Jauf (or Jof) region, where serious disorders, probably the result of Wahabite intrigues, had occurred. A settlement had been made with the unruly Zaranik in the coastal section. They seemed anxious to reach a friendly solution of the Aden frontier question and to realise that any attempts to retake Dala or commit fresh aggressions in the Protectorate would prevent this. As regards the failure of previous negotiations with us, and our more recent activities by air, the Imam's tone was one of injured innocence. Mr. Park gathered that he did not consider himself an entirely

* Not printed.

free agent. While the dynasty is respected, the Imam himself has never been popular, and discontent with his rule has been much aggravated by economic stress, which many people attribute to his parsimony and failure to facilitate trade. He is compelled, therefore, to rely on the support of the Conservative (Zeidi and religious) elements, whose political outlook is reactionary, and who oppose treaty relations with foreign (and Christian) Powers. To this element any formal and final renunciation by the Imam of his dynastic claims over Aden and its Protectorate seems impious and treasonable. You will recollect that this was one of the difficult points which arose in the negotiations conducted two years ago by Sir Gilbert Clayton.

Mr. Loder Park told me that he had been careful to explain to the Imam that his visit to the Yemen had no connexion with the Aden question, discussion about which was initiated in each case by the Imam or the Ministers. Nevertheless, as the opportunity presented itself, he was able to express opinions and even give informal advice which may be helpful at this stage of our relations with the Imam. I have expressed my personal sense of obligation to him for his friendly assistance, and would suggest that an appreciation of his good offices might be conveyed to the American Ambassador in London.

I have, &c.

G. S. SYMES.

Resident and Commander-in-Chief, Aden.

[E 4594/58/91]

No. 30.

Lord Cushendun to M. Bordonaro.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, September 22, 1928.

ON the 31st May the counsellor of the Italian Embassy communicated to my department a memorandum, suggesting the desirability of taking steps for constituting the Sanitary Co-ordination Commission for Pilgrimages, the establishment of which was contemplated by article 117, section 2, part 4, of the Lausanne Settlement of 1923. In view of this suggestion, and of the courteous enquiry of the Italian Government as to the opinion of His Majesty's Government on the subject, the situation in regard to the sanitary control of the pilgrimage has been carefully reviewed.

2. It is true that the question of the constitution of the proposed commission has been allowed to lapse, but this has not, so far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, been the result of any oversight. On the contrary, they reached the conclusion that the circumstances had so far changed as to render it inexpedient, from the point of view of efficiency and economy, to pursue the matter.

3. The situation appears, in fact, to have very largely changed following on the discussions of the International Sanitary Conference of 1926 (in which, as your Excellency will recollect, the Italian Government participated) and the conclusion of the International Sanitary Convention of that year. The conference revised in detail the whole of the elaborate clauses for the control of the Mecca Pilgrimage, and the acceptance of the convention determined many of the questions which a Sanitary Co-ordination Commission, if established, would have had to discuss and endeavour to harmonise without the authority afforded by the International Sanitary Convention. In addition, the Sanitary, Maritime and Quarantine Board of Egypt was authorised, in the interests of uniformity, to take measures in regard to various matters which could not appropriately be dealt with in specific articles in the convention. For instance, article 151 of the convention requires the board to transmit to the sanitary authorities of all the countries interested and to the Office international d'Hygiène publique information and particulars collected during the pilgrimage concerning the sanitary condition of the Hejaz and the countries through which the pilgrims pass. The same article places upon the board the duty of compiling an annual report, for communication to the same authorities and to the Office international, on the health of the pilgrimage and on the measures of control employed. A report on these lines, dealing with the pilgrimage for 1927, was, in fact, presented last October to the Permanent Committee of the Office international d'Hygiène publique by the president of the Quarantine Board, and a similar report is, I am informed, promised for the session of October next. Both the Quarantine Board and the Committee of the Office international are of an international character, and the Italian Government is, as your Excellency is no doubt aware, represented on both these bodies. The Committee

of the Office international consists, moreover, of official Government delegates from practically all the countries concerned with the control of the pilgrim traffic.

4. Under the system described above there is thus a double opportunity for any country which may consider that there is a greater need for co-ordination in any matter relating to the pilgrimage to call attention to the point in question at a meeting when it can be effectively and officially considered. Article 117 of the Treaty of Lausanne, on the other hand, makes no provision for regular meetings of the proposed Sanitary Co-ordination Commission, or for the payment of expenses in connexion with them. I am, moreover, informed that, at the International Sanitary Conference of 1926, when parts 2, 3 and 4 of the International Sanitary Convention were concluded in their present form, it was generally considered that any action under article 117 of the Treaty of Lausanne would be unnecessary, and no counter-proposal was made by any of the delegations with the object of setting up the Lausanne Co-ordination Commission in place of the arrangements embodied in the convention.

5. In view of these considerations, it is the opinion of His Majesty's Government that probably at no time since the institution of the sanitary control of the Mecca Pilgrimage has there been a better definition of the system of control which should be followed or of the authorities by whom it should be applied, or more effective means in existence of bringing to light any deficiencies or inequalities in the system in such a way that they can be authoritatively dealt with by the competent bodies with international authority. For these reasons they would deprecate any change in the existing arrangements, and feel that the position has, since the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne, been modified to so great an extent as to render it unnecessary to contemplate the establishment of the Sanitary Co-ordination Commission then proposed.

I have, &c.

CUSHENDUN.

[E 4726/1/91]

No. 31.

Agent, Jeddah, (No. 172) to High Commissioner, Bagdad.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received September 27.)

(No. 85.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, September 27, 1928.

ACTING Minister for Foreign Affairs states that he has seen in several newspapers account of an interview recently given by you to correspondent of "Palestine Bulletin," in which you are reported as saying you believe Ibn Saud to have lost power over and control of his chiefs and he has not the means of securing their friendship and submission. You are further reported to have said, in answer to correspondent's remark that a solution must be found for the strained relations between Nejd and Iraq, that you think matters will end by a blow falling on Wahabis which will result in their utter destruction.

I told Fuad that it was quite impossible that you should have expressed such views. He then requested me to furnish him with a true account of the interview.

[E 4770/484/91]

No. 32.

Mr. Stonchewer-Bird to Lord Cushendun.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 141.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, August 31, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz for the period the 1st to the 31st August, 1928.

2. Copies of this report are being sent to Ramleh, Jerusalem (2), Jerusalem for transmission to the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Trans-jordan, Bagdad, Aden, Simla, Beirut, Damascus, Khartum through Port Sudan, Singapore, Lagos (2).

I have, &c.

F. H. W. STONEHEWER-BIRD.

Enclosure 1 in No. 32.

Jeddah Report for Period August 1 to August 31, 1928.

THE King arrived in Jeddah on the 1st August and held his first meeting with Sir Gilbert Clayton that afternoon. The resumed conversations led, as was expected, to no definite result. Ibn Saud maintained his contention that the erection of posts by Iraq constituted a breach of the Uqair Protocol. The communiqué published by the Hejaz Government on the breakdown of relations was moderate and unobjectionable in tone. The breakdown is attributed to disagreement on the subject of the frontier posts, which, in spite of the goodwill shown by both parties, prevented a successful conclusion being reached. In spite of the failure of the negotiations, "the Hejaz Government will continue to deal with its neighbours in a spirit of concord and in accordance with the text of treaties concluded."

2. Sir Gilbert Clayton and Mr. Antonius left Jeddah for Port Sudan in H.M.S. "Clematis" on the 9th August, and the Iraq delegation left for Suez on the following day. During her stay in port H.M.S. "Clematis" was honoured by a visit from the King's brother, the Amir Abdullah, and three of the King's younger sons. Commander Ratsey entertained the King's counsellors to dinner, and a searchlight and firework display, and an at-home was also given at which most of the leading Hejaz and Nejd notables attended. The hospitality of Commander Ratsey and of the officers of H.M.S. "Clematis" were very highly appreciated.

3. The breakdown of the Jeddah conversations unfortunately coincided with certain movements of forces in Iraq. The Hejaz Government gathered from reports appearing in the Iraq press that the Iraq Government had been hurrying reinforcements to the frontier. They protested against this movement of troops as being a breach of the temporary agreement concluded with Sir Gilbert Clayton, and as calculated to arouse the active resentment of Nejd tribesmen in the vicinity. Information was received from His Majesty's High Commissioner to the effect that no posts had been strengthened, nor had reinforcements been moved to the proximity of the frontier. The frontier posts had become uninhabitable during June and July owing to the excessive heat prevailing, and their garrisons had been moved to cooler quarters. Early in August these garrisons returned to the posts, which were thus merely brought up to normal strength. The Hejaz Government also took exception to the language used by the Iraq Prime Minister in his speech regarding the breakdown of negotiations. The statement complained of was to the effect that while "King Feisal and the Government of Iraq had done their utmost to promote a spirit of goodwill and to avoid the shedding of Arab blood, they regretted that King Ibn Saud had not shown more appreciation of their goodwill." This statement was construed by the Hejaz Government to mean that Ibn Saud had not shown the same desire to avoid the shedding of blood as had Iraq, and must, therefore, be held responsible for any further bloodshed. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has been given an official explanation of the alleged strengthening of the frontier defence forces and have been informed that the Iraq Prime Minister's statement was unobjectionable both in form and in intention.

4. Another Hejaz protest was evoked by the reports appearing in the Iraq and Egyptian press of a meeting held at Bagdad in the house of Ali-bin-Nasir in commemoration of Hejazis who fell in the Nejd-Hejaz war. It was alleged that the meeting was attended by many members of the Shereefian family, that violent anti-Nejd speeches were made and that means were discussed for stirring up revolt in the Hejaz and liberating the country from its present domination. An answer to the protest has been received in which His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq states that the meeting was private, that it was largely attended by boys and servants, and was not of sufficient importance to merit official notice. The Government, however, continue to take a serious view of the matter. The latest edition of the "Um-el-Qura" contains an official statement that the Government have decided to confiscate the property of those Hejazis who attended the meeting. They will at the same time probably lose their nationality and their right to reside in the Hejaz.

5. The railway conference at Haifa, convened to discuss technical matters connected with the repair of the Hejaz section of the line, broke down at the outset. The Hejaz delegate, in spite of the fact that he was fully aware of the limited scope of the conference, thought fit to call for a discussion on the question of the ownership and control of the line as a whole. Unless the delegates receive instructions from Ibn Saud to confine themselves to the discussion of the matters for which the

conference was expressly called, an adjournment is inevitable. Incidentally, Dr. Damluji, the first delegate, incurred the King's displeasure by allowing his photograph in European clothes to appear in the Egyptian newspaper, the "Ahram." Instructions were telegraphed to him to appear at the conference in Nejd costume.

6. The King left Jeddah on the day following Sir Gilbert Clayton's departure. He spent a few days in Mecca and then returned to Taif, where he remained until the end of the month. He is expected to leave for Riyadh on the 2nd September. Before leaving he expressed the hope that he would be able to return to the Hejaz early next year as he was anxious to spend Ramadan in Mecca. Whether he can follow this inclination must depend on the situation in Nejd. He must be slightly apprehensive. He had induced the tribes to refrain from all hostile action against Iraq on the undertaking that he would obtain satisfaction for them by diplomatic means. He has been unable to keep his promise and resentment may be strong. There seemed to be indications at one moment that Ibn Saud contemplated staging a distraction for his northern tribes in the shape of an attack on the Imam, but more recent events tend to prove that this idea, if ever entertained, has been abandoned. A rebel Yemeni sheikh and a delegation of two Zaranik have recently visited Ibn Saud to invoke his aid against the Imam. They were met, it is reported, with a categorical refusal. Had Ibn Saud designs on the Imam's territory he would not have failed to take advantage of the opportunity offered by the disaffection of the Zaranik.

7. As against this evidence of pacific intentions, an unconfirmed report has been received from Jizan to the effect that a force of 8,000 men has collected at Sada.

8. Ibn Saud undoubtedly feels the difficulty of his position; he has been at much greater pains this year than last to propitiate the more fanatical elements among his Nejd population. Instances of religious intolerance have been more frequent during the past months, and Ibn Saud has done little to restrain his Wahabi subjects from interference in the religious observances of pilgrims and Hejazis. He has given full powers to the committee established in Mecca and Jeddah to regulate the conduct of the inhabitants. This committee has drawn up a list of twenty-one rules of conduct, many of which are merely irksome, while the remainder are frankly tyrannical. The activities of this committee have aroused the bitterest resentment against the present régime, which is being compared unfavourably with that of the Turks. At all hours of the day parties of prisoners are marched off to the local jail to meditate on their crimes; the most frequent cases of imprisonment is the failure to pray at the specified times, while smoking in the streets is another crime punishable with imprisonment. All these delinquents are publicly flogged before incarceration. Many have also been flogged on the accusation that their breath smelt of alcohol. The chief clerk of a leading Jeddah merchant was flogged and imprisoned because, the informer stated, his shop smelt of wine. He had just lighted a spirit stove. Two Syrian women were publicly flogged after being placed in sacks for the purpose; they were accused of having been photographed. A leading pilgrim from Eritrea was publicly beaten and imprisoned for insisting on praying alone. A delegation headed by the kaimakam and composed of leading Jeddah notables has left for Taif to remonstrate with the King. The case is aggravated in Jeddah by the fact that the president of the committee is a young man of notoriously loose morals. A list of the twenty-one regulations drawn up by the committee is attached to this report. No European has yet been molested except the German pilot in charge of the aerodrome, who underwent a short term of imprisonment for drinking. Gramophones may now not be played even by Europeans.

9. The German pilot recently made a trial flight to Rabigh, accomplishing the return journey of 80 miles in two hours.

10. The Red Sea Petroleum Company have decided to withdraw from the Farsan Islands. Ibn Saud, having come to the conclusion that there was no hope of agreement between the Idrissi and the company on the lines of the existing concession, insisted on the negotiation of a new concession as a preliminary to any transfer of the company's field of operations. He was unwilling even to sanction experimental borings. The King was, therefore, informed that the company had no option but to evacuate. He has promised that all assistance shall be given to the company in the removal of their property.

11. The Hejaz Government, who have been in communication with the Government of Palestine with a view to the introduction of a service of money

orders between the two countries, have decided to prepare and sign a contract on the lines proposed by the Government of Palestine. Correspondence will be conducted in Arabic, but an endeavour will be made to prepare statements of account in French or English. They propose that the service should come into force one month after the signature of the agreement.

12. The practice indulged in largely by Jeddah merchants and others of handing letters to the masters of north or south bound ships to be posted at Suez or Aden has been stopped by Government order. The reason given is that the post office is thereby defrauded of much of its revenue. The decision was, however, more probably prompted by the Government's suspicion that propaganda was in this way being carried on. Though there has been no official intimation that correspondence is to be censored, there have been cases recently where letters have been opened before delivery.

13. A new decree has been published relating to the practice of medicine and the sale of drugs in the Hejaz to the following effect:—

- (1.) No doctor, dentist, midwife, dispenser or chemist may exercise his profession until he has obtained a licence from the Public Health Department.
- (2.) A licence may be revoked if the holder is proved to have committed any act justifying such revocation.
- (3.) The following fees are leviable for the issue of licences:—
 - (i.) Doctor's licence: 200 piastres Mirri (roughly £1 16s.).
 - (ii.) Dispensing chemist's licence: 100 piastres Mirri (roughly 18s.).
 - (iii.) Midwife's licence: 25 piastres Mirri (roughly 4s. 6d.).
- (4.) A chemist may not sell any drug prohibited by the Department of Health.
- (5.) If prohibited drugs are confiscated by the Department of Health, no claim to compensation will be admitted.
- (6.) First offenders under this decree will be liable to a maximum fine of £5 and to a maximum term of one month's imprisonment. Recidivists will be liable to a fine not exceeding £50 and a maximum of six months' imprisonment.

14. Abdul Ghani Senni, the Turkish diplomatic representative to Ibn Saud and the Imam Yahya, has left the Hejaz for an indefinite period of leave. He had intended to visit the Yemen this summer, but the state of his health precluded the possibility of his undertaking the arduous journey. He is suffering from several serious complaints, not the least of which is senile debility. An unfortunate mixture of childish imbecility and pompous insolence, he succeeded in alienating the sympathies of all those with whom he came in contact. In his absence the duty of representing Turkey has devolved on the Chancellor, a musty old gentleman, who sighs for the good old days when he could wear a fez; those who know the straw hat which he now affects share his regrets.

15. During the period under review no slaves have applied to this agency for manumission.

Enclosure 2 in No. 32.

List of Regulations.

- No. 1. At the call to prayer everyone must go to the mosque and all must pray together.
- No. 2. It is forbidden to curse a man's religion and nation or to use abusive language.
- No. 3. All forms of amusement and sport are forbidden.
- No. 4. It is forbidden to ill-treat animals.
- No. 5. It is forbidden to shave.
- No. 6. It is forbidden to drink intoxicating liquors.
- No. 7. It is forbidden to smoke tobacco.
- No. 8. It is forbidden to wail for the dead.
- No. 9. It is forbidden for men to consort with women.
- No. 10. It is forbidden to tell fortunes (sand divining).

- No. 11. It is forbidden for men to wear gold and silver ornaments or silk clothing.
 No. 12. It is forbidden for women to visit the tombs or to go out in the evening unless accompanied by a male relative.
 No. 13. Iskat, Zikr and Maealid are forbidden.
 No. 14. Zar and Nezmar are forbidden.
 No. 15. It is forbidden for boys to sing and to swear.
 No. 16. It is forbidden to be dishonest in business transactions and to give short measure.
 No. 17. It is forbidden to go out in parties to meet and celebrate the arrival of caravans.
 No. 18. It is forbidden to appear in public insufficiently clad.
 No. 19. It is forbidden to take interest on money.
 No. 20. It is forbidden to sell or purchase at prayer time.
 No. 21. It is unlawful to take any oath except in the name of God.

[E 4867/58/91]

No. 33.

Mr. Stonehewer-Bird to Lord Cushendun.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 152.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, September 12, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the 1928 pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina.

2. In the preparation of this report I have received much assistance from the Indian vice-consul, the Indian doctor and the Malay pilgrimage officer.

3. Copies of the report have been addressed to Delhi, Singapore, Cairo and Khartum.

I have, &c.

F. H. W. STONEHEWER-BIRD.

Enclosure in No. 33.

*Report on the Pilgrimage, 1928.**1. Introductory and General.*

"HAJ" day fell this year on the 29th May. The number of pilgrims from overseas, including nearly 5,000 children, totalled nearly 101,000, while the number assembled at Arafat is estimated at roughly 180,000. There was thus a reduction on last year's figures of about 30,000 in the number of overseas pilgrims, and of roughly 40,000 in the total attendance at Arafat. The reduction in the number of pilgrims from the interior is explained largely by the fact that Ibn Saud did not encourage his Nejdīs to perform the pilgrimage. These fanatical Wahabīs are a constant source of annoyance and a potential source of real danger to the pilgrims. The falling off in the number of overseas pilgrims is explained in various ways. The decrease in the number of pilgrims from the Dutch East Indies and British Malaya is attributed to the unsatisfactory state of the rubber market, while the much reduced size of the Indian pilgrimage is attributed to poverty in Bengal. Pilgrims from all parts may also to some extent have been influenced by the wild newspaper reports of unrest in the Hejaz resulting from the unsatisfactory state of affairs on the Nejd-Iraq frontier. Apart from these considerations, to expect the 1928 pilgrimage to reach the 1927 total was to be unduly optimistic. Last year's pilgrimage was confidently expected to be a Haj Jumaa, i.e., a year in which the Aid falls on a Friday, thereby conferring a sevenfold blessing on the faithful, who attend. This year no hope of extraordinary blessing was entertained. Moreover, among the 1927 pilgrims were many who had waited to perform their pilgrimage until complete security was known to have been established in the Hejaz.

Though the number of pilgrims thus fell short of last year's record total by more than 30,000, yet the 1928 pilgrimage may be regarded as the most successful of late years.

In point of numbers, it was the second largest since 1910. Though the revenue which accrued to the Government from taxes on pilgrims was slightly less than last

year, the income from customs dues was considerably greater. Accurate customs statistics are not available, but it is generally believed that the value of imports for the first eight months of this year was nearly double that for the corresponding period of last year. The tax on imported kerosene, motor spirit and on oil alone was not far short of £10,000. The increase in imports is directly traceable to the pilgrimage; goods are imported either to meet the needs of the pilgrims themselves, as in the case of cars, petrol and food-stuffs, or they are imported to meet the increased needs of those who have grown rich at the expense of the pilgrims. Thus any revenue from customs may be regarded as revenue attributable to the pilgrimage.

Security has been, as last year, absolute. Motor services from Jeddah to Mecca and from Jeddah to Medina were uninterrupted except for the few days when the camel caravan was travelling from Mecca to Medina. There were about 600 cars employed in the transport of pilgrims, and these were inspected before each journey from Jeddah by a British engineer. The danger of overcrowding or accidents due to mechanical imperfections was thus greatly reduced.

The Jeddah-Mecca road was repaired, or rather constructed, for stretches totalling about 10 miles. The cost of the work was heavy and the result unsatisfactory. A more economical scheme is now under consideration, namely, to lay wire netting along the sandiest stretches of the road.

Serious endeavours were made to cope with the question of water supply at Jeddah, Mecca, Muna and Arafat. As regards Jeddah, a new condenser was purchased in England and was in working order before the return of the pilgrims from the Haj, the time at which the need is greatest. The two condensers are capable of a total maximum output of nearly 300 tons a day. There was consequently no shortage of water, nor did the cost, as in previous years, appreciably increase during the season. At Mecca, a disused water course was opened up, and the Government were helped in this work of ensuring sufficient supplies by two days' very heavy rain just before the pilgrimage. Wells were dug, storage tanks provided at Muna and Arafat and on the road between these places. Shelters and tents were also erected by the roadside between Muna and Arafat. Better arrangements were made for the disposal of the carcasses of sacrificial animals. Ambulances provided with water and ice were in attendance to pick up those suffering from heat stroke or exhaustion. Cars were also provided for the removal of the dead. Mortality was much lower than last season. Two Indian doctors were engaged by Ibn Saud and appointed to posts under the Health Department. Their qualifications and efficiency compared very favourably with those of the Syrian doctors employed, and their services were highly appreciated.

Regulations were enforced to curb the cupidity and dishonesty of pilgrim guides, and there were fewer complaints on this score than in previous years. A school for mutawwifs is to be opened before next season, and only those who obtain a certificate of proficiency will be allowed to exercise this profession.

With a few notable exceptions which are dealt with under the section of this report devoted to Indian shipping, arrangements for the repatriation of pilgrims were satisfactory. The question of destitutes presented little difficulty this year, as, with one exception, all countries despatching pilgrims to this country either insist on some provision for the return journey being made before the pilgrims' departure, or, as in the case of Nigeria, place at the disposal of the agency sufficient funds to allow of pilgrims being repatriated when stranded. The King provided funds this year for the repatriation of destitute Afghans.

There were more frequent cases this year of interference with foreign pilgrims in the performance of their special rites. Indian and Persian pilgrims were the chief sufferers. Certain Persian pilgrims were imprisoned for insisting, after a warning, in celebrating the Moharram festival, a practice offensive to the Wahabīs. A number of Indians also received rough treatment at the hands of a party of Nejdīs as a result of their insistence on invoking the name of the Prophet in their prayers before his tomb at Medina. Maluvi Mushtaq Ahmed, an Indian preacher of some note, was imprisoned for several days as a common criminal for preaching in the Mecca Mosque against Wahabi "infidels."

Several Moslems of importance performed the pilgrimage this year. Chief among these were the Sultan of Shehr and Mokalla, the Sultana Permsisuri of Perak, the Begum of Junagadh, and Sheikh Ibrahim Musa Madibbo and Sultan Mohammed Bahr-ed-Din Abbakr from the Sudan. There was also this year an increased number of Indian political undesirables whose voices were frequently heard in denunciation of the West. Chief among these were Ismail Ghaznavi, Zafar Ali and Abdul Kadir Qassori.

No Moslem conference was held this year, but the King entertained and had frequent conversations with leading Moslems.

The Mahmal was not brought from Egypt, and it now appears as though Egypt will not again provide the holy carpet, at least for as long as Ibn Saud is in power. The main covering for the Kaaba was made in Mecca by Benares weavers specially brought to the Hejaz by Ibn Saud for the purpose; the embroidered portions (the Hizam) were made in Delhi and brought from India by Ismail and Abdul Wahid Ghaznavi.

In spite of differences of opinion between the Hejaz and Egypt on the subject of the Mahmal and of the establishment of hospitals, the number of Egyptian pilgrims showed small decrease on last year's figure. The Khedivial Steamship Company this year obtained the contract for the carriage of Egyptian pilgrims, and employed for the purpose three ships of the Mogul Line. The service was most efficiently organised and conducted.

The experience of this year compared with last has shown that 100,000 pilgrims is normally as many as this country in the present state of evolution can absorb, and is as many as the shipping companies at present employed in the pilgrim traffic can, without confusion, cope with. The three main requirements of pilgrims are shipping, motor and camel transport and water. These, owing to the reduced numbers of the pilgrims, were in contrast to last year sufficient to meet all needs. While Government taxes were in certain cases higher, the cost of living was lower, and the average cost of the pilgrimage to the individual pilgrim was certainly less than last year. The reduced cost of living was due in part to the stabilisation of the exchange brought about by the introduction of sufficient silver and nickel coinage to meet current needs, and in part to the reduced price of water consequent on the erection of the new condenser at Jeddah and on the increased supply at Mecca, Muna and Arafat.

There was an increase in the number of Russian Soviet subjects who performed the pilgrimage this year. They totalled 749 as against 315 last year. They were brought to the Hejaz in two Soviet steamers, the "Tobolsk" and the "Theodor Nette." Both these ships carried in addition to their pilgrims cargoes of sugar and flour. On the former travelled Astokhoff and Belkin on a commercial mission to the Yemen. Their attempts to gain popularity for their goods by selling them at uncommercial rates met with little success in the Hejaz, where they found themselves in conflict with the influential merchants with interests in India. Every obstacle was put in their way. At Hodeida they appear to have had a greater measure of success.

North African pilgrims came in approximately the same numbers as last year. Italian North Africans were carried in the "Sofia Pa." the service was well organised and no untoward incidents occurred. The French North African and Syrian pilgrimage was, on the other hand, deplorably mishandled. Tenders were offered for the privilege of transporting pilgrims. Contracts were obtained by rascals with little or no capital, who quoted prices on which a loss was in most cases shown. The service, which in the face of strong competition was the most disgracefully conducted, unfortunately employed a ship flying the British flag, the steamship "Maltana." This ship was chartered by an Italian Tunisian of shady character, who boasted a capital of £250. He had no money to pay landing dues on arrival and none to pay Suez Canal dues on departure. As the ship was British, the charterer Italian, and the pilgrims French, three foreign representatives were involved in the resultant confusion.

2. Statistics.

To obtain accurate statistics of the number and nationality of pilgrims who perform the Haj is difficult. The quarantine authorities issue statistics, but group the pilgrims by race rather than by nationality; under the heading of Javanese, for example, are included all Netherlands East Indies pilgrims, Malays, Chinese and Philippine Islanders. Figures supplied by consulates are based on the number of passports registered, and do not include children. Moreover, not all consulates oblige their nationals to register, and even where such registration is obligatory, many pilgrims evade their obligation.

The following list, based on quarantine and consular statistics, shows a total of 100,767 overseas pilgrims. It may be taken as approximately accurate both as regards the total number and as regards the figures for each nationality:—

LIST of Overseas Pilgrims by Nationality.

Netherlands East Indies ...	42,730
British Malaysians ...	4,418
Various Far Eastern pilgrims (Chinese, Siamese, Philippine Islanders, &c.) ...	2,246
British Indians ...	13,954
Afghans ...	3,022
Bokharans ...	1,987
Cingalese ...	68
Sarawakis ...	81
Persians ...	3,403
Muscatis ...	341
Iraqis and Kurds ...	528
Hejazis ...	1,169
Hadramis ...	732
Yemenis ...	1,242
Nejdīs ...	74
Somalīs ...	266
South Africans ...	112
Zanzibaris and East Africans ...	34
Egyptians ...	14,099
Syrians ...	1,109
Palestinians ...	471
Turks ...	875
Russians ...	749
Eritreans ...	76
Tripolitarians and Cyrenaicans ...	183
Algerians ...	1,401
Moroccans ...	151
Tunisians ...	600
Senegalese ...	91
West Africans (British and French) ...	2,051
Unclassified North Africans ...	490
Sudanese ...	2,014
Total ...	100,767

Statistics furnished by shipping companies show the following numbers of pilgrims as having embarked at the undermentioned ports:—

Indian ...	22,063
Netherlands East Indies ...	32,568
Malayan ...	15,279
East African ...	123
Port Sudan ...	1,874
Massowa ...	650
Egyptian ...	11,577
Syrian ...	100
Mokalla ...	356
Russian ...	749
North African ...	2,390
Total ...	87,729

Ships of various nationalities employed on the pilgrimage were as follows:—

Flag.	Ships.
British ...	104
Dutch ...	29
Italian ...	21
Egyptian ...	1
Greek ...	2
French ...	1
Soviet ...	2
Total ...	160

The following table shows the number of pilgrims carried by ships of each nationality:—

Flag.	Number of pilgrims.
British ...	51,427
Dutch ...	32,568
Italian ...	1,006
Egyptian ...	31
Greek ...	961
Russian ...	749
French ...	987
Total ...	87,729

3. Quarantine.

As was the case last year Indian and Malay pilgrims were loud in their complaints regarding their enforced stay of twenty-four hours at Kamaran, and were envious of the good fortune of their Netherlands East Indies co-religionists, who remain only a few hours and are not obliged to land.

It is, of course, for the Government of India and of the Straits Settlements to decide whether the introduction of a regulation to enforce inoculation and vaccination would meet with opposition, but it is quite clear that the leading pilgrims, at least, would welcome such a regulation as dispensing them with the enforced stay at Kamaran. British shipping interests would also profit by the gain of an extra day.

Apart from their objection to the enforced delay, pilgrims had various complaints to make regarding the actual arrangements. Better-class Indians objected, as they do in Jeddah, to landing in sambouks and considered that a few motor-boats should be at their disposal. They also complained that, on landing, inadequate protection was afforded them from the sun. Malays and Indians complained that they were obliged to await their turn for ablutions clad only in a towel and standing on the bare floor, sometimes for an hour or more, and that this, especially in the winter months, resulted in chills.

As the pilgrimage was declared clean, no ship called at Kamaran on the return voyage.

Owing to reported cases of plague at Suez, ships arriving from the north were, in most cases throughout the season, quarantined at Jeddah, and the passengers detained on one of the islands for periods varying from one day upwards. The quarantine islands are adequate as regards accommodation, sanitary arrangements and food and water supply. Pilgrims were merely detained; they were not subjected to medical inspections nor was there any disinfection of their persons or effects.

Frequent complaints were made by shipping agents, especially of the Blue Funnel line, against the quarantine doctors, who, by their delay in carrying out the medical inspection, often retarded the departure of ships by several hours. They either did not go out to a ship until two hours after its arrival, or, when they did go out, were unduly slow in completing the necessary formalities. The fault lay probably not so much with the doctors themselves as with the Government, which only provides two doctors, where four could, with advantage, be employed during the heavy months of the pilgrimage. One of the doctors enjoys a probably quite unjustified reputation as a clever practitioner. Local officials continually call him away from his regular work to attend their families. On the remaining doctor devolves the duty of visiting two or three ships anchored some 4 miles from the quay in one morning, and it is perhaps only natural that he should wish at times to toy with a cold beer on board or take a well-earned nap ashore.

A fresh endeavour was made this year to induce the Hejaz Government to become a party to the Conseil sanitaire maritime et quarantenaire d'Égypte. The Hejaz had been invited to send a delegate to the regional conference held at Port Sudan in April, but, on the excuse that owing to the pilgrimage the date fixed was unsuitable, no delegate was sent. The President of the Council, Major C. P. Thomson, held a conversation in Jeddah with Dr. Hamouda, the director of the Hejaz Health Department, but no agreement was reached. The Hejaz Government are rooted in their determination not to ratify the new Paris Convention, as, in spite of all arguments to the contrary, they continue to regard the clauses relating to the Hejaz as derogatory to their sovereign independence.

4. Health

There was no epidemic during the pilgrimage months. The diseases most prevalent among the pilgrims were dysentery, malaria and diarrhoea, while a lesser number suffered from skin affections, respiratory troubles and heat stroke. Cases of pneumonia and bronchitis and rheumatic affections were frequent. These cases are traceable according to the agency doctor's report, to a large extent, to exposure at Kamaran. The constitutions of the old and feeble, who form so large a majority of the pilgrims, are unable to resist the cold bath and the long and draughty wait preceding it. The number of pilgrims attended by the Indian doctor up to the date of the return pilgrimage was 3,520, of whom 1,420 received treatment at Jeddah and 2,100 at Mecca and Muna. Of these patients most were of the poorer classes and were of advanced age. The most unfit and the most liable to disease were the Bengalis, who were of poor physique and were content to live in the filthiest and most insanitary conditions.

The table of diseases given below shows the rough percentages of cases treated in the Indian dispensary. Malaria, which accounts for 23½ per cent., is especially prevalent in Mecca and Medina, where tanks and cisterns teem with mosquitos. Jeddah is comparatively free.

Dysentery is endemic and accounts for the greatest mortality in the Hejaz both among pilgrims and local inhabitants. Flies, contaminated water and the use of common latrines are the chief contributory causes.

Small pox is also endemic. No pilgrims were this year infected.

There were a few isolated cases of enteric fever.

DISEASES, &c., Treated in Indian Dispensary.

	Percentage.
Malaria and its complications ...	23.5
Affections of the respiratory system ...	18.0
Dysentery ...	14.5
Diarrhoea ...	4.25
Other disorders of digestive system ...	4.25
Circulatory system ...	0.5
Neuralgia and nervous system ...	2.0
Urinary system ...	1.0
Eye ...	2.0
Ear, nose and throat ...	1.0
Women's diseases ...	0.5
Skin diseases ...	2.0
Heat exhaustion ...	0.5
Surgical—	
Wounds ...	4.5
Abscesses, boils ...	1.5
Fractures ...	0.75
Contusions ...	1.75
Teeth extractions ...	2.25

The rate of mortality among pilgrims showed a very marked reduction on last year's figure. Complete statistics of deaths among pilgrims of all nations are not available, but the figure probably does not exceed 5,000, or less than 5 per cent. of the total number of pilgrims. The most notable improvement in this direction was among Indian and Malay pilgrims. The death rate of Indians was 3 per cent., as against 6 per cent. last year, and the Malay rate fell from 12 to 6 per cent. More than 60 per cent. of the total mortality occurred among the Netherlands East Indies pilgrims, who lost more than 3,000 or roughly 8 per cent. of their number. Even this figure showed a reduction on last season's figure of 10 per cent. High mortality among the Javanese is inevitable. There are invariably numbers of children, old men and pregnant women. The aged come with the definite intention of leaving their bones in holy ground, while many women seek, by giving birth to a child in the holy land, to acquire additional merit both for themselves and their offspring.

The reduction in the number of deaths may be attributed largely to improved conditions. The increased water supply, the erection of shelters and the ambulance service all contributed to reduce the number of deaths from heat exhaustion, which swelled so greatly last year's figures.

The Government this year introduced an improved system of registration of deaths; monthly lists were forwarded to the consuls of the names of their nationals who died on pilgrimage.

Sanitary conditions in Jeddah were poor, and there was little improvement on last year. The average Indian pilgrim does not bring to the Hejaz sufficient funds to allow of his hiring decent accommodation. Pilgrims crowd into disused store rooms without sanitation, or, if they are wise, they camp out in the streets. There are no public lavatories in Jeddah. As a result, the stench within yards of any wall is overpowering. The intense heat of the sun acting as a natural incinerator alone saves Jeddah from the outbreak of serious epidemics. Houses which boast a drainage system (soakage pit) are invariably, owing to the careless and uncleanly habits of the occupants, malodorous. The use of disinfectants is confined to the very few. Flies swarm in millions in the market, and no attempt is made to protect food from contamination. Few Europeans have entirely escaped sickness this season.

Sanitary conditions at Mecca were little better than at Jeddah. Pilgrims unable to afford or to procure decent accommodation crowd into small rooms, one latrine serving perhaps thirty persons. The Mecca streets are said to be dirtier even than those of Jeddah.

The same conditions prevail at Muna, with the exception that the vast majority of the pilgrims live in the tents, and such houses as exist are consequently less thickly inhabited. Houses are of a better pattern but are falling into decay.

Though it will be seen that little advance has been made in the direction of providing more sanitary housing conditions, yet credit must be given to the Government for introducing certain definite improvements which undoubtedly reacted favourably on the pilgrims' health and well-being. One of the most noted of these improvements was the erection of shelters along the Mecca-Muna-Arafat road.

Water Supply.

The Government erected at Jeddah, at the cost of £16,000, a second condenser of the same pattern as the first, and capable of the same output of 150 tons a day. There was thus no shortage of water, and the price did not, as last year, rise appreciably during the season. Many of the poorer Indian pilgrims were, however, unable to pay the price asked for fresh condenser water, and bought from local inhabitants well water or condenser water bought some months before at a cheaper rate and stored in underground tanks against a possible shortage. These tanks are often in close proximity to the drains, and pilgrims ran a certain risk in drinking it.

At Mecca there was a sufficiency of fresh water from the Zubeida Canal. The supply had been much increased by the opening up of a disused course. There were heavy rains just before the pilgrimage, and wells and reservoirs were also well furnished. As is the case in Jeddah, there is risk of this water becoming contaminated owing to the proximity of drains.

At Arafat the water supply was fully adequate. Much free water was distributed by charitable persons, and the price did not exceed 4d. for a 4-gallon tin.

At Muna the supply was less plentiful, and the price rose roughly to 10d. or 11d. a tin, but there also the King and a certain number of the richer pilgrims made arrangements for free distribution of water in cases of need. It has been suggested by leading pilgrims, and the suggestion is supported by the Indian doctor, that there should be a fund at the disposal of the agency for the provision of free water and food to destitute pilgrims. There are several serious objections to the proposal. Experience has taught that if there is a chance of anything being obtained free, a pilgrim takes immediate steps to appear as a destitute. The object of the Haj Committee in India and of all employed in pilgrimage duties should be to induce by all means at their disposal intending pilgrims not to undertake the Haj unless they are in possession of sufficient funds. The knowledge that they need not provide for themselves would merely induce penniless pilgrims to embark even more light-heartedly than at present.

Another branch of the Health Department's work which showed vast improvement was the collection and disposal of the dead. A certain number of motor ambulances circulated among the pilgrims both on the road and at Muna and Arafat, and the dead were speedily removed. Pilgrims suffering from heat exhaustion were taken up and received immediate medical attention. In this way many lives were undoubtedly saved. Arrangements for the disposal of the carcasses of sacrificial animals were improved. Slaughter was not permitted in the vicinity of tents or

houses, and deep pits were dug at sufficient distance from the camp. Pilgrims were, however, in many cases slack, and the regulations were not always enforced.

There is still much room for improvement as regards hospitals. Accommodation is very limited. In Jeddah, for example, where there are at times after the pilgrimage as many as 8,000 pilgrims, there are sixty-three beds in the hospital. Hospitals are badly equipped, badly staffed, and inadequate stocks of medicines are kept. The Egyptian Government, it is understood, were willing to establish, equip and staff a hospital with funds previously devoted to the making and despatch of the Mahmal, but negotiations are said to have broken down, as the Hejaz Government insisted on absolute control of hospitals so founded.

It is especially in the supply of medicines that the Hejaz hospitals are deficient. Many of the leading Indian pilgrims brought a supply of drugs with them, and this practice is to be encouraged. Pilgrims have complained, with some justification, that the medical staff attached to the agency is insufficient. It is always difficult to decide at what moment the doctor should leave for Mecca and when he should return to Jeddah. If he leaves for Mecca many weeks before the date of the actual pilgrimage, pilgrims arriving from India and requiring medical attention in Jeddah cannot obtain it. After the pilgrimage the doctor's presence is required in Jeddah, as many thousands of Indian pilgrims are then assembled to await their ships; on the other hand, several thousand remain in Mecca. It is certainly desirable that a second doctor, a sub-assistant surgeon, should be attached to the pilgrimage staff for the five months of the season. This temporary medical staff could arrive by the first and leave by the last pilgrim ship. Many young doctors would doubtless be willing to perform the pilgrimage in these conditions, and the cost to the Government should not be great. The Straits Settlements Government have suggested attaching a Malay dresser to the Indian medical staff. If this proposal is adopted, it will not be necessary to despatch a temporary Indian dresser.

The Indian doctor, Muzaffar Ali, assumed his duties on the 7th February. He early met with a serious disappointment in that the title of vice-consul enjoyed by his predecessor was transferred to the pilgrimage officer. As Muzaffar Ali appears to have accepted the post on the understanding that it carried with it the title of vice-consul, his resentment was natural. It has been suggested that he also should be appointed vice-consul for the duration of his contract, and it is hoped that effect may be given to the suggestion. Muzaffar Ali's disappointment has not, however, prevented him from giving loyal and efficient service throughout the pilgrimage. His duties have been well and conscientiously performed. A telegram and several letters were received from pilgrims during the season expressing gratitude for the services rendered by him. In his work he was ably seconded by his dispenser, Saiful Rahman.

5. Transport.

Motor.

The number of cars employed in transporting pilgrims from Jeddah to Mecca and Medina during the season exceeded 600. The supply more than met the demand, with a result that a price-cutting competition was entered into by the various companies engaged. While the fixed Government rates were £15 per passenger for the return journey from Jeddah to Medina and £1 4s. for the return journey to Mecca, competition was at certain periods so strong that pilgrims often paid only £8 and 12s. for the respective journeys. As the Government taxes levied on the car owners were £6 and 8s. respectively, little or no profit was made. The import of cars was, as a result of this state of affairs, limited towards the middle of the season. As wastage is very high, possibly 20 per cent. of new cars are scrapped during the season, the effect of the limitation of import was soon felt, and prices towards the end of the season were more normal. Profits were, however, very small. The luckier among the owners have paid their expenses and met the cost of their cars, but the important "Saudieh" company is said to have suffered a loss of about 5 per cent. of its capital.

All cars and lorries were inspected before departure by the British engineer in charge of the Government workshops. The number of passengers was fixed according to the strength and power of the car, with reference necessarily to the possible seating accommodation. This ruling caused much distress to those owners who had thought, by fitting large and flimsy bodies to light cars, to make large profits. After the mechanical inspection pilgrims were obliged to take their seats and remain in the cars while the necessary stores of petrol and water were collected.

A certificate was then granted to the effect that the car was in good repair, had sufficient petrol, oil and water, and that it was licensed to carry so many passengers. On the car leaving the Medina or Mecca gates the certificate was endorsed by the police. Pilgrims complained loudly of the delay occasioned by these regulations, and they were later relaxed to the extent that cars were allowed to pick up their pilgrims after all formalities other than the last police inspection had been carried out.

In Mecca, pilgrims had a similar complaint. They were detained in their cars often for hours while owners wrangled with officials over the amount of tax due. There was one case of death from heat exhaustion due to this prolonged wait in the sun.

Although the number of cars available was more than sufficient to meet all needs, yet in many cases pilgrims were kept for days awaiting transport or were accommodated in lorries when they had paid a higher price for seats in small cars. They had either hired cars belonging to small companies or had been forced by their mutawwifs to use the mutawwifs' own cars. A small owner or mutawwif might have three cars; if one broke down, pilgrims were stranded until it had been repaired. Complaints on this score became so numerous that it was necessary to invoke the aid of the local authorities in obtaining refunds on the fares paid and in providing alternative accommodation. In order to remedy this evil, the Government have framed a regulation whereby no company will be allowed to carry pilgrims unless it has at least thirty cars at its disposal. Owners or companies disposing of small numbers of cars must amalgamate.

Drivers were careless, and a certain number of minor accidents occurred, but only one fatal accident to a British (Indian) subject was reported. Chauffeurs had to undergo a fairly severe test before being allowed to drive pilgrims, but once on the road their object was to reach their destination at the earliest possible moment regardless of the comfort of the passengers or the strain on the car. High wages were paid, amounting in some cases to as much as £15 a month. Many complaints were received from Adenese and Sudanese who had signed agreements to work at £4 or £5 a month and who found on arrival that their wage was less than half the normal wage prevailing.

Camel Transport.

By no means all the pilgrims availed themselves of the car service. Many, on religious grounds or for reasons of economy, preferred to adopt the Prophet's own form of transport. Religious objections against the use of cars were expressed, chiefly by the Netherlands East Indian pilgrims. The allegation that Javanese mutawwifs had been heavily subsidised by camel owners to instil these objections is quite possibly true, as among no other pilgrims was the anti-car feeling so strong. Camel hire to Mecca varied from £1 to £1 3s. for two persons, of which the Government collected 10 rupees as Koshan tax. The price was later raised to £2, of which the Government collected £1, and in consequence many of the poorer pilgrims performed the journey from Mecca to Jeddah on foot. There was also a large increase in the cost of camel transport from Mecca to Arafat. Camel hire to Medina was £12, of which £7 went to the camel owner and the balance to the Government.

These largely increased rates for camel transport were sanctioned by the Government in order to appease the Bedouin camel owners, who showed signs early in the season of active resentment at the introduction of cars in such large numbers. As it was, with the increased fares sanctioned, the Bedouin probably made, in spite of the competing car, as much profit as in previous years.

It has not been possible to obtain accurate statistics of the numbers of pilgrims who travelled by camel or on foot rather than by car, but the following figures are correct as regards Indians who visited Medina:—

By car	5,625
By camel	3,920
On foot	1,311
Total	10,856

6. Mutawwifs.

Serious complaints against mutawwifs were fewer this year, though minor complaints were received in great numbers. In most cases the Indian vice-consul

and the Malay pilgrimage officer succeeded in settling these minor differences without its being necessary to make official representations to the Central Government. In grave cases, where representations were made, the mutawwifs concerned were fined or suffered terms of imprisonment. The Jeddah local authorities were invariably prepared to mete out just punishment, but they were hampered latterly by the interference of the Central Government, who passed through an unfortunate phase when any attempt by a consul to intervene on behalf of a foreign subject was regarded as an attempt on the sovereign independence of the country. On one occasion where the Governor of Jeddah had, on the representation of this Agency, obliged a mutawwif to refund the sum of £140 unfairly obtained from pilgrims, he was instructed by higher authority to return the money to the mutawwif. This he did, bearing the loss from his own pocket.

Mutawwifs have a fine old tradition of extortion inherited from their fathers and grandfathers, the profession being handed down from father to son. The measures introduced by the Government for the listing by mutawwifs of the property of pilgrims under their care on their arrival at Jeddah and for the handing over, with a certified list, of the effects of a deceased pilgrim, have gone far to rob the mutawwif of his spoils. It must be said in defence of the mutawwif that his legitimate profits are so low as to make honesty a luxury which he can ill afford. Owing to an increase in the Government tax, profits were even lower this year than last.

The following tables showing fees collected from pilgrims and taxes paid to the Government afford an indication of the small legitimate profits accruing:—

CHARGES collected from pilgrims.

	1927-28.
	Rupees.
Mutawwif's fee	15
Zamzami	3
House rent	14
Tent at Arafat	4
Zubaida tax	1
Municipal tax	12
Total	37-12

TAXES paid by Mutawwif to Government.

	1927.	1928.
	Rupees.	Rupees.
Radwa (Government tax)	8	12
Health tax	6	6
Municipal tax	12	12
Zubaida tax	1	1
Totals	15-12	19-12

Out of the 18 rupees remaining to him after paying Government taxes, the mutawwif must provide accommodation in houses at Mecca and in tents at Muna and Arafat. Moreover, it frequently happens that pilgrims make their own housing arrangements, and the mutawwif then receives no fee on this score, but must still pay the same amount of tax to the Government. In addition to his expenses in the Hejaz, a mutawwif must either pay his own or his agent's passage to India to tout for pilgrims. In India the mutawwif or his agent, it is reported, is obliged, in competition with other mutawwifs, to approach the influential men of the district, who offer to provide a certain number of pilgrims for a definite consideration. The greatest number goes to the highest bidder. The expenses of a mutawwif are, therefore, high, and as his legitimate profits are ridiculously low, means of supplementing his income must be found.

There is another aspect of the mutawwif question which deserves special mention—namely, the danger of the spread of communistic or pan-Islamic propaganda in India.

Mutawwifs may imbibe in the Hejaz from various sources subversive doctrines. They are unlikely to be able, owing to the strict supervision exercised, to influence the pilgrims in the Hejaz, but, while in India, they may possibly do so. It is difficult if not impossible to stop mutawwifs from visiting India, except in cases where

definite evidence is available that they have maltreated or robbed the pilgrims, or where they are known to hold undesirable political opinions. To prevent these men from touting for pilgrims would arouse the natural indignation of the Hejaz Government, as on this form of advertisement they rely chiefly to maintain the numbers of pilgrims visiting the Hejaz. It would be as well, however, if the activities of these mutawwifs were closely watched with a view to ensuring that they are confined to their legitimate business of touting.

7. Religious Intolerance.

The number of occasions on which pilgrims of all branches and sects of Islam suffered from the fanatical intolerance of the Wahabis was markedly greater than last year. The King professes to disapprove of the interference of his Nejdīs in the religious performances of the pilgrims. He, indeed, let it be generally known last year that Moslems from all parts and of all beliefs would be permitted to perform the pilgrimage in accordance with their own special rites. He was, however, this year either unable or unwilling to ensure to the pilgrims that liberty which they had been led to expect. Ibn Saud has a difficult task. In the interests of the country's prosperity he must ensure a large pilgrimage; in order to do this he must study the wishes and beliefs of the Moslem world in general. At the same time he cannot afford to alienate the Wahabis, whose primitive faith was the driving force behind his rise to power and on whose support he relies for the maintenance of his position. The hopeful signs apparent last year of a more liberal religious policy may have been the outcome of his confidence in the firm establishment of his power; he had just signed a treaty with Great Britain and doubtless felt that he could devote himself to establishing himself in the good graces of Islam. This year, owing to the unfortunate incidents on the Nejd-Iraq frontier, he has realised once again his dependence on Nejd and the Wahabis. He has had to humour the Nejdīs even at the expense of losing favour in the eyes of the Islamic world. The following brief summary of incidents reported to have occurred this season suffice to show the intolerant attitude of the Nejdīs towards those who do not share their narrow conception of Islam.

Permission was last year granted to visit the site of Khadija's tomb at Mecca (the tomb itself had been destroyed); this year no pilgrim was allowed to approach the spot. This order gave grave offence to many Moslems, who hold the name of Khadija in especial reverence. Nejdī Bedouins did not hesitate to park their camels in the cemetery in which many of the Prophet's companions and friends are buried.

There were several cases reported of the severe beating by Nejdīs of pilgrims who in their prayers invoked the name of the Prophet. The practice of touching the Mukam Ibrahim, a spot opposite to the Kaaba, was also repugnant to the Nejdīs, and pilgrims caught in the act were beaten on the hands.

The usual annual celebration by Persian pilgrims in Jeddah of Moharram 10 was interrupted by the local police, the room in which the celebration was being held was wrecked and the religious leaders taken off to prison.

At Medina Indian pilgrims are in the habit of praying before the Prophet's tomb with hands raised. This custom is objectionable to the Wahabis, and several pilgrims suffered punishment at the hands of Nejdīs. Two Imams of Bombay mosques reported that they were beaten for this offence and even suffered a short term of imprisonment. They were released by the orders of the Emir Feisal.

A serious case was that of Maulvi Mushtaq Ahmed, a Sunni preacher of Delhi. He came on the pilgrimage in company with Ismail Ghaznavi and other Indian Wahabis, who had taunted him with his beliefs and dared him to express them openly in the Hejaz. He allowed his religious zeal to outrun all prudence, and addressed a gathering in the Mosque at Mecca, loudly proclaiming that all Wahabis were infidels. He was arrested and detained in the common jail for several days. His friends applied to the agency on his behalf, fearing that his life was in danger. Although this was a question of a purely religious order in which official representations were out of place, it was found possible to point out to the King privately the ill effects on his prestige which any unduly harsh treatment of a leading preacher could not fail to have. Maulvi Mushtaq was eventually released; he was, before leaving for India, granted an audience of Ibn Saud, who appears to have been at pains to propitiate him.

Malay pilgrims complained of a recent decree whereby religious instruction may only be given by approved teachers in the Mosque at Mecca. Private tuition in the

houses of teachers is no longer permitted. The reason for this regulation is, however, more probably political than religious. There is a danger of these gatherings of students becoming centres of intrigue.

In Jeddah an unofficial committee was this year formed with the King's sanction to act as a "police des mœurs" or Vigilance Committee. This committee, which is still in existence, is a cause of considerable annoyance. They arrest Moslems on suspicion of drunkenness, they drive the faithful to prayer, they prohibit smoking in the streets or shops, they stop the playing of musical instruments, and they beat adulterous women. The favour extended by the King to this troublesome body has given grave offence to Jeddawīs and especially to the local authorities, of whose control they are independent.

8. Indian Pilgrimage.

The number of pilgrims who sailed from Indian ports this season was 21,109 as against last year's record figure of 36,089. Of this number, 13,954 were British Indians, a decrease of 13,592 on last year.

The following table shows the number of pilgrims from each province of India:—

Bengal	...	5,107	Sind	...	1,110
Punjab	...	2,237	Central Provinces	...	242
Madras	...	808	Delhi	...	199
N.W.F.P.	...	459	Other provinces	...	1,944
Baluchistan	...	676			
United Provinces	...	1,172	Total	...	13,954

Foreign pilgrims who sailed from Indian ports numbered 7,155, as follows:—

Afghans	...	2,456	East Africans	...	8
Chinese (Turkestan)	...	1,723	South Africans	...	17
Persians	...	1,828	Tibetans	...	6
Javanese and Malays	...	279	Siamese	...	3
Iraqis	...	49	Hejazis	...	451
Mokallans	...	197			
Russians (Turkestan)	...	16	Total	...	7,155
Persian Gulf Arabs	...	122			

The considerable falling off in the numbers of Indian pilgrims this year is stated in certain quarters to have been due to alarmist reports appearing in the Indian press at the time of the Nejd-Iraq frontier incidents. These reports may have had some effect, but a comparison of the numbers of pilgrims who arrived from the different provinces of India this year and last leads me to believe that the reason given by most of the pilgrims themselves for the decrease in their numbers is correct, namely, poverty in Bengal. The decrease in Bengali pilgrims alone was more than 10,000. The Punjab sent 2,000 less than last year. The number from Madras, on the other hand, was greater by 200, and from the United Provinces by 1,100.

It was hoped that with this comparatively small number of pilgrims little difficulty would be experienced in providing return shipping, and that consequently the number of pilgrims detained at Jeddah would be reduced to a minimum. Owing, however, to the failure of one of the shipping companies concerned, last year's problems had again to be faced.

With the concurrence of the Hejaz authorities, a committee was again appointed, under the presidency of the Indian vice-consul, to draw up lists of returning pilgrims and to allot them accommodation on ships in the order of their arrival. There served on this committee the president of the local Haj Committee, the chief mutawwif and representatives of the shipping companies. The Turkish diplomatic representative (in charge of Afghan interests) and the Persian consul were invited to send representatives to attend on their behalf. This step was taken as Persian and Afghan pilgrims travel on Indian pilgrim passes and no distinction is made between them and Indians in the allotment of return passages. This year return tickets were collected by mutawwifs at the instance of the agency from the pilgrims on landing and handed over to the Indian vice-consul with a list of the holders and the name of the mutawwif in whose charge the pilgrims were placed. The tickets were stored in the agency and handed back against the receipts which

the pilgrims had been given on landing. The work of collection was comparatively easy, whereas the distribution of the tickets to the pilgrims on their return was a task which taxed the energies of the pilgrim staff to the utmost. In the fortnight following the Haj more than 10,000 tickets were distributed. The benefits of the system were very clearly proved. Of the total number of return tickets issued in India, only fifteen as against roughly 1,000 both in 1926 and 1927 were lost this year. By noting the date of arrival of each pilgrim, fines could be levied on the shipping companies in respect of those detained beyond the regulation period. Mutawwifs were in close touch and to some extent under the control of the agency; the work of dealing with complaints being thus greatly facilitated. Pilgrims left in the order of their arrival in Jeddah; there was no question of paying a premium for priority of treatment. Another result of the system has been the reduction in the number of destitutes and the cost of their repatriation, which fell from 25,602 in 1926 to 1,500 rupees in 1928. The collection and distribution of tickets and the booking of passages was only rendered possible by the assistance and goodwill of the local authorities, of the shipping agents who provided and paid for the necessary clerical staff, and of the mutawwifs, who were put to much trouble and expense. No benefit accrues to either shipping agents or mutawwifs; on the contrary, the close control exercised has put an effectual stop to the system of premiums for early bookings and the theft or purchase of tickets by mutawwifs. The agency may not be able next year to count on the assistance of clerks from the shipping offices, nor on the same measure of goodwill from the Government. In this event, if the system is to be maintained, additional clerical assistance will be required.

Shipping.

Pilgrims were brought and repatriated to the Hejaz by the Mogul Line and by Messrs. Namazee's and Shustari's ships as follows:—

	No. of Ships.	No. of Voyages to Jeddah.	Pilgrims brought.	Return Voyages.	Pilgrims repatriated.	No. of Pilgrims not returning.
Mogul Line	7	9	9,830	9	9,934	..
Namazee	3	6	5,582	3	2,997	2,585
Shustari	2	6	5,580	4	4,656	924
Total	12	21	20,992	16	17,587	3,509

Of the 3,509 pilgrims shown in the last column, 279 were Javanese or Malays who returned to their homes by direct steamer; 2,000 were Persians and Bakhtiariis who returned by the northern route; the balance of 1,100 comprises deceased pilgrims, Indians who have elected to remain in the Hejaz, and Hejazis who travelled from India on pilgrim passes.

The following tables show the number of pilgrims carried from and to Indian ports, classified according to ports of departure:—

	Arrivals.	Departures.
Bombay	10,499	14,503
Karachi	10,114	3,084
Calcutta	379	..
Total	20,992	17,587

Of the 20,992 pilgrims carried in Indian ships, 15,902 took return tickets, 4,696 single tickets, and 394 made deposits in India, as shown in the following table:—

	Return tickets.	Single tickets.	Deposit passes.	Total.
Mogul Line	7,915	1,521	394	9,830
Namazee	3,883	1,699	..	5,582
Shustari	4,104	1,476	..	5,580
Total	15,902	4,696	394	20,992

The following table shows the number of ships available on given dates for the repatriation of pilgrims, the number of pilgrims of each line awaiting repatriation and the number repatriated on each date:—

Dates.	No. of Ships in Port.	Pilgrims awaiting Shipment.				Pilgrims Despatched.				Pilgrims Remaining.				Names of Ships which Sailed.
		T.M.	N.	S.	Total.	T.M.	N.	S.	Total.	T.M.	N.	S.	Total.	
June 7, 1928	8	5,601	2,624	2,920	11,145	1,470	..	1,495	2,965	4,131	2,624	1,425	8,180	Sultania (S.) and Akbar (T.M.)
" 8	6	261	211	..	472	986	986	4,392	2,835	439	7,666	Zayani (S.)
" 9	5	27	27	2,598	2,598	1,794	2,835	466	5,095	Alavi and Khoerou (T.M.)
" 12	3	198	28	185	411	1,134	948	..	2,382	558	1,915	651	3,124	Shuja (T.M.) and Englestan (N.)
" 13	1	6	..	9	15	..	1,127	..	1,127	564	788	660	2,012	Arabestan (N.)
" 16	1	488	12	17	517	612	612	..	800	677	1,477	Dara (T.M.)
July 1	1	322	94	197	613	322	322	..	894	874	1,768	Homayun (T.M.)
" 7	1	167	104	72	343	..	702	946	1,648	167	296	..	463	Sultania (S.)
" 14	1	732	275	146	1,153	899	899	..	571	146	717	Khoerou (T.M.)
" 19	1	290	189	83	562	..	760	..	760	290	..	229	519	Sarvistan (N.)
" 23	1	147	147	437	437	229	229	Jehangir (T.M.)
Aug. 8	2	98	44	115	257	98	..	344	486	Alavi (T.M.) and Zayani (S.)

T.M. = Turner Morrison.
N. = Namazee.
S. = Shustari.

From the above statistics the following facts emerge :

1. Messrs. Shustari again only employed two ships to bring to Jeddah 5,580 pilgrims, a greater number than they could hope to repatriate within the regulation periods.
2. Messrs. Nemazee was again responsible for the detention of pilgrims for long periods.
3. No pilgrim holding a return ticket issued by the Mogul Line was detained for more than ten days.

Messrs. Turner Morrison were enabled to deal without difficulty with the problem of repatriation of pilgrims holding their return tickets. They did not, however, escape severe criticism. Their refusal to accept Nemazee return tickets, even when stamped as interchangeable with their own, was difficult to justify, either on legal or on humanitarian grounds. An agreement appears to have been made between the two companies whereby as from the 2nd April no Nemazee tickets would be available for travel on steamers of the Mogul Line. This was naturally taken by pilgrims to mean that tickets issued by Nemazee's previous to the 2nd April were still valid for the return voyage by Mogul steamers. Messrs. Turner Morrison decreed otherwise, and categorically refused to embark any Nemazee ticket holders, in spite of the fact that during almost the whole period of the return pilgrimage one or other of the Mogul Line steamers lay idle in harbour, while Nemazee ticket holders clamoured for repatriation.

Though a perusal of the reports of recent years makes the statement difficult to believe, Messrs. Nemazee's arrangements this year were even more deplorable than in the past. Nemazee's ships were throughout the season either seized or threatened with seizure. They eventually passed into the hands of a Bombay merchant, Agha Khaleel Shirazi, who by employing Nemazee's as his agents ensured that no improvement in the organisation was to be expected. On the date when pilgrims were assembled in Jeddah to await repatriation—the 6th June—there were in harbour three Nemazee ships, two of which were bound for Indian ports and one for Singapore. Although these ships had been in harbour for more than a fortnight, not one was ready to sail. One had no money and insufficient stores and coal. Two had an insufficient quantity of coal. One proceeded to Port Sudan to coal and was unable for days to obtain the necessary supplies. Nemazee had no credit, and the definite position of Khaleel with regard to the ships was not yet established.

The Indian bound Nemazee ships eventually sailed on the 12th and 13th June with 2,075 pilgrims, leaving 800 of their ticket-holders to await the return of one or the despatch of another Nemazee ship. As, in spite of constant telegrams, both from the shipping agents to Khaleel and from this agency to the Government of India, a ship was not despatched within the time specified, many of those pilgrims who could afford to do so had booked fresh passages by the Mogul Line, sacrificing the return half of their Nemazee tickets, while 550 pilgrims were embarked on the steamship "Sultania" of the Shustari Line, the cost of the passages being advanced by the Government of India. Khaleel protested strongly against this action. He adopted throughout the attitude that he had taken over Nemazee's ships but not their responsibilities. He regarded the belated despatch of the "Sarvistan" as a favour rather than as an obligation.

Much trouble was also caused by the number of Nemazee first-class ticket holders who could not obtain first-class accommodation for the return journey. The "Englestan" has first-class accommodation for fifty passengers, whereas the "Sarvistan" has only sixteen first-class berths. As the former ship made two voyages to Jeddah and only one return journey, the second voyage being undertaken by the "Sarvistan," more than thirty first-class passengers were unable to secure the berths to which their tickets entitled them. The case was aggravated by the fact that a ship of the Mogul Line, for which their tickets were also theoretically available, had ample accommodation. The agents eventually agreed to refund to the pilgrims the difference between the cost of a first-class and a deck passage, and the pilgrims travelled as deck passengers.

Of the 4,104 return ticket holders brought to the Hejaz by Messrs. Shustari's two steamers, 2,920 were ready to return to their homes by the 6th June. Of these 2,481 were repatriated on the two steamers available, the remaining 438 were obliged to await at Jeddah the return of one of the ships thirty-one days later. The "Zayani" and the "Sultania" are old and very slow. The speed of their return was further retarded by their picking up cargo *en route*. It might be perhaps

possible in this connexion to prohibit ships from calling at intermediate ports for cargo on their return to Jeddah, when a full complement of pilgrims awaits their arrival. Messrs. Shustari might in any case be moved to replace at least the "Zayani" by a newer and speedier ship. The redeeming feature as regards Shustari's handling of the pilgrimage is the courtesy and efficiency of their Jeddah agents, who are always ready to assist this agency in every possible way, and who invariably pay without demur any fine imposed upon them.

The last pilgrim ship sailed from Jeddah on the 8th August. Had the deposit system been in force the season would have ended on the 15th July. This season has shown even more clearly than last the evils of the return ticket system as against compulsory deposits. This question is dealt with under a separate heading.

It was suggested in last year's report that a direct service from Calcutta to Jeddah should be established. Bengali pilgrims, though fewer in number this year, formed nearly 40 per cent. of the total Indian pilgrimage. Only 379 sailed direct from Calcutta, the remainder travelling overland to Bombay. Pilgrims complain bitterly of the hardships they undergo at Bombay while awaiting shipment.

There was a pleasing absence of complaints against the masters and officers of ships, though the ships' doctors were in some cases the objects of criticism. It would add much to the comfort and peace of mind of the pilgrims if Moslem doctors only were engaged.

The addition of the Bengali clerk and of two messengers to the pilgrimage staff made it possible to afford considerable assistance to pilgrims on landing and embarking. The Indian vice-consul attended on board on the arrival and departure of all pilgrim ships. He heard pilgrims' complaints, settled minor disputes and collected the estates of pilgrims who had died on the voyage. With very few exceptions, the masters and officers of pilgrim ships treated him with due consideration and afforded every assistance.

The question of feeding pilgrims on board, which was raised in the report for 1927, is receiving the attention of the Government of India. Most pilgrims appeared to be in favour of the introduction of the system, though few, it must be admitted, had considered the practical difficulties involved in so catering for pilgrims. It is to be hoped, however, that in the interests both of the pilgrims themselves and of the ships' officers, the difficulties may not prove insurmountable. The pilgrims would have more deck space at their disposal; they would, moreover, be assured of adequate food on the return journey when their vitality is lowest. The masters of ships would benefit in that the risk of fire would be minimised, the ships would be cleaner and pilgrims would cease to beg for food. A certain amount of confusion results from the fact that pilgrims are responsible for their own sambouk hire from steamer to shore. Shipping companies were approached by the Government of India last season with a view to the inclusion in the cost of the ticket of sambouk hire. The companies, however, have not found it possible to agree to this proposal, the chief reason probably being that three rates of hire are in force in Jeddah according to whether a ship is anchored in the inner, middle or outer harbour. If in future years the Hejaz authorities who have been approached on the subject agree to the fixing of a uniform rate for the transport of all pilgrims by sambouk, companies may find it possible to include this charge.

It was also proposed that ships' derricks should be used for the unloading of pilgrims' baggage. Messrs. Turner Morrison, who had given the system a trial, find it retards the work of embarkation and disembarkation of pilgrims if the ships' crews only are employed. It was not intended that outside labour should be entirely dispensed with, but the work should be carried out, as in the case when cargo is unloaded, by coolies engaged by the companies. The present system, whereby dhowmen swarm on to the ships and take possession of pilgrims' baggage, leads to great confusion and often loss. The agents of the Blue Funnel Line, who make use of the ships' derricks and employ their own labour, assure me that no delay is thereby occasioned in the embarkation or disembarkation of pilgrims.

Detention of Pilgrims.

It was hoped that the reduction in the number of pilgrims carried to the Hejaz this year would render their speedy repatriation a matter of no difficulty. Owing, however, to the breakdown of Nemazee's arrangements and the delay of Messrs. Shustari's ships in returning from their first voyage, to which reference has been made above a number of pilgrims were detained beyond the twenty-five days

allowed by the regulations. Messrs. Nemazee and Messrs. Shustari both became liable to fines under article 209 A of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act. The latter paid the sum demanded, while the agents of the former refused to do so, on the score that they had ceased to be Nemazee's agents, but were now acting for the new owner, Agha Khaleel Shirazi. The latter refused to pay on the plea that, as Nemazee had issued the tickets, Nemazee must be held responsible. Sanction was, therefore, obtained from the Government of India to draw on Government funds for the amount of the fines due and to distribute the proceeds to the pilgrims detained. The total number of pilgrims detained at Jeddah for more than twenty-five days was 1,413, the fines leviable amounting to 8,150 rupees, of which 4,878 rupees is payable by Nemazee and 3,272 was paid by Shustari. The corresponding figures last year were 3,234 pilgrims detained and 21,322 rupees leviable. The following table shows the number of pilgrims detained, the period of their detention and the sums distributed to them as compensation:—

No. of Pilgrims.	Ticket-holders.	No. of Days detained.	Compensation paid.
			Rupees.
9	Nemazee	41	144
19	"	40	285
22	"	39	308
3	"	38	39
5	"	37	60
21	"	36	231
5	"	35	50
2	"	34	18
271	"	32	1,897
226	"	31	1,356
80	Shustari	31	480
346	"	30	1,730
87	Nemazee	30	435
13	"	29	52
192	Shustari	29	768
78	"	28	234
1	Nemazee	28	3
27	Shustari	27	54
6	"	26	6
			8,150

Of the sum of 8,150 rupees shown above, 237 were returned by richer pilgrims to be used for the relief of distress among their poorer compatriots.

Five hundred and fifty Nemazee pilgrims who had already been detained for more than twenty-five days, and in respect of whom the agents refused to pay compensation, were repatriated with the concurrence of the Government of India on steamship "Sultania." One hundred and fifty-two Nemazee pilgrims, who, although they had not been detained for the full twenty-five days, grew tired of waiting for a Nemazee ship, purchased fresh tickets on a ship of the Mogul line. Fifty-five Shustari ticket-holders also booked accommodation by this line. It was explained to these pilgrims that they had no valid claim to a refund from Messrs. Nemazee or Shustari.

Eighty-seven pilgrims died at Jeddah while awaiting repatriation, of whom 35 were Nemazee, 34 Shustari and 18 Turner Morrison ticket-holders. These pilgrims might, of course, have died on the voyage home, but it is significant that the mortality is highest among the ticket-holders of companies responsible for the longer periods of their detention.

Much could be done to avoid the detention of pilgrims by the companies, Messrs. Nemazee, or Messrs. Agha Khaleel Shirazi, if he has now taken charge of all the former's shipping interests, have the requisite number of ships, but they lack organising ability, and further confusion is added by their attempt to join in the transport of Malay as well as Indian pilgrims. Messrs. Shustari can provide an additional ship and replace those at present in use. But even were Messrs. Nemazee and Shustari to turn over a new leaf, the situation would still be unsatisfactory, especially in the event of a large pilgrimage, such as last year's. There is only one way in which the Government of India can ensure the speedy repatriation of pilgrims, namely, by the introduction of a system of compulsory deposits in India.

Destitutes.

The number of destitutes repatriated this year at the expense of the Government of India was 179. Authority was only asked for the repatriation at Government expense of 100, which was the number reported to be awaiting shipment. It is always difficult to gauge the number of destitutes likely to apply for free repatriation as it is only just before the sailing of the last ship that any steps are taken to discover the numbers. Were it generally known that free passages were being booked, numbers of pilgrims would immediately apply. Rivalry between Messrs. Turner Morrison and Messrs. Shustari's agents, both of whom had accommodation for destitutes' passages [*sic*: ? omission], were obtained for the very low figure of 13 rupees 8 annas. The cost of passages purchased for destitutes amounted in all to 2,416 rupees, 8 annas, of which the Government of India paid 1,500 rupees; 550 rupees were collected from such pilgrims as were not entirely destitute, while the balance was paid out of the funds placed for this purpose at the disposal of this agency by certain better class pilgrims who refused to accept sums due to them as compensation for detention.

Of the 179 pilgrims repatriated as destitutes, thirty-five were single ticket-holders, who had signed declarations that they did not intend to return to India; the remaining 144 travelled to the Hejaz by land. There is a considerable danger that more pilgrims may avail themselves of the land route via Basra and Nejd, and it would be advisable if possible to prevent pilgrims travelling to the Hejaz except by sea.

The number of destitutes to be repatriated would have been even greater had not the King decided to repatriate all destitute pilgrims whose interests were not protected by any foreign consul. As neither the Turkish nor the Soviet representatives made any attempt to deal with their destitutes, these were repatriated at the expense of the Hejaz Government. More than 200 destitute North-West Frontier pilgrims presented themselves to the local authorities as Afghans and obtained free passages.

It was distressing to note that 400 of those who made declarations in India to the effect that they did not intend to return within two years should have demanded passages back to India immediately after the Haj. A possible means of stopping this abuse would be to insist on a deposit from these pilgrims of 70 rupees, the sum to be repaid to them at Jeddah at the end of the pilgrimage season.

Deposit System.

The advantage of this system has been dealt with at length both in previous reports and in separate correspondence with the Government of India. The chief objection to the system in the latter's view would appear to be that it is undesirable to force on pilgrims a system of which Indian Moslems are not in favour. Conversations with leading pilgrims from all parts of India, however, indicate that the introduction of the system would, far from meeting with opposition, be definitely welcomed. Pilgrims have themselves suffered too much from the disadvantages of the present system not to realise the benefits which would accrue from the change. Had the deposit system been in force this year no pilgrim need have been detained for more than a few days after his arrival in Jeddah. Turner Morrison had so many more ships available than were required for the transport of their Indian pilgrims that they were enabled, without interference with their normal work, to undertake the task of transporting from and to Egypt the bulk of the Egyptian pilgrims. One of their ships was almost invariably lying idle in port, and the last few ships left without a full complement. It was, as may be imagined, particularly galling to an Indian pilgrim reduced to his last rupee to see ship after ship leave for India with empty space on board for the accommodation of himself and his family. It was even more distressing to a pilgrim to see an empty India bound ship in harbour when he and hundreds of his companions must wait for weeks for a ship of their own line.

Pilgrim Passes.

If, as is hoped, the deposit system is introduced in the near future, it will be necessary to modify the present form of pass. The most satisfactory form of pass is that issued by the Straits Settlements Government in book form with photograph attached. A perforated counterfoil bearing the same serial number as the pass itself, and on which could be stamped the amount of deposit paid, would be required. This

counterfoil could be detached when the pilgrim landed at Jeddah and retained at this agency until his return. The issue of the present form of pass, without photograph, in connexion with the deposit system is undesirable. It is desirable that a pilgrim should have in his possession a document to prove his identity; it would thus be inadvisable to collect all passes from pilgrims on arrival, but to leave in his hands a document which he can sell or lose would be to swell the ranks of the destitutes and increase the cost of repatriation.

The main disadvantage of the present form of pass is that it is without photograph. Pilgrim passes may be exchanged, stolen, lost or sold, and control is almost impossible. Moreover, every person travelling on a pilgrim ship, be he Indian, Persian, Afghan or Hejazi, travels on the same form of pass. Pilgrims who wish to return to India by the northern route are unable to do so unless in possession of a regular British passport. Much trouble would be saved to the agency and disappointment to pilgrims if it could be made clear to them that their passes are valid only for the return journey to the Hejaz, and if those who express a desire to travel through Egypt, Syria, and Iraq could be provided with duly endorsed passports before their departure from India. It was possible in certain cases, where the *bona fides* of the applicant was vouched for by respectable resident Indians, to issue passports in Jeddah, but many applicants preferred to return to India rather than meet the cost of telegraphic reference to the Government of India.

Thanks to the introduction of the system of collecting return halves of tickets from pilgrims on arrival, only fifteen were reported as lost this year. These were in the possession of pilgrims who had failed to hand over their tickets. The shipping companies, though they are only obliged to do so in the case of deposit passes, accepted emergency passes in lieu of the lost return tickets and passes and booked the fifteen pilgrims free of charge. If the deposit system is not introduced and pilgrims are still allowed to purchase return tickets, the regulation regarding the issue of emergency passes in case of loss might with advantage be reworded so as to embrace the case of loss of return tickets.

Cost of Pilgrimage.

The cost of the pilgrimage was approximately the same this year as last. No pilgrim should leave India with less than 600 rupees in his pocket after purchasing his return ticket. If he proposes to travel in the Hejaz by car rather than by camel, he should have not less than 700 rupees.

Information supplied regarding the minimum cost of the pilgrimage was communicated by the Government of India to local Governments and administrations with a view to its being brought to the notice of intending pilgrims. It is requested that the same steps may be taken this year to ensure as far as possible that no pilgrim leaves for the Hejaz inadequately provided with funds.

Staff.

The Indian pilgrimage staff consisted of the British (Indian) vice-consul, a Bengali clerk recently appointed by the Government of India and two messengers, one permanent and one temporary. This increase in staff enabled the work of visiting ships to be carried out thoroughly and efficiently. It did not, however, permit of the introduction of a system of registration, which, if practicable, would be of great assistance, especially in tracing lost or deceased pilgrims about whom enquiries are made by relatives in India. At the cost of very considerable labour, it was found possible, however, to control the booking of pilgrims for the return journey to India. An advance was made on last year's system in that all tickets were collected from pilgrims on landing and distributed on their departure. Much assistance was afforded by the shipping agencies and by the pilgrim guides, but, even so, the work taxed the powers of the Indian vice-consul and the Indian staff too highly. For the first three days after the pilgrimage, Munshi Ihsanullah and the clerk had to work night and day to distribute the tickets. The clerk was of great service owing to his knowledge of Bengali. The services of a second clerk are, however, urgently needed if the present system is to be kept up. The second clerk should have experience of office work, be able to type and to read and write the Arabic character. It would be an advantage if he could talk Urdu. If the Government of India do not see their way to appointing another permanent clerk, an efficient man could perhaps be spared for six months each year. The Straits Settlements Government, whose

pilgrims do not exceed 30 per cent. of the number of Indians, maintain for the pilgrimage season a staff of three.

I cannot speak too highly of Munshi Ihsanullah. His unflagging energy, his loyalty and his genuine devotion to the cause of the pilgrims are deserving of the highest praise. He has received many well-merited letters of thanks from leading pilgrims, who, in conversation with me also, spoke most highly of his services. He was, early in the season, appointed vice-consul, promotion to which the excellence of his work thoroughly entitled him. His living quarters were turned into a free club for the use of Indian pilgrims, and his expenses in minor entertainment must have been considerable. He gleans in this way much information of a valuable nature.

Shah Jehan, the Bengali clerk's, services were most useful. He has a good knowledge of English, and when he has become more conversant with Arabic he will be a valuable member of the staff.

The question of medical staff is dealt with under the section of this report on the subject of health.

Office and Personal Accommodation.

That part of the agency building previously occupied by His Majesty's agent as residential quarters has been freed for use as offices. The rooms previously occupied by the agency and consular offices have been freed for use by the Indian and Malay pilgrimage staffs. The English clerks, who occupied half the house in which the Indian doctor is living, have been accommodated elsewhere, thus freeing quarters adjoining the agency for the Indian vice-consul. It is hoped that the Government of India will sanction the rent of these quarters. Ihsanullah is at present housed at a considerable distance from the agency, which, especially at the height of the season, is a cause of grave inconvenience.

House rent at Mecca at the rate of £180 per annum was sanctioned by the Government of India, and a suitable house was rented for the accommodation of the vice-consul and clerk and the medical staff. Accommodation at the same rental has already been secured for next season.

9. Afghan Pilgrimage.

The number of Afghans who performed the pilgrimage this year was roughly 3,000, of whom 2,456 sailed from Indian ports to Jeddah, while the remainder reached the Hejaz via Suez and Yambo.

As was reported last year, the protection of Afghan interests was entrusted to the Turkish diplomatic representative. This year, Abdul Ghani Senni Bey discharged his duties to the entire dissatisfaction of all concerned. He endeavoured early in the season to collect from pilgrims, most of whom are nearly indigent, a heavy registration fee. A very limited number were foolish enough to pay; the amount of the fee was later reduced, but with no better results, from the Turk's point of view. On the pilgrims' return from the Haj they were expected to call at the Turkish consulate for a visa costing 10s. The assistance of the local Government in enforcing this payment was invoked by Senni Bey and rightly refused. As Afghans travel on Indian pilgrim passes all arrangements for return passages were made by this agency, the Turk's efforts on their behalf being limited to an attempt to induce the agency not to allow them to proceed without his visa. As to accede to his request would have meant the disorganisation of the system of booking pilgrims, and as the agency's sympathies were entirely with the Afghans in their reluctance to pay a Turkish visa fee for the privilege of returning via India to their homes in Afghanistan, he was informed that it was proposed to accord to Afghans exactly the same treatment as to Indians, and that they would be booked according to their dates of arrival in Jeddah, irrespective of whether they had or had not obtained a Turkish visa.

The present situation is most unsatisfactory. Owing to the fact that Afghans are treated for pilgrimage purposes as British Indians, all arrangements relating to the issue of passes and transport are made in India by the British India officials, and in Jeddah by this agency. The Turkish representative's protection is calculated to hinder rather than to assist, and for the protection so accorded he exacts registration and visa fees.

10. Malay Pilgrimage.

There was a large reduction this year in the number of Malayan pilgrims who visited the Hejaz. The chief reason appears to have been the failure of rubber. A contributory cause may have been alarmist reports in the Malay press, though at the time these reports were published most Malays would normally have left for the Hejaz. They, in company with pilgrims from the Netherlands East Indies, prefer to spend several months in the Hejaz before the Haj.

The total number of pilgrims arriving from Malayan ports was 15,279, of which only 4,418 were British Malaysians, the balance being composed of Dutch (N.E.I.), Siamese, Chinese and a sprinkling of Philippine Islanders. The corresponding figures last year were 29,604 and 12,184. The register kept by the Malay pilgrimage officer shows the following distribution of Malay pilgrims, according to their colonies or States of origin:—

Singapore	...	621	Kedah	...	448
Penang	...	193	Perlis	...	40
Malacca	...	211	Kelantan	...	570
Perak	...	658	Tringganu	...	217
Selangor	...	324	Brunei	...	16
Negri Sembilan	...	254	Labuan	...	15
Pahang	...	147			
Johore	...	704			4,418

Mortality among the pilgrims this year was lower; it did not exceed 6 per cent. as against 12 per cent. last year. Six per cent. is not a high rate of mortality in view of the considerable number of aged pilgrims who perform the Haj and the length of the pilgrims' stay in unhealthy conditions. The number of deaths, as recorded by the pilgrimage officer, was 344, including deaths which occurred among the 821 1927 pilgrims who remained in the Hejaz for the 1928 pilgrimage.

Twenty-six steamers were employed in the transport of pilgrims from Malayan ports, of which twenty-two were of the Blue Funnel Line (Holt's), three of Nemazee's of Hong Kong, and one of the Straits Hejaz Steamship Company. These steamers carried respectively the following number of pilgrims:—

Blue Funnel	...	13,268
Nemazee	...	1,136
Straits Hejaz	...	875

The first pilgrim ship left Singapore on the 17th November. This early date was chosen in the expectation of a pilgrimage equal in size to that of last year. The last pilgrim ship from Singapore reached Jeddah on the 17th May, twelve days before the celebration of the Aid. The first ship left Jeddah with returning pilgrims on the 7th June, and the last on the 15th July, by which date all Malay pilgrims and left the Hejaz.

Messrs. Holt's arrangements were as usual admirable. One complaint only was made by the pilgrims, namely, that they were not allowed to take water on board with them, nor was the ship's supply available until the pilgrims had been some hours on board. Apart from the supply of drinking water which pilgrims take with them, they also have small quantities of zemzem water, and distress was caused by the action of the ship's officers in certain cases throwing this overboard.

Messrs. Nemazee's succeeded in escaping the imposition of any fine for the detention of pilgrims this season owing to the fact that they only brought to the Hejaz in three ships sufficient pilgrims to complete the complement of one returning ship. The departure of their ship was, however, delayed as in the case of Indian ships of that line, by their change of ownership. The ship was short of coal and short of stores, and it appeared for some time as though neither the new nor the old owners were prepared to take any steps to remedy matters. Messrs. Nemazee showed enterprise in calling at Malacca and Port Swettenham to collect pilgrims.

The Straits Hejaz steamer, "Ling Nam," tried the experiment of offering to feed the pilgrims for a small additional payment. Some 90 per cent. of the pilgrims availed themselves of the offer. Most pilgrims, indeed, appear to be in favour of the introduction of this system. Deck space available for pilgrims is not great; it is at present encumbered with bags of rice, sacks of firewood and cooking utensils.

At the request of the agency the shipping companies agreed to report after the

departure of each pilgrim ship the number of British Malayan pilgrims embarked. In this way it was possible this year to gauge at any given moment the exact number of pilgrims of each line who remained in the Hejaz awaiting shipment.

Much correspondence has passed on the subject of refunds on return tickets in cases of death of the holders, or in cases where the validity of the ticket has expired. Pilgrims feel that as they are pressed by the companies to take return tickets the latter should in cases where the holders have no intention of returning to their homes during the period of validity of their ticket, arrange for the refund in Jeddah of the return half. They feel also that in cases of death the relatives of the deceased should be enabled to obtain a refund from the Jeddah agents. The present system whereby after much correspondence the shipping companies agree to make refunds in Singapore is thoroughly unsatisfactory to all concerned. It throws an unnecessary burden of extra work on the authorities at Singapore and on the agency staff at Jeddah. Were tickets to be marked at the agency "good for refund—bearer not returning from the Hejaz," or "good for refund—former holder deceased," the local agents of the companies concerned could make immediate refund to the holder or to the relative of the deceased. The chief objection to the system on the part of the companies appears to be that a number of pilgrims would obtain refunds on their tickets and then when their money was exhausted demand repatriation at cheap rates. The experience of the Dutch consul with his pilgrims leads me to believe that this would not be the case. Return halves of tickets issued by Dutch companies to Netherlands East Indies pilgrims are negotiable. They may be purchased for cash at any moment by the local agents. In spite of this facility cases of destitution or demands for repatriation are of the rarest occurrence.

The most satisfactory solution of the difficulty would be for shipping companies to authorise their agents to extend the validity of the tickets of those who intend to return within a few years, making a small charge, if necessary, for each extension of validity; and in the case of those who had decided not to return to authorise their agents to make a refund at Jeddah. The only alternative is to encourage pilgrims of the student class who are unlikely to return within three or four years, and those who are definitely making their homes in the Hejaz, to take single tickets.

Pilgrim Passes and the Registration of Pilgrims.

The passes issued to pilgrims are entirely satisfactory for purposes of travel to the Hejaz and of registration. In cases, however, where a pilgrim desires to continue his journey beyond the Hejaz—if he wishes, for example, to visit Egypt, Syria or Iraq—he should be provided in Singapore with a British passport and not a pilgrim pass. The same holds good of pilgrims travelling to the Hejaz via India, of whom there were a number this year. A certain number of Hejazi Arabs travelled to the Hejaz on pilgrim passes; this is undesirable. The work of registration was on occasion complicated by the fact that issuing officers had grouped a family on one pass rather than issue a separate pass to each member.

A great deal of criticism was again levelled at the system of registration and collection of passes by shipping agents and by the local authorities, who alleged that the departure of pilgrim ships and pilgrims was thereby unnecessarily delayed. It was maintained that its main object, namely, the prevention of the sale of return tickets, was not attained and that the system was, therefore, useless. The delay to shipping was found to be of the very shortest. The abandonment of a system which has much in its favour in order to permit of a pilgrim ship leaving Jeddah a few hours sooner is not to be thought of. It is to some extent true that the system fails to prevent entirely the sale of tickets. A Malay may call at the agency and collect his ticket as though intending to sail that day. His movements when he has left the agency cannot be controlled. He may proceed immediately to the shipping agents and book his passage, or he may sell his ticket and remain in the country. If not an absolute preventive, the system is, however, a definite check on the sale of tickets. It, moreover, keeps tickets out of the hands of mutawwifs, who are apt, through illiteracy or expediency, to mix the pilgrims' tickets. Moreover, the risk of theft in the case of deceased pilgrims is eliminated.

Mutawwifs' Fees and Cost of Pilgrimage.

Mutawwifs' charges remained approximately the same as last year, the only increase being in the composite tax known as "Duit Jamu," which comprises house rent at Mecca, Government tax and maintenance at Arafat and Muna. This tax

was increased from £5 to £6. Motor hire was, owing to the increased number of cars, considerably cheaper than last year, and more Malays availed themselves of this mode of travel. Malays travel with so great a quantity of luggage, much of it quite unnecessary, that the cost of their pilgrimage is unduly raised by heavy charges for freight. The pilgrimage officer reports that in certain cases pilgrims paid greater sums in freight during the pilgrimage than would cover the cost of the articles transported. This is especially the case as regards food-stuffs. It is quite unnecessary for pilgrims to bring provisions of rice, which can be readily and cheaply purchased in the Hejaz.

Destitution and Repatriation.

There was no destitution among the pilgrims. Of the funds placed at the disposal of the agency for the relief of distressed pilgrims only £10 in all was distributed. One pilgrim, who had travelled to the Hejaz via India with a single ticket, was repatriated at a cheap rate by direct steamer.

Effects of Deceased Pilgrims.

Monthly lists of deceased pilgrims were furnished by the Hejaz Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In cases where relatives authorised to take over the estates of deceased pilgrims were in the Hejaz, the Government handed over the effects to those relatives. In other cases effects are retained until the end of the season, when they are sent to the agency. Two instances occurred where the local court, instead of handing estates to the accompanying relatives noted on the deceased's pass, handed them to unauthorised persons who had made the usual sworn declaration of heirship in accordance with the Sharia law. It would be as well if the names of *two* accompanying relatives or persons authorised to take possession of the estate in case of death were inserted in the pilgrim pass; the names should be written in English and Arabic.

Staff.

Owing to the small number of Malay pilgrims the work of the pilgrimage officer and the Malay clerks was, with the exception of the few days immediately following the Haj, much lighter than last year. Haji Abdul Majid performed his duties thoroughly conscientiously and to the general satisfaction. The title of vice-consul having been conferred on his Indian colleague, it was natural that he, too, should desire a similar title to be conferred on him. He is well educated and has an exceptionally good knowledge of English, both written and spoken. His functions are similar to those of his Indian colleague, and there is no objection to his being given a similar title, on condition that he understands quite clearly that the title would be that of British (Malay) vice-consul and that he would be a member of the staff of the agency and not an independent representative of Malay interests in the Hejaz. It was suggested in the pilgrimage report for last year that periodical visits by the pilgrimage officer to Mecca, both before and after the pilgrimage, would prove of benefit to Malay interests, and sanction was asked for the payment of the cost of such journeys. This suggestion is submitted once again for the favourable consideration of the Straits Settlements Government.

11. East African Pilgrimage.

The official statistics published by the Jeddah quarantine authorities show the number of Takrunis (West Africans) who performed the pilgrimage this year to have been 2,051. Of these, 650 travelled by Italian steamers from Massowa, the balance by Khedivial steamers from Suakin. The official figure of 2,051 must inevitably fall far short of the total number of West Africans who visited the Hejaz. The number who, in order to evade pilgrim regulations, leave Africa clandestinely for Southern Arabian ports and thence travel on foot must still be fairly considerable, though no figures are available. The Sudan regulations have rendered the practice of travel in sambouks impossible from Sudan ports, and recent measures introduced as the result of representations by His Majesty's Government to the Italian Government have helped to hinder the practice in Eritrea. Whereas, however, the Sudan authorities, by their insistence on deposits to cover the cost of the return journey,

have solved the problem presented in the past by the stranding in the Hejaz of large numbers of destitutes, the Italian authorities have not yet thought fit to make it compulsory for pilgrims either to travel by direct ship or to make deposits or take return tickets. Until Eritrea regulations are brought into line with those in force in the Sudan, the question of repatriation of destitutes still remains. The situation has been fully explained to the Italian consul, who has been informed that this agency cannot be held responsible for the repatriation of those pilgrims who have been allowed to embark at Massowa without provision for their return. There must also still remain in the Hejaz a number of West Africans who travelled by Sudan ports before the introduction of the new regulations; these may, in due course, apply for repatriation. The number of destitutes must, however, necessarily diminish every year, and, if the Italian authorities introduce and enforce adequate measures, the evil will cease. In 1927, 1,186 British West Africans were repatriated to the Sudan at a cost of £320. Most of these had arrived in the Hejaz three or four years previously. The bulk of Nigerian destitutes do not apply for repatriation until some time after the close of the pilgrimage, when there is no longer a demand for unskilled labour. Up to the date of writing this report—early September—no British West Africans have applied for repatriation. The French consul has, however, already repatriated 150 French West African subjects via Massowa.

The Alexandria quarantine board is much exercised over the question of the transport of West Africans. The British delegate has suggested that pilgrims should be obliged, before leaving Nigeria, to make a deposit sufficient to cover the cost of their return journey to their homes. Such a regulation, admirable in theory, would probably be extremely difficult of application. A certain number of richer pilgrims travel by sea, and these would doubtless be in a position to pay a deposit; the majority, however, appear to leave their homes in the vague direction of Mecca, stopping for long periods on the way, to earn sufficient to take them a stage further. The time taken to accomplish the whole journey is anything from one to four years, and one pilgrim is reported to have reached Mecca forty years after his departure from Nigeria. To insist on a deposit from such pilgrims, if practicable, would be tantamount to prohibiting all but the well-to-do pilgrims from performing the pilgrimage. It is, however, of the highest importance to ensure that no pilgrim shall embark for or from the Hejaz except on pilgrim ships sailing to and from those ports only at which quarantine regulations can be enforced. This object can be most easily achieved by the insistence of the Italian authorities on embarkation of pilgrims on pilgrim ships at Massowa only, and on their providing themselves with return tickets.

12. Sudanese Pilgrimage.

The number of Sudanese pilgrims carried to and from the Hejaz by ships of the Khedivial Mail Line was 2,014. The service was efficiently run, and there was no undue delay in repatriating pilgrims after the Haj. No Sudanese pilgrim applied for repatriation at Government expense. As far as can be ascertained, all pilgrims from the Sudan travelled by ship and were in possession of passes and return tickets. A few pilgrims reported the loss of their passes and, in cases where enquiries showed that they had been genuine holders, emergency documents were issued.

Among Sudanese pilgrims who performed the Haj this year were Sheikh Ibrahim Musa Madibbo and Sultan Mohammed Bahr-ed-Din Abbakr. They were in possession of letters of recommendation and assistance was rendered to them where necessary. They were included by the Hejaz Government in the category of royal guests, and arrangements for their accommodation and transport were made by the Hejaz authorities.

13. Iraqis.

Five hundred and twenty-eight Iraqis are reported by the Hejaz quarantine authorities to have landed at Jeddah this year. This figure shows a decrease of about 20 per cent. on last year's total. Forty-eight pilgrims travelled via India and the remainder via Egypt.

Destitutes, though few in number, again proved an embarrassment. Individual cases must be referred to Bagdad before advances may be made to stranded Iraqis. This involves much waste of time and money and unnecessary hardship to the pilgrim. The hope was expressed in last year's report on the Iraq pilgrimage that passports

would not be issued to intending pilgrims unless they could guarantee or deposit the cost of their return journey. The introduction of deposit passes such as are now issued to Palestinian pilgrims is strongly recommended.

14. Palestinians.

The number of Palestinians to whom pilgrim passes were issued is reported by the issuing authorities in Palestine to have been 471. The deposit system introduced in Palestine enabled the agency to make small advances to returning pilgrims without reference to Palestine. The sum at present deposited is, however, barely sufficient to cover the cost of the steamship ticket to Suez and allows no margin for subsistence. This fact was pointed out with reference to the 1927 pilgrimage, and the Government of Palestine have agreed to raise the amount to be deposited by £1. Advances were made to four pilgrims who declared that they had insufficient means to meet the cost of their passages and subsistence on the journey.

15. Sarawak Pilgrims.

Eighty-one Sarawakis performed the Haj this year, of whom half travelled by Blue Funnel steamer and half by Messrs. Nemazee's. All arrangements were carried out by Messrs. Gellatly Hankey, whose local manager now enjoys the title of Sarawak pilgrimage officer.

[E 4912/3182/91]

No. 34.

Agent, Jeddah, to Lord Cushendun.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 89.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, October 10, 1928.

I HAVE received to-day a letter of protest from Ibn Saud on following points:—

1. Aeroplanes from Transjordan crossed the frontier on 20th July, flew over Nabk and Kaf and then returned.
2. Howeitat raid on Shararat 24th July, looting 160 camels and killing 25 men.
3. Raid 27th July by Mefleh-bin-Mesbeh and ten camel-men on Shararat at Malqur, looting eighty camels.
4. Howeitat raid 8th August in region of Jauf, looting three of the King's own camels.
5. Howeitat raid 11th August on Shararat at Ramamin, taking twenty-one camels.
6. Howeitat raid 13th August on Shararat at Dian, looting five camels.

Ibn Saud requests early reply of His Majesty's Government on these matters, which he refers to as having become intolerable.

In handing me the King's letter, Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that he was instructed to add a strong verbal protest, to demand satisfaction on the vital point of crossing of frontier by aeroplanes and an assurance that no repetition would be permitted; similarly, an assurance was requested that raids would be stopped and looted property returned.

On all points Hejaz Government reserves its right to compensation for damage done.

In connexion with my telegram No. 58 to Foreign Office, repeated to Jerusalem No. 104, King's letter, which I am sending by next bag, now gives the following details of losses from Transjordanian raids during the final three months of the last Moslem year: 1,600 camels and other plunder taken, and men, women and children killed.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 175.)

[E 4953/1/91]

No. 35.

Mr. Stonehewer-Bird to Lord Cushendun.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 154.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, September 24, 1928.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 139 of the 27th ultimo, with which was enclosed a note addressed by me to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the alleged movement of troops in Iraq, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the reply addressed to me by Fuad Hamza.

2. I awaited Fuad Hamza's visit to Jeddah, when I hoped to have an opportunity of discussing certain points connected with his note before forwarding a translation.

3. Fuad Hamza called on me yesterday, and the question of the alleged movement of troops was duly brought up for discussion.

4. I told him that I failed to understand the meaning of the latter part of paragraph 2 of his note, which reads: "It is unfortunate that the reply to these complaints (against Iraq and British officials in Iraq) should emanate from those who were the cause of the complaints. What will be the state of affairs when the defendant himself replies to a charge?" I said that every accused person was at liberty to answer a charge brought against him. That, Fuad replied, was not what he meant; what he objected to was that British officials in Iraq were in this case both "juge et parti." The charge was levelled equally against Iraq and British officials in Iraq, and the latter furnished the official reply. I replied that the natural person to furnish an explanation was the High Commissioner in Iraq, who was the representative of His Britannic Majesty's Government.

5. Fuad Hamza then calls in question the reason given for the return of the troops to their posts in the desert. The desert, he maintains, is as hot in August and September as in June and July. I offered, on the occasion of our discussion, the explanation that, the heat being intense in June and July, it was thought wise to give the troops a change of climate, but this did not mean that they were not to return to their posts before the end of the period of great heat.

6. Fuad Hamza concludes by stating that the point on which he wishes to lay particular stress is that the Hejaz Government must hold Iraq responsible for the possible results of their action in moving troops unnecessarily and without giving due thought to the consequences.

7. A copy of this despatch and its enclosure is being addressed to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq.

I have, &c.

F. H. W. STONEHEWER-BIRD.

Enclosure in No. 35.

Fuad Hamza to Mr. Stonehewer-Bird.

(After Compliments.)

Jeddah, August 31, 1928 (Rabia I 16, 1347).

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 27th August, 1928, in which you reply to my letter regarding the statement of the Iraq Prime Minister and the despatch by the Iraq Government of forces and troops to the frontier.

His Majesty the King complained of the action of the Iraq Government and of British officials in Iraq, and it is unfortunate that the reply to these complaints has emanated from those persons who were the cause of them. What will be the state when a defendant himself replies to a charge?

Similar incidents have now again been repeated. I have forwarded to your Excellency a protest against the despatch by the Iraq Government of armed troops to the frontier at a time when it is necessary for the sake of peace to avoid movement of troops, as such action would disturb the peace and cause excitement.

The Iraq Government sent through you the reply contained in your letter referred to above.

I am unable to understand the statement of the Iraq Government that the severity of the heat during June and July was the cause of the withdrawal of the troops to cooler quarters, and that the diminished heat of August was the reason

for their return. Is it meant that the heat in the desert during June and July is greater than in August and September?

The news now being spread from Bagdad mentions unusual activity in the despatch of military forces and the mustering of Government and private motor cars, which leaves no doubt that the mobilisation includes persons other than those at the Shabaka post.

Moreover, during the course of several conversations the members of the British and Iraq mission mentioned the decision of the Iraq Government to forgo the establishment of the Shabaka post.

Their mobilisation in that post would confirm the fact mentioned by me in my previous protest to your Excellency.

However, the important point to which I would wish to draw your Excellency's attention is not the fear of the mobilisation of military forces of the Iraq Government, but that the Iraq Government and the officials who take such action without considering the consequences will be held responsible by my Government for whatever may occur.

I beg, &c.

FUAD HAMZA.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Jeddah.

[E 4956/484/91]

No. 36.

Mr. Stonehewer-Bird to Lord Oushendun.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 158.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, September 30, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz for the period the 1st to 30th September, 1928.

2. Copies of this report are being sent to Ramleh, Jerusalem (2), Jerusalem (for transmission to the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan), Bagdad, Aden, Simla, Beirut, Damascus, Khartum through Port Sudan, Singapore, Lagos (2).

I have, &c.

F. H. W. STONEHEWER-BIRD.

Enclosure in No. 36.

Jeddah Report for Period September 1 to 30, 1928.

IBN SAUD left Taif for Riyadh on the 4th instant. He was expected to accomplish the journey in five stages and to reach his destination on the 9th instant, but no news has yet been received of his arrival. The King had intended to leave the Hejaz shortly after the departure of the Clayton Mission, but pressure of work and his desire to clear up the internal situation delayed him.

2. The Beni Malek, as mentioned in the Jeddah report for June, had been showing obstinacy in the matter of taxes. All attempts to settle amicably the questions at issue proved fruitless, and Ibn Saud before his departure ordered the despatch in three separate parties of a force of some 3,000 men to invest the stronghold of the recalcitrant tribe. There is as yet no news of the outcome of this expedition, though rumours are current that it has not met with the hoped-for success. Once Ibn Saud has decided to move in force against the tribe he cannot afford to fail, as the effect of his failure to punish this definite defiance of his authority would naturally react most unfavourably on his prestige in the Hejaz. There is a growing feeling among certain sections of Hejaz opinion that Ibn Saud should have made any sacrifice rather than run the risk of alienating British sympathy by holding out against His Majesty's Government in the matter of Iraq-Nejd differences. The loyalty of the Hejaz to Ibn Saud is based largely, in the opinion of many, on the fact of his friendship with Great Britain and the stability which this friendship ensures.

3. The internal administration of the Hejaz has during the past year left much to be desired, and an attempt was made by Ibn Saud before his departure to ensure an improvement in this direction. The negotiation and signing of contracts with foreign companies has been taken out of the hands of the Foreign Ministry. All tenders are now submitted to the Council, whose composition and duties were reported on in the Jeddah report for June. Abdullah Suleiman, the Director-General or Minister of Finance, has now full power, subject to the Council's sanction, in all matters of finance. No expenditure may now be incurred without his sanction; even municipal disbursements are previously submitted to him. Abdullah Suleiman celebrated his rise to power by arriving in Jeddah followed by no fewer than thirty scarlet robed retainers, a style in which Ibn Saud himself does not travel between Mecca and Jeddah.

4. It is an open secret that Damluji has resigned his post as Foreign Minister. His power and influence have gradually been declining in favour of the Syrian element, and with the removal of the privilege of negotiating contracts with foreign firms his post ceases to be lucrative. With all his faults Damluji was infinitely more suited for his post than either Yussuf Yassin or Fuad Hamza, both of whom have acted for him and either of whom it is to be feared may succeed him. That his resignation was such a blow and a surprise to Fuad Hamza as the latter pretends is doubtful. Neither he nor Yussuf Yassin scrupled to endeavour by all possible means to undermine his authority and reputation, and he must have realised that Damluji was growing restive. Another of the King's counsellors who has been eclipsed by the Syrians is Hafiz Wahba. Before leaving for Egypt on the 10th instant he opened his heart to a member of the agency staff. He is most pessimistic. He had little good to say of Damluji, but regards the Syrian influence as highly prejudicial to the interests of Ibn Saud and the Hejaz. He believed the Syrian advisers to be pressing Ibn Saud to conclude treaties with Soviet Russia and Turkey—treaties which Sheikh Hafiz regarded as useless to the Hejaz and calculated to estrange His Majesty's Government. Hafiz Wahab also expressed strong disapproval of the King's policy in sanctioning the formation of religious vigilance committees, whose tyrannical behaviour was arousing resentment against the Wahabi régime.

5. There was early in the month a slight lull in the activities of the Vigilance Committee, followed by a vigorous campaign against cigarette smoking. Sixty persons were one evening imprisoned for smoking in public, and it was one of the evening distractions of those whose houses overlook the police station to see the prisoners marched in, the commandant of police leaning on his balcony the while placidly smoking a cigarette. For some occult reason, smoking is not prohibited in the prison itself, either for prisoners or their guards.

6. In answer to the note from His Majesty's Government and the French Government to the effect that the Hejaz delegates must either discuss the questions for the consideration of which the Haifa Conference was called or must regard the conference as terminated, the Hejaz Government have replied at very great length, tracing in their note the origin of the Hejaz Railway and the religious objects with which it was built and stressing the fact that it is Wakf property vested in the Moslem world as a whole. They have asked that the whole question of the ownership and unity of the line may be reopened at a conference attended by delegates with full powers to discuss all aspects of the problem.

7. The tone of the "Um-el-Qura" in its articles on Iraq has definitely improved during the last month. In the issue of the 7th instant Taufik Bey Es-Suaidi's statements in Egypt are commented on with resentment but without undue bitterness. Suaidi was regarded by Ibn Saud during the negotiations as an adjunct to Sir Gilbert Clayton's Mission and not as an independent delegate, the point of view of the Hejaz Government being that Iraq, not having recognised Ibn Saud, cannot be in diplomatic relations with him. They do not, therefore, consider that he was qualified to make any statement on the course of the negotiations. In the issue of the 21st instant Iraq again comes under discussion, but on this occasion appreciation is expressed of an article which appeared in the "Iraq Times" of the 25th August criticising the Iraq Government for its failure to prevent the abuse of Ibn Saud in the Iraq press and for tolerating an anti-Saud propagandist meeting in Bagdad. A probably quite incorrect version of an interview given by His Majesty's High Commissioner in Iraq to a representative of the "Palestine Gazette" has, Fuad Hamza reports, been circulated in the Near East press and has caused intense resentment, and a request has been made to Sir Henry Dobbs to furnish, for the information of the Hejaz Government, an account of what was actually said at the interview.

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8. The Red Sea Petroleum Company, whose intention to abandon their concession in the Farsan Islands has already been reported, succeeded in removing all their property and leaving Zifaf on the 13th instant. Ibn Saud had promised that no obstacle should be placed in the company's way and the evacuation was in effect carried out without incident.

9. The Government decided some months ago to place three important contracts: for a further large supply of silver and nickel coins, for two or three motor coastal patrol boats and for a condenser at Yambo. It seems probable that the contract for coins will go, if it has not already gone, to the Mint, Birmingham. Negotiations for the motor boats have not yet been completed; both Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Sharqieh (Limited) (Philby) have been approached. As regards the Yambo condenser the position has become extremely complicated. On the 2nd instant, Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey, after much correspondence had passed, were informed that they had obtained the contract and were asked to expedite the order; the contract would be signed in a few days' time. The order was placed immediately and the contract signed on the 9th instant by the local representative of the Finance Department and the Director of Condensers on behalf of the Government. On the 23rd instant the manager of Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. was informed that the officials who had signed had no authority to do so and that the Government had decided not to order a condenser through the firm. To vigorous protests the answer was returned that the Emir Feisal had not sanctioned the signature of the contract which was, therefore, not binding on the Government, and that the only redress lay in bringing an action against the two officials. It was pointed out officially to the Acting Foreign Minister that the effect of the Government's repudiation of the contract could not fail to exercise an adverse effect on the Government's credit abroad, and that the saving effected by purchasing a cheaper article through "Sharqieh," which was apparently their object, was too high a price to pay for the loss of their good name with foreign business houses. It was soon apparent that the stumbling-block was not the question of price but the offended dignity of the Emir, undoubtedly worked on by the director of Sharqieh (Limited). Though the Emir has not yet said his last word, there is little cause for optimism; meanwhile, the condenser has been completed and will, if required, be ready for shipment in about a month's time.

10. The Government have sent a circular letter to all foreign business houses drawing their attention to the article of the currency law whereby they are obliged to accept Saudian dollars as legal tender on all occasions and up to any amount. This letter has caused intense annoyance; the Government have been paying their debts in silver with the result that the safes of the companies are already crammed with silver. The Government paid Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey the balance due on the Jeddah condenser, some £4,000, in dollars and fractions of dollars. The work of shifting the bags and counting the coins alone incapacitated two of their employees for several days. The Netherlands Trading Company were also paid in this way. Sharqieh Limited, who received £2,000 in silver, conceived the brilliant idea of sending it round to the Netherlands Trading Company and protesting to the Government when, naturally enough, it was refused. To Fuad Hamza, who has asked for the co-operation of the agency in enforcing this regulation on British firms, it has been pointed out that unless the Government provide, as the decree in question stipulates, means of converting surplus silver into gold, it is unreasonable to expect business houses to accept silver in unlimited quantities. He can at most demand that payment should be accepted in silver for goods purchased in the country, but to ask firms to accept silver in exchange for drafts payable in gold abroad is, unless the Government arrange for the free conversion of this silver at par rate of exchange, quite unreasonable.

11. The German pilot in charge of the Hejaz aeroplanes recently succeeded in reaching Wejh, but made a false landing, damaging the plane beyond hope of immediate repair. Both he and his passenger, the commandant of troops in Jeddah, received slight injuries.

12. One slave, of Sudanese origin, took refuge in the agency during the month under review and was repatriated to Suakin.

13. The first 1929 Indian pilgrim arrived in Jeddah on the 1st instant.

[E 5038/3182/91]

No. 37.

Lord Cushendun to Mr. Jakins (Jeddah).

(No. 55.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, October 25, 1928.

YOUR telegram No. 89 of the 10th October: Protest by Ibn Saud against Transjordan raids and violation of frontier by aeroplanes.

You should reply on following lines:—

1. On the 21st July aeroplane inadvertently flew over Kaf while proceeding from Amman to Bagdad, owing to pilot mistaking Kaf track for Bagdad track. His Majesty's Government much regret this occurrence, and steps are being taken by the authorities concerned to mark the proper route and to guard against a repetition of this error.
2. Enquiries are being made into all the alleged raids, and result will be telegraphed to you as soon as possible. The Amir of Transjordan, however, points out that the last three incidents of which the Hejaz Government complain appear to have been not raids but individual robberies, which no Government can altogether prevent.

If you have not already informed Hejaz Government of incident dealt with in Transjordan telegram No. 35 to you of 16th October you should add reference to it in your reply to the Hejaz Government's protest.

[E 5184/3261/91]

No. 38.

Foreign Office to Mr. Jakins (Jeddah).

(No. 215.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 1, 1928.

I AM directed by Lord Cushendun to inform you that Sir Gilbert Clayton has now reported to His Britannic Majesty's Government on his recent mission to the Hejaz. His Britannic Majesty's Government have learnt with regret that he has been unable to reach any agreement with King Ibn Saud on the major question at issue, namely, that of the advanced police posts in the southern desert of Iraq. In consequence, it was not possible further to discuss the various subsidiary questions in regard to which it was desired that he should negotiate arrangements with King Ibn Saud.

2. You will recall that in September of last year King Ibn Saud addressed to the High Commissioner for Iraq a protest against the establishment by the Iraq Government of certain advanced police posts. The post to which His Majesty took principal exception was one at Busaiyah, then in course of construction, which provided accommodation for some fifteen police. The post was situated at a distance of 75 miles from the nearest point on the Iraq-Nejd frontier. In his letter His Majesty represented that the construction of this post was contrary to the provisions of article 3 of the Uqair Protocol of the 2nd December, 1922, which reads as follows:—

"The two Governments mutually agree not to use the watering places and wells situated in the vicinity of the border for any military purpose, such as building forts on them, and not to concentrate troops in their vicinity."

Some three weeks later King Ibn Saud followed up this letter with a further protest. At this point it should be explained that the construction of the Busaiyah post and similar police posts was undertaken by the Iraq Government originally in response to a previous complaint by King Ibn Saud that the measures taken by the Iraq Government to put a stop to tribal raids into Nejd territory had proved ineffective. The Iraq Government hoped by the establishment of these advanced police posts to facilitate the administration of the tribal areas and to obtain early information which would enable them to deal more effectively with raids across the frontier from either side.

3. In the latter part of October the High Commissioner replied through His Majesty's Agent to King Ibn Saud, pointing out that there was no foundation for

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the charge that the establishment of the Busaiyah post was a contravention of the Uqair Protocol, and sending photographs and details of the post to demonstrate that, quite apart from the fact that it could not be described as "in the vicinity of the border," its small size and limited garrison rendered any description of it as "a fort" misleading. On the 5th November, while this correspondence was in progress, a party of Mutair attacked the Busaiyah post and slaughtered its occupants, including, in addition to the garrison of six police, an official of the Public Works Department, twelve coolies and a woman. After this attack there followed in quick succession a number of serious raids by Mutair tribesmen upon Iraq tribes. Strongly-worded protests were sent to King Ibn Saud, but these produced unsatisfactory replies which, while admitting that in carrying out these raids the leader of the Mutair, Sheikh Faisal-al-Dawish, had acted in defiance of His Majesty's instructions, represented that the fault really lay with the Iraq Government in constructing the police post, and that if the post were abandoned the raids would cease. It seemed clear that the Mutair tribe had temporarily thrown off King Ibn Saud's authority and were no longer under his effective control, and this view was apparently substantiated by a warning which His Majesty conveyed to the Resident in the Persian Gulf to the effect that a large force of Akhwan were marching north contrary to his orders. In these circumstances, His Britannic Majesty's Government decided that there could no longer be any objection to the Royal Air Force in Iraq being authorised to pursue Akhwan raiders across the border in order to inflict, if possible, a lasting lesson upon them. This decision was communicated to King Ibn Saud and was put into effect without delay.

4. In the meantime these constant Akhwan raids had had the effect of seriously unsettling the Iraq tribe of Anizah, one of the most powerful tribal confederations in Iraq. Towards the end of December the High Commissioner reported that, unless effective measures were taken to prevent further raids and to restore the confidence of this tribe, there was a serious danger that they would throw off their allegiance to Iraq. He explained that, owing to the immense stretch of frontier, and the great distance involved, it was almost impossible for British aircraft to catch the raiders red-handed and to inflict punishment upon them within Iraq territory. After full consideration, His Britannic Majesty's Government decided to extend air action beyond the Iraq frontier in order to deny an area of grazing grounds to the Akhwan. Early in January, and after the lapse of some two months since the initial incursion had taken place, during which further raids had occurred and King Ibn Saud had apparently taken no effective measures to restrain his recalcitrant subjects, the authority for the adoption of this measure was given and King Ibn Saud was notified accordingly. Advance aircraft and armoured-car bases were pushed forward to the vicinity of the frontier and notices were dropped warning tribes to move out of the area which was to be denied to the Akhwan. This action, coupled with constant air reconnaissances, was sufficient to restore the confidence of the Iraqi tribes, and for some three weeks the raiding activities on the part of the Mutair were suspended. At the end of January, however, further raids occurred, culminating in a raid upon Iraq and Kuwait tribesmen by some 2,000 of the Akhwan who penetrated to a depth of some 65 miles. The raiders were attacked by British aircraft, and are understood to have suffered severe losses.

5. As you are aware King Ibn Saud had hitherto endeavoured to justify himself and his tribes by the contention that the Iraq Government had broken their treaty pledges, and thus to excuse his failure to prevent the raids and to administer punishment. He now represented that the crossing of his frontier by British aeroplanes was a violation of his territory. These aeroplanes, he alleged, by bombing guilty and innocent alike, had so outraged the feelings of his people that he had had to abandon measures which he had already set in motion for the control and punishment of the Mutair, his work of pacification had been destroyed and he could no longer control the feelings of his people. In regard to this allegation, the High Commissioner for Iraq telegraphed on the 19th March in the following terms:—

"It is important to emphasise and to keep on emphasising that no human beings have been bombed other than those pursued hot-foot after the raids in Kuwait territory of the 27th January and at Jarishan in Iraq on the 19th February. A few bombs were dropped in the neighbourhood of encampments in the zone of operations within Nejd territory during the period the 18th January to the 2nd February, in order to frighten them into obeying the warnings already scattered. Only four or five camels were killed. No human beings were hit."

6. In response to the King's message, His Britannic Majesty's Government replied that, in order to assist him to regain control and provided that His Majesty would give assurances that he would prevent further raids and would punish the offenders and exact full reparation, orders would be issued that no aircraft should cross the Nejd frontier except in hot pursuit of raiders. At the same time, His Britannic Majesty's Government repeated a suggestion previously made by them on several occasions that a meeting should be arranged between His Majesty and the British Resident in the Persian Gulf to discuss the questions in dispute. His Majesty did not accept this invitation, nor did he give the assurances for which His Britannic Majesty's Government had asked, but merely reiterated his previous protests. Meanwhile, rumours became current that all the Akhwan were joining with the Mutair in a regular *jihad* (holy war) against the non-Akhwan States of Iraq, Transjordan and Kuwait, and that King Ibn Saud (himself powerless to prevent it) had been forced to associate himself with this movement. Later information, however, threw doubt upon these rumours, and indicated that King Ibn Saud had dissociated himself from the movement. Subsequently it became apparent that he had regained control.

7. Throughout his letters King Ibn Saud maintained that the establishment of the Busaiyah post or any similar police posts was a contravention of the Uqair Protocol, and he continued to press for its abolition as providing the only solution of the present trouble.

His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, were not prepared to admit that the Iraq Government, in constructing such posts, acted otherwise than in full accord with their treaty obligations; nor were they prepared to agree to the demolition of such posts. It seemed to them, however, that a full and frank discussion of the question in dispute might go far to convince King Ibn Saud that his protests against the establishment of the Busaiyah post were unjustified, and that in this matter the action of the Iraq Government had been entirely correct. To this end it was decided that Sir Gilbert Clayton should proceed to Jeddah to enter into personal discussion with King Ibn Saud and to furnish him with such explanations and assurances as, it was hoped, would set at rest any genuine doubts which he might feel both as to the intentions of the Iraq Government in constructing such posts and as to the use to which it was proposed that they should be put.

8. The main point at issue now resolved itself into a difference of interpretation of the words "in the vicinity of the border" (Arabic: "ala atraf al hudud") in article 3 of the Uqair Protocol. It appeared that King Ibn Saud had read into these words far more than they were intended to convey by His Britannic Majesty's Government. In his view, the object of the article was to prevent the erection of fortified posts at any of the wells situated in the open desert on either side of the frontier and at any distance from the frontier, and he contended that had not this been the intention he would have refused to ratify the Convention of Mohammerah, to which the Protocol of Uqair was appended. Unfortunately, no detailed record of the conversation leading up to the signature of this protocol exists. But Sir Percy Cox, the British Plenipotentiary, who represented the interests both of His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Iraq Government, at their discussions, has categorically affirmed that, on his part at least, the words in dispute were not intended to bear any strained or exceptional construction or to convey any meaning other than that which would ordinarily be assigned to them, namely, a short distance on either side of the frontier.

While, therefore, it seemed clear that these words would not admit of the interpretation placed upon them by King Ibn Saud, events had shown that they were, in fact, open to misunderstanding. Consequently it appeared to His Britannic Majesty's Government highly desirable in the interests of both parties that some means should be found of removing any element of ambiguity and eliminating the possibility of further dispute by the adoption of an accepted definition. Sir Gilbert Clayton was therefore authorised to suggest to King Ibn Saud that they should be defined as meaning within some specified distance from the frontier, and for this purpose a maximum distance of 25 miles was suggested as a basis for discussion. Alternatively, it was suggested that instead of a definition based upon distance from the frontier, certain wells on each side of the frontier should be specifically enumerated at which the construction of posts would be prohibited.

9. These suggestions were conveyed to King Ibn Saud on the occasion of Sir Gilbert Clayton's first visit to Jeddah in May last. He was, however, as you will remember, unable to convince His Majesty that in constructing the advanced desert posts the Iraq Government had not contravened their treaty obligations; nor

could any progress be made towards arriving at an agreed interpretation of the disputed words in article 3 of the protocol. The advent of the pilgrimage season, which required the King's presence at Mecca for over a month, made it necessary to bring the conversations to a close in any case, and it was decided that Sir Gilbert Clayton should take this opportunity to return to England and report personally to His Britannic Majesty's Government.

10. On the receipt of Sir Gilbert Clayton's report, and on learning of the attitude taken up by King Ibn Saud in the matter of the Uqair Protocol and the advanced posts, the whole question was re-examined by His Majesty's Government in consultation with the Iraq Government. After the fullest consideration, His Majesty's Government decided that in this matter they were unable to make any concession of principle. They held that, subject to existing treaty engagements which, in their considered opinion, were in no way infringed in the present case, the Iraq Government had every right to make what arrangements they deemed necessary for the administration of their tribes and of their desert areas, and that any attempt to interfere with this right must be resisted. Sir Gilbert Clayton was therefore instructed on his return to Jeddah to inform King Ibn Saud accordingly, but at the same time to make it clear that the permanent system of administration to be adopted for this purpose had not yet been determined, and that it was proposed immediately to consider a reorganisation of the present system. Sir Gilbert Clayton was also authorised to inform King Ibn Saud that it was the present intention of the Iraq Government to retain three advanced posts only apart from such posts as might be required for the protection of the trans-desert route and of a pipe-line, if and when constructed, and apart also from posts so remote from the frontier as clearly to be of no interest to His Majesty.

11. Sir Gilbert Clayton was, furthermore, instructed to repeat to King Ibn Saud the assurance of His Britannic Majesty's Government and of the Iraq Government that these advanced posts were not designed for offensive purposes, and that Nejd tribes would suffer no interference with customary rights of watering, grazing and peaceful movement at any of the points where advanced posts might be established. He was to add that the two Governments realised that friendly co-operation with His Majesty was a necessary condition of the satisfactory administration of the tribal areas and the maintenance of peace in the desert, and that to this end they again suggested, for his serious consideration, the appointment of frontier representatives on each side of the border who could confer together in the case of raids or other frontier incidents, and could apprise each other, as also their own Governments, of any occurrence likely to disturb the tribes and thus the peace of the border. He was further to state that in order that King Ibn Saud might be in a position to satisfy himself that any advanced post maintained by the Iraq Government was not being used for offensive purposes, and that there was no interference with any Nejd tribes in their legitimate pursuits, the Iraq Government would welcome periodical visits to these posts by his frontier representative. Sir Gilbert Clayton was also instructed to endeavour once more to persuade His Majesty to adopt the proposal put forward in May that the disputed words "in the vicinity of the border" used in article 3 of the Uqair Protocol should be accepted as meaning within 25 miles of the frontier, except in the vicinity of the trans-desert route and contemplated pipe-line, in which region, it was understood, His Majesty felt no objection in principle to the construction of protective posts. In addition, Sir Gilbert Clayton was authorised to inform His Majesty that, subject to a satisfactory agreement being reached in the matter of the advanced posts, the Iraq Government were prepared to conclude arrangements with King Ibn Saud in regard to *bon voisinage*, extradition, the surrender of tribal offenders, the exchange of diplomatic representatives, &c., on the lines discussed with his Majesty's advisers on the occasion of Sir Gilbert Clayton's earlier mission, and in terms which were understood to be acceptable to His Majesty.

12. During the conversations of May, King Ibn Saud had enquired whether His Majesty's Government regarded the provisions of article 6 of the Bahra Agreement, which stipulates that "the forces of Iraq and Nejd may not cross the common frontier in pursuit of offenders except with the consent of both Governments," as applying to British as well as Iraqi forces. Sir Gilbert Clayton was instructed to assure His Majesty that His Britannic Majesty's Government fully intended to observe the stipulations of this article, and that British forces would not cross the common frontier in pursuit of offenders. In the case, however, of an organised attack on a township or post—as opposed to a mere tribal raid—or in the event of a series of raids with which His Majesty had proved himself unable or unwilling to

deal, His Britannic Majesty's Government must reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they thought fit. Sir Gilbert Clayton was directed, when communicating this assurance to King Ibn Saud, to invite His Majesty to explain the meaning which he himself attached to the term "forces" in article 6 when applied to the forces of Nejd. It was felt desirable that, in order to avoid the possibility either of genuine misunderstanding or of equivocation, an acceptable definition of what must be held to constitute the "forces" of Nejd should be obtained from King Ibn Saud, since it was understood that for military operations he had hitherto relied almost exclusively upon tribal elements of the nature of those which had recently carried out a number of raids against Iraq.

13. As you know, Sir Gilbert Clayton returned to Jeddah to conclude his interrupted conversations with King Ibn Saud at the end of July, and he at once communicated to His Majesty the decision of His Britannic Majesty's Government in the matter of the advanced posts and the various assurances and explanations set out in the preceding paragraphs of this despatch. In doing so, he emphasised the close attention which the matter had received, and the full consideration which had been given to His Majesty's views and arguments, and explained that, although unable to give way on the main principle involved, His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Iraq Government were prepared to go to great lengths to meet the Government of the Hejaz and Nejd in various other questions to which His Majesty had always expressed himself as attaching high importance. For example, the Iraq Government had expressed their willingness to waive their objections to the extradition of political offenders—a point which the Hejaz and Nejd Government had pressed for some time past. King Ibn Saud replied that, after having given the matter careful and mature reflection, he was unable to reconsider his attitude in regard to the advanced posts. He represented that on this question he was now pledged to his people, who would never be content with mere assurances in a matter which they held to be vital, and in which he personally shared their views to the full. Although still inspired by unalterable feelings of friendship towards Great Britain, and convinced that a policy of co-operation and amity with His Britannic Majesty's Government was in the best interests of his country, the question of the posts was one in which he was powerless to subscribe to the decision which His Majesty's Government had seen fit to make.

Subsequent conversations failed to move King Ibn Saud from this attitude; although his demeanour throughout the resumed conversations was markedly friendly, and even conciliatory, on the main point of principle he was entirely immovable. Consequently, as further argument would have been both useless and undignified, Sir Gilbert Clayton had no alternative but to inform the King that, in the circumstances, there was no course open to him but to terminate the conversations, return to England and report the failure to reach an agreement to His Britannic Majesty's Government.

14. It now remains only for His Britannic Majesty's Government to confirm through the official channel their decision in the matter of the Uqair Protocol and the advanced desert posts. You should accordingly communicate to King Ibn Saud the note of which the English text, with Arabic translation, is enclosed herein.

I am, &c.

MONTEAGLE.

Enclosure in No. 38.

*Draft of proposed Note to King Ibn Saud.**

Your Majesty,

November 1928.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Majesty that I have been instructed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on behalf of His Britannic Majesty's Government, to address the following communication to your Majesty.

2. His Britannic Majesty's Government, while fully appreciating the friendly spirit in which the recent conversations between your Majesty and Sir Gilbert Clayton were held, have learnt with deep regret that those conversations have not resulted in any agreement on the major question at issue, namely, the interpretation of article 3 of the First Protocol of Uqair.

3. His Britannic Majesty's Government have given the most careful and sympathetic consideration to the views and arguments put forward by your Majesty, and they are particularly anxious to do everything in their power to assist your

* Addressed to Ibn Saud on November 16, 1928.

Majesty in your manifest efforts to maintain peaceful conditions on the frontier. But, on the other hand, they cannot but regard it as a matter of fixed principle that the Government of every country is entitled, in the absence of specific undertakings to the contrary, to carry out such measures of internal administration within its territory as it may from time to time think necessary. The interpretation which your Majesty seeks to place upon article 3 of the First Protocol of Uqair is one which, in the opinion of His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of Iraq, is not only inconsistent with the text of the article, but would involve an unwarrantable departure, to the detriment of Iraq, from the above-mentioned principle. It is for these reasons that your Majesty's interpretation is unacceptable.

4. In the conversations which he was privileged to have with your Majesty, Sir Gilbert Clayton emphasised the pacific and friendly nature of the reasons which had caused the Iraq Government to construct and maintain certain posts in the desert. He also made it abundantly clear that the posts in question were not intended to interfere with the customary rights of grazing and watering enjoyed by Nejd tribes, or to hamper their lawful movements and migration across the desert areas of South-Western Iraq; and he gave your Majesty explicit verbal assurances to that effect. Both His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Iraq Government desire formally to repeat those assurances which correctly represent their considered policy.

5. In earnest of their desire to arrive at a fair and peaceful settlement of the question at issue, and to remove all obstacles in the way of consolidating the relations of amity and concord between the two Arab States, His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Iraq Government are prepared, should your Majesty so desire, to submit the points in dispute to an arbitrator to be selected in consultation with your Majesty and in agreement between the Governments concerned. I am authorised formally to offer to your Majesty this proposal of arbitration and to invite your Majesty to inform me whether you are prepared to assent in principle to a settlement on that basis, so that the mode and conditions of the proposed arbitration may be discussed without delay.

6. His Britannic Majesty's Government desire to repeat the assurance given to your Majesty by Sir Gilbert Clayton, to the effect that they regard the provisions of article 6 of the Bahra Agreement as applying to British as well as to Iraqi forces, and that they fully intend to observe the stipulations of that article, provided, of course, that your Majesty's subjects abstain from hostile acts of aggression of a nature and on a scale likely to endanger the security of Iraq.

7. His Britannic Majesty's Government hope that their proposal of a settlement by arbitration will commend itself to your Majesty, not only for the sake of settling in a manner which is fair and honourable to all parties the points of dispute, but also because such a settlement would pave the way to the conclusion of formal agreements on the various questions affecting Nejd, Iraq and Transjordan, which were discussed and agreed upon in principle by your Majesty and Sir Gilbert Clayton. Those questions relate to agreements on *bon voisinage*, extradition, the surrender of fugitives from justice, the appointment of diplomatic representatives and cognate questions.

8. If, on the other hand, your Majesty should not agree to seek a settlement on this basis and would prefer, rather than have recourse to arbitration, to leave the question unsettled, with the resultant risk of unrest on the frontier. His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Iraq Government could only regret such a decision on the part of your Majesty.

9. In that case the Governments concerned must agree for the time being to postpone any settlement as to the true meaning of article 3 of the First Protocol of Uqair. Nevertheless, the various treaties and agreements regulating the relations between the Governments concerned remain in full force and effect; and it is the firm intention of His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Iraq Government scrupulously to observe the obligations imposed upon them by those instruments, and to direct their energies to the prevention of any incidents of a nature to provoke disturbances on the frontier or to disturb the friendly relations of the two countries. They are confident that your Majesty will discharge your obligations with the same scrupulous regard, and they note with satisfaction your Majesty's assurance to Sir Gilbert Clayton that the Government of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies intends strictly to observe the terms of all treaties and agreements in its relations with the neighbouring States.

[E 5269/3182/91]

No. 39.

Mr. Jakins to Lord Cushendun.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 167.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, October 20, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to send herewith a translation of the letter from Ibn Saud referred to in my telegram No. 89.

2. His Majesty protests against the crossing of the frontier on the 20th July by aeroplanes from Transjordan, refers to five raids into Nejd between the 4th July and the 13th August, and estimates the total loot for the period Ramadan to Zil Hijja 1346 (22nd February to 20th June, 1927, if inclusive) at 1,600 camels, apart from other property, and the loss of the lives of men, women and children. His Majesty shows impatience at these acts and presses for a reply from His Majesty's Government.

3. In handing me the letter, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me that the King, unwilling to allow of any variation in the tone of his correspondence on the subject, had instructed him to make a strong protest verbally. The crossing of the frontier by aeroplanes was a breach of sovereignty, and he was instructed to press for an assurance that its repetition would not be permitted. This was a matter of vital importance. An end must be put to the raids, which only served to provoke restiveness among the Akhwan.

4. The Hejaz Government required the return of loot and reserved their right to compensation for damage. The fuller details given by the King were those promised in writing by Dr. Damluji.

5. I pointed out to Fuad Hamza that apparently the only outstanding details promised by Dr. Damluji were those relating to specific raids in the second half of Zil Hijja (5th to 20th June, 1928) (see Jeddah telegram No. 52), while the figures supplied by the King covered a whole period—Ramadan to Zil Hijja (22nd February to 20th June, if inclusive). Moreover, it was difficult to reconcile the figures now given with those appearing in the list he himself had recently sent for the period Zil Hijja 1345 (May 1927) to Moharram 1347 (June 1928). I asked him to ascertain exactly in what raids the 1,600 camels were taken and to obtain full details of the losses covered by the vague reference in His Majesty's letter to the looting of other properties and the killing of men, women and children.

6. He has since informed me that the estimate of His Majesty does not include the month of Zil Hijja (21st May to 20th June). It cannot, therefore, refer to the raids reported in Jeddah telegram No. 52.

7. He, moreover, states that his own list, of which I have the honour to enclose a copy,* is incomplete, but that further details will be added when available.

8. I have sent a copy of this despatch to the Acting High Commissioner at Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

H. G. JAKINS.

Enclosure in No. 39.

Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdurrahman-al-Faisal to Mr. Stonehewer-Bird.

(Translation.)

WE hope that your Excellency will forward the following to the central British Government at London as soon as possible:—

1. On 3.2.1347 (July 20, 1928) three aeroplanes came from Transjordan, flew over Nebk, proceeded to Kaf, the seat of the Amir of Qariat-el Melh, and then returned. This, as the British Government will realise, is contrary to undertakings and an infraction of covenants.

2. The investigation we ordered concerning the raids previously reported to have been committed from Transjordan on our tribes shows that the total plundered from our subjects from Ramadan up to Zil Hijja 1346 amounts to approximately 1,600 camels alone, besides men, women and children killed and the properties looted.

* Not printed.

3. We have received the following information concerning bands which, from the beginning of the new year, have frequently attacked our subjects and plundered them :—

- (a.) On 7.2.1347 (July 24, 1928) the Howeitat raided the Shararat, looting four groups of camels, numbering 160 camels in all, and killed twenty-five men.
- (b.) On 10.2.1347 (July 27, 1928) Mefleh-bin-Mesbeh, accompanied by ten mounted men, raided Shararat at Maiqur, looting eighty camels.
- (c.) On 22.2.1347 (August 8, 1928) the Howeitat raided the neighbourhood of Jauf and looted three camels from our residence there.
- (d.) On 25.2.1347 (August 11, 1928) the Howeitat raided the Shararat at Ramamin, taking twenty-one camels.
- (e.) On 27.2.1347 (August 13, 1928) the Howeitat raided the Shararat at Dian, looting five camels.

We protest against all these acts and await the reply of the British Government on these matters, which are overstepping the bounds of patience.
This is what we beg your Excellency to communicate to the British Government.
(Respects.)

IBN SAUD.

18.4.1347 (October 2, 1928).

[E 5448/3182/91]

No. 40.

Agent, Jeddah, to Lord Cushendun.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 98.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, November 15, 1928.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs has sent me a strong protest that on 24th and 29th September last raiders from Beni Atia, Sukhur, and Howeitat, from Kerak and Maan took forty camels and two groups [sic] from Akhwan of Antim and others in the neighbourhood of Jauf and returned to Transjordan.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 192.)

No. 41.

Lord Cushendun to Mr. Jakins (Jeddah).

(No. 57.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, November 21, 1928.

YOUR telegram No. 93 of 27th October: Violation of Nejd frontier by British aeroplane.

Please inform Hejaz Government that on 31st August a British aeroplane, returning to Iraq from Egypt, lost track near Kasr Karana and may have crossed Nejd frontier.

You should add that steps have been taken to mark the track more clearly, and that His Majesty's Government trust that this will prevent a repetition of such incidents, which they greatly regret.

[E 5700/484/91]

No. 42.

Mr. Jakins to Lord Cushendun.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 176.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, November 1, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz for the period the 1st to 31st October, 1928.

2. Copies of this report are being sent to Egypt, Bagdad, Jerusalem (2), Jerusalem for transmission to the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan, Aden, Delhi, Beirut, Damascus, Singapore, Khartum through Port Sudan, Lagos (2).

I have, &c.

H. G. JAKINS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 42.

Jeddah Report for Period October 1-31, 1928.

THE King is in Riyadh. The Royal family and entourage, in all 500 persons, had the satisfaction of being squeezed for the journey into sixty-two cars instead of the twenty-five of last year. His Majesty's first act was to call a meeting for the 4th October of all the Nejdīs of standing in the villages and among the Bedu so as to come to a decision as to future interior and foreign policy. This convocation is in redemption of the promise made by Ibn Saud at Buraida before leaving to meet Sir Gilbert Clayton. Never before, it is said, has there been such a gathering in the country, for 10,000 are expected to be present, and Riyadh looks fuller than Mecca in the height of the pilgrimage season. The meeting has since been postponed until the 29th October, and the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that Ibn Humaid-bin-Bijad had already arrived, but that Faisal-ed-Doweish was nervous as to his reception. He had therefore sent his sons to Ibn Saud to ask that the settlement of their disputes might be postponed until after he had attended the conference. If this is true it lends considerable support to the view of those who have maintained that Ibn Saud's control of the tribes as a whole has never been weakened to the extent that his anxiety last spring led him to fear. He is now said to have urged upon the tribes the necessity of keeping peace with Iraq, and if the tendency of the Mecca Foreign Office is any indication of the policy likely to be adopted, one may expect that the might of the sword will give way to the pin-pricks of the pen. The recent decision not to co-operate in bringing to justice the refugees in Nejd accused of complicity in the desert motor convoy raids is an obvious step in this direction.

2. With Busaiyah given over to the peaceful discovery of the cheetah, the centre of raiding interest has shifted to the Transjordan frontier. The Hejaz Foreign Ministry has presented a list of twenty-seven raids by the Howeitat of Transjordan on the Shararat of Nejd, and complained that their own unruly subject, Auda-el-Atna, is allowed to use Transjordan as a base for raids on Nejd. The King has protested against five similar raids and the crossing of the frontier on the west by aeroplanes. One aeroplane, it has been explained, mistook the Kaf track for the Bagdad track, but the King has produced a second complaint of the same nature. Following the Transjordan raids, only one Nejd counter-raid has taken place, so that the claim that the Nejd tribes are being held in restraint seems to be not entirely unfounded. But so convinced is the King that the Howeitat raids have been inspired by the foiled villain of Iraq, whose one endeavour is to create a breach between the Hejaz and His Majesty's Government, that he appears to have completely overlooked the serious Ruala raid which, in Transjordan, is regarded as having instituted the present series. The most effective rejoinder to the string of large and petty Nejd claims seems to lie in the preparation of a complete and detailed statement of the Transjordan position.

3. The incident of the Beni Malek, after greatly exercising the Hejazi mind and imagination, seems to have fizzled out. There are two versions of the story. The full-blooded Nejdī one is that the tribe has been completely annihilated, that their chief, Abdulla-bin-Fadl, and his son (not to be confused with the Viceroy's adviser, Abdulla-el-Fadl, or his brother Mohammed) had been spared for execution in Mecca, but that they had not survived the journey and only their heads were now to be expected. The sceptical Hejazi maintains that the Beni Malek were impregnablely ensconced in a mountain valley which could be comfortably defended by two men, and that the punitive expedition had failed. Otherwise, why was the sale of food-stuffs controlled in Lith, behind which the tribe had its habitat, and where was the captured booty? But the prospect of the meeting at Riyadh and the unsettled state of the Transjordan frontier made it imperative that the Government troops, which were estimated at as many as 10,000 in all, converging from various directions, should not fail. It seems therefore most probable that the Beni Malek were betrayed by the Beni Ali sub-section.

4. With the continued export of gold to England, to swell presumably the King's private banking account, the Saudian real remains very unsteady. In Mecca the £ has been at a premium of 8 girsh, and although in Jeddah the Dutch bank (Netherlands Trading Society) on the initiative of the Government, but at their own risk, spent £5,000 gold in an attempt to bolster up confidence in the currency, and actually succeeded in bringing the rate of exchange down to within 3 girsh of par,

[19083]

the improvement has not been maintained, and on the last day of the month the £ was back to 226. Nor while the present financial policy is pursued is there likely to be any improvement until the pilgrims start arriving in numbers and create a demand for small coins.

5. In the absence of Sharqieh's local mischief-monger it was possible to get down to the market value of the deep affront to the Emir's dignity occasioned by the signing of the Yambo condenser contract. A tentative offer of a reduction in price of £200 was seized upon with alacrity, and at the sacrifice of that princely sum Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey were able to secure a second and approved contract closely modelled on the lines of the "unauthorised" one. Fuad Hamza, who seems to have considerable influence with His Royal Highness, insisted on the insertion of a new clause referring any dispute which might arise to the Kadi of Jeddah, to be settled in accordance with the terms of the contract. This clause, in the bright legal mind of its proud parent, effectively rules out any possible reference by the firm to this agency, and, indeed, so far as this contract is concerned, is sufficient to deprive them of any claim to British protection. But the strain on the Government in their display of scruples in allowing the contract has proved too great, or the force of habit too strong, for they have not yet been able to bring themselves to pay the whole of the now overdue first instalment.

6. During the month a meeting of the leading merchants was called by the kaimakam to apportion responsibility for the delivery of cargo. In the past attempts have been made to hold shipping agents responsible for goods until their delivery to buyers. The kaimakam, with the concurrence of the merchants, and much to his own satisfaction as agent for the Turner Morrison line of steamships, has now secured that in accordance with the terms of bills of lading the responsibility of shipping agents will cease when goods leave a vessel. The sheikh of the lightermen will thereafter bear the responsibility until relieved by the Customs authorities.

7. The Dutch destroyers "De Ruyter" and "Eversley" put into Jeddah on the 25th October, and left on the 27th October. I gather, although the commanding officer was very hazy on the subject, that the call was in return of the visit of the Emir Faisal to Holland. His Highness came down to Jeddah for two or three days and entertained the officers and the Dutch colony to a dinner. He was subsequently entertained on board. The foreign representatives were not invited owing to the failure of the acting Dutch consul to agree to the suggested placing of the Soviet representative. On the eve of their departure the ships gave a short searchlight and firework display, but I understand the sook is very hurt at the omission of the customary salute on arrival. The visit seems to have fallen flat.

8. Kerim Khakimoff, the Soviet agent, left on the 13th October. When I saw him on the eve of his departure he was looking forward to a year's stay in Russia. He produced an excellent bottle of vodka, and although abstaining himself became increasingly maudlin and affectionately reminiscent on former occupants of this post. He stated his firm conviction that of all the sects of Islam, the Hanbalis, which include the Wahabis, would be the last to enter Paradise. He expects to return to Jeddah—after his leave, that is. Turaculov, his successor, comes from Turkestan and has a marked Mongol appearance. He showed himself clearly no stranger to the bottle. He said in confidence that he got no kick out of a whole bottle of vermouth, and that whisky, to which he had been introduced in Jeddah, was feeble stuff. He speaks little Arabic or French. None the less, he has been very active since he arrived. He paid frequent visits to the Emir Faisal while the latter was in Jeddah, and has freely received one of Ibn Saud's confidential propagandists. It is reported that the Bolsheviks wish to make a fresh start in their commercial activities, but it is difficult to believe that so much discussion should be limited to preparing the ground for another attempt at mere trading.

9. The Soviet ship "Kommunist" put into Jeddah on the 13th October and left on the same day. She is a vessel of nearly 2,000 tons and carried wood, flour, corn, stuffs and sugar. No cargo was discharged in Jeddah, but a sum of £4,000 gold, said to be the proceeds of the sale of Soviet merchandise previously landed, was taken on board. I have heard a report, which I have been unable to confirm, that a supply of ammunition was carried. Axelrod, formerly attached to the Soviet agency in Jeddah, was among the passengers, and stated that he was proceeding to the Persian Gulf. The next port of call was to be Hodeidah, where 2,000 packages would be landed.

10. Mohammed-es-Said left on the 21st October on his appointment to Constantinople. He announced that he attributed this change, which includes promotion to the rank of consul of the first class, to the remarkable success of the

discussions he had so ably conducted with the King this summer. As nothing has as yet been heard of agreement on the leading Egyptian questions of the Mahmal, the proposed new hospitals and water supply and the Egyptian objection to the Hejaz Nationality Law, this declaration was received with some surprise. It appears, however, that my colleague was referring to the effect on His Majesty of his personal charm and elegance.

11. I attach a copy of a regulation relating to motor car companies.

12. I have been officially informed that the pilgrim dues levied last season and detailed in the appendix to Jeddah report for the month of October 1927 will be unchanged next season.

13. One slave, of Sudanese origin, took refuge in this agency during the period under review, and was repatriated to Suakin.

Enclosure 2 in No. 42.

Motor Car Companies Regulation.

ARTICLE 1. A committee will be constituted in the Hejaz to organise the motor car service, and to prevent damage and loss to owners of cars and to pilgrims.

Art. 2. The members comprising the said committee will be chosen by the companies, one from each. Half will be in Jeddah and half in Mecca.

Art. 3. The Government will appoint two officials, one in Jeddah and the other in Mecca, to preside over the committee.

Art. 4. All directors and managers of Hejaz motor car companies must be subjects of the local Government.

Art. 5. The committee will distribute pilgrims among the companies in proportion to the number of their cars and their capacity.

Art. 6. Passengers shall take their tickets only at the place specially fixed for that purpose. Tickets shall be signed by the special official and by the remaining members. Any company carrying passengers without the permission of the committee will be fined £10 for each passenger.

Art. 7. The price of tickets fixed by the Government will not be liable to any increase or decrease. Any company increasing or decreasing the rate fixed by the Government will be fined £10 for each passenger.

Art. 8. All Government demands will be made through the specially appointed official. No other official shall interfere in the affairs of the companies except through the intermediary of the special official. The demands will be distributed equally among the companies.

Art. 9. Civil and military employees shall pay half-rates while they remain in the public service.

Art. 10. The Government will pay half-rate for their guests.

Art. 11. Every five large cars shall be accompanied by one large spare one. Four or a smaller number of large cars shall be accompanied by one small car. Every five or less than five small cars shall be accompanied by a small spare car.

Art. 12. If one of the companies' cars breaks down with passengers during the journey between Mecca and Jeddah, Jeddah and Medina or Medina and Yambo, and the company concerned fails to arrange for the transport of the passengers with the necessary alacrity, the committee will order the company to send a car for their conveyance within three hours of the receipt of the order if the breakdown occurred between Mecca and Jeddah, within twenty-four hours if it occurred between Jeddah and Medina, and within twelve hours if between Medina and Yambo. If the company fails to arrange for the necessary transport before the expiration of the given time, the committee will send a car of another company to carry the passengers and will recover the fare from the first company for payment to the second.

Art. 13. Any car proceeding on any road between Jeddah and Mecca or between Jeddah and Medina carrying no passengers and finding a broken-down car with passengers shall take over the said passengers, and may claim from the committee a fare in proportion to distance to be recovered by the committee from the company whose car broke down.

Art. 14. The committee shall appoint engineers to assist the engineer appointed by the Government to examine cars for Medina and to ensure that they have the proper spare parts and number of passengers.

Art. 15. The company has the right to refuse to carry more than 5 kilog. weight of luggage for each person.

Art. 16. Owners of cars are not permitted to transport merchandise or luggage.

Art. 17. When distributing passengers among the companies the committee shall prepare a statement in duplicate of the number of passengers allotted to each company, and retain one copy and hand the other to the mamur of the koshan.

Art. 18. Passengers' fares are to be paid in cash at the office of the committee. One per cent. shall be deducted for working expenses, and shall be held by the committee for payment of salaries and other necessary expenses of the committee. At the end an account of the deductions will be made, and whatever remains over will be returned to the motor-car proprietors and any shortage will be collected from them.

Art. 19. Mutawifs will be given a quarter of an Arab real for each pilgrim travelling by car from Jeddah to Mecca, or *vice versa*, 1 real for those proceeding from Mecca to Medina and 1 real for the return journey.

Art. 20. The committee will collect from the companies £1 for each car as an advance to cover their initial expenses. This loan will be met from the 1 per cent. allotted to the committee.

Art. 21. The committee will draw up as soon as possible, and forward to the Government for approval, a regulation for drivers.

Art. 22. The committee will function from the 20th Jamad Tani (sixth month) to the 15th Safar (second month) of each year.

No driver shall be employed unless he produces a certificate of good conduct from the company with which he last served.

[E 5622/5622/91]

No. 43.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir H. Rumbold (Berlin).

(No. 1548.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 30, 1928.

THE German Ambassador called at the Foreign Office on the 23rd November and informed Sir R. Lindsay that his Government had recently received a communication from the Foreign Secretary of the Government of the Hejaz, a communication which had also been addressed to the German Minister in Cairo, expressing the desire that the German Government would formally recognise the Hejaz Government, and would open negotiations with a view to improving commercial relations. The German Government had replied accepting these overtures, and wished His Majesty's Government to be informed immediately of their action.

2. The German Government had since then received a communication from a certain Raghit, an official of the Government of the Imam of the Yemen, also asking for recognition and formal relations. To this the German Government had hitherto sent no answer; they understood that relations existed between the Yemen and Italy, and that they were likely to be contracted in the near future with Turkey, but they were not quite certain what the position of affairs was between the Yemen and His Majesty's Government, and, while anxious not unduly to delay any answer, thought it would be desirable to have some information on this point before doing so.

3. Sir R. Lindsay informed M. Sthamer that he would make enquiries into the matter and communicate with him further.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 5918/1/91]

No. 44.

Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 100.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, December 13, 1928.

LORD LLOYD has asked me whether there is any truth in reports in Egyptian press of serious revolt in Hejaz against Ibn Saud.

These reports probably arose from Beni Malek incident, which is now regarded as closed. In addition, there has recently been looting at Taif by Ibn Bujad's

Uteibah from Ghut Ghut. Qade is said to have been killed, but Amir Feisal went there in person and calm is now restored.

I have no further information respecting situation in the interior, and must regard reports of a revolt either serious or widespread as unfounded.

(Repeated to Cairo, Jerusalem, and Bagdad, No. 196.)

[E 5945/3261/91]

No. 45.

Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 15.)

(No. 101.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, December 15, 1928.

YOUR despatch No. 215.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that Ibn Saud has accepted in principle His Majesty's Government's offer to refer disputed points to arbitration. I will telegraph details as soon as His Majesty's letter arrives in Jeddah.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 198.)

[E 5946/1/91]

No. 46.

Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 15.)

(No. 102.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, December 15, 1928.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs informs me that at conference at Riyadh attitude on Iraq frontier question was upheld. It was decided to maintain peaceful relations with Iraq and Transjordan, and full sovereign rights of Ibn Saud to control policy were confirmed. I understand that there is to be some tribal reorganisation.

A special number of "Umel Qura" will be issued giving report of proceedings. (Repeated to Bagdad and Jerusalem, No. 199.)

[E 6012/3261/91]

No. 47.

Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 19.)

(No. 105.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, December 19, 1928.

MY telegram No. 101.

I have now received an advance copy of King's letter. After much preliminary argument Ibn Saud asks His Majesty's Government to reconsider their decision, but "if the British Government will not be satisfied to execute third clause of the Protocol of Uqair as it stands, unless it is referred to arbitration, we accept arbitration."

The following points are put forward for consideration:—

1. Arbitrators to be composed of two parties chosen by Nejd and Iraq respectively.
2. His Majesty's Government to be neutral.
3. Arbitrators to be familiar with conditions of Arabs and anxious for the present and future preservation of Nejd and Iraq independence.
4. Subject for discussion to be reconsideration of the whole question from its origin, and to include examination of frontier between Iraq and Nejd.
- [? 5]. His Majesty's Government to undertake the execution in Iraq of decision reached.
6. After decision consideration to be given to avoid either party suffering from its execution.
7. In view of critical position, the whole question to be settled as soon as possible. His Majesty awaits the views of His Majesty's Government and also asks that provisions of article 6 of Bahra and article 10 of Hadda Agreements be accepted without reservation.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 202.)

[E 6033/3182/91]

No. 48.

Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 106.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, December 20, 1928.

YOUR telegram No. 55.

Ibn Saud has informed me that he has no comment to make if proposed marks are to follow the route formerly used by aeroplanes between Iraq and Transjordan.

If, however, it is intended to delimit frontier between Nejd and Transjordan, which has hitherto only been fixed on the map, he would like to give matter consideration.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 203.)

[E 5987/5622/91]

No. 49.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to M. Sthamer.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, December 20, 1928.

ON the 23rd November your Excellency informed Sir R. Lindsay that the German Government had recently received a communication from an official of the Government of the Imam of the Yemen, asking them to accord recognition to that Government and to enter into formal relations with it. You added that the German Government would be glad to receive, in connexion with this *démarche* by the Government of the Yemen, information as to the relations now existing between that Government and His Majesty's Government.

2. In reply, I have the honour to inform you that for some years past the Imam of the Yemen has been in occupation of certain areas of the Aden Protectorate. Early in the present year he was responsible for further acts of aggression in Protectorate territory, and His Majesty's Government consequently took forcible action to expel the Imam's troops from these areas. In September last the Imam indicated his willingness to reopen negotiations with His Majesty's Government, and His Majesty's Government, for their part, are prepared to conclude a treaty with him, recognising the independence of the Yemen and defining the boundary between the Imam's territories and the Aden Protectorate. It is, however, not yet possible to foretell whether these negotiations will result in a satisfactory settlement.

I have, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 6012/3261/91]

No. 50.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Jakins (Jeddah).

(No. 61.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 21, 1928.

YOUR telegram No. 105 of 19th December: Proposed arbitration on questions in dispute between Iraq and Nejd.

Meaning of Ibn Saud's proposals is not clear, and further information is especially required on following points, numbered as in your telegram:—

1 and 2. Is it the King's intention to suggest that there shall be one arbitrator for Iraq, one for Nejd and a British arbitrator as neutral umpire?

4. Is this meant to imply that arbitrators shall be empowered to suggest alterations in the frontier as laid down by existing agreements, or does it mean that procedure should include visit by arbitrators to frontier zone affected?

6. Can you give any indication what this suggestion means?

[E 6070/1/91]

No. 51.

Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 22.)

(No. 107.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, December 22, 1928.

BAGDAD No. 169 S.

My telegram No. 102.

If report of proceedings now published is to be believed, Ibn Saud adopted a very firm line with tribes and received their complete support. Minister for Foreign Affairs told me this morning that the leadership of Mutair had been taken away from Feisal-ed-Dawish and given to his son, who was present at Riyadh.

I cannot pretend to be in close touch with the interior situation of Nejd or that on the Iraq frontier, but lapse of time since Riyadh assembly and general absence hitherto of incident support repeated official claim that Ibn Saud's control is absolute.

In view of King's frequent assertion that nothing untoward can happen without his consent and somewhat sharper tone of his recent letters, any message in the sense desired, whether coming from Iraq or from His Majesty's Government, is likely to be most distasteful and highly resented, particularly in view of acceptance of offer lately made.

According to reply now received to letter addressed to Ibn Saud on Bagdad telegram No. 159 S, Mutair were in their normal dwelling-places, and Ibn Ashwsu had been there since the summer.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 206.)

[E 6071/3182/91]

No. 52.

Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 108.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, December 23, 1928.

MY telegram No. 89 and your telegram No. 55.

1. In his reply to explanation sent to him, Ibn Saud states that not one but three aeroplanes were concerned. He asks for reinvestigation.

2. King sees in reference of Amir of Transjordan to individual robberies an attempt to treat lightly matters which are contrary to Hadda Agreement. He asks whether His Majesty's Government have adopted Amir's attitude.

With reference to Jerusalem telegram No. 38, the King denies that Shararat lost nothing in the raid by Mefleh-bin-Musbeh, and gives the names of the following claimants: Muteila-bin-Warda, Hamud-bin-Warda, Adwa-bin-Warda.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 207.)

[E 6113/484/91]

No. 53.

Mr. Jakins to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 198.)

Sir,

Jeddah, December 4, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz for the period the 1st-30th November, 1928.

2. Copies of this report have been sent to Egypt, Bagdad, Jerusalem (2), Jerusalem for transmission to the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan, Beirut, Damascus, Aden, Delhi, Singapore, Khartum through Port Sudan, Lagos (2), the Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Sloops.

I have, &c.

H. G. JAKINS.

Jeddah Report for Period November 1-30, 1928.

THE month of November opened with an early morning tempest of tropical fury. With lightning flickering for hours with the rapidity of a cinema projection, whole sides of rooms were whisked off by the wind, windows burst open, and sleepers swept drenching from their beds, and some fourteen houses in the town pushed over.

2. The political situation has in contrast appeared to be completely tranquil. Not a word has filtered through from Riyadh. Supporters of the King hazard that he has persuaded the tribes to refrain from aggression and to adopt a defensive attitude in which they can rely on his whole-hearted support. Opponents liken the meeting at Riyadh to the famous meeting at Mecca in July 1926, when Ibn Saud was proclaimed King of the Hejaz, a step which "His Majesty would have preferred in all sincerity to be deferred; but the people of the Hejaz, in the exercise of their inherent right to elect a ruler, insisted with him upon his acceptance, and he was not able to excuse himself from giving them satisfaction." They ask whether Ibn Saud, whose policy has always been to profit by "unauthorised" raids, and who provided Feisal-ed-Doweish with his wants in food and ammunition, called the meeting at Riyadh so that he might tell himself that his own plan had failed, or was it to conjure up the prospect of a conflict with Transjordan after the coming pilgrimage? Certainly with the growing severity of religious restrictions and the increasing pressure which is being brought to bear to have the Prophet's tomb at Medina demolished, to prohibit the import of motor cars and to cancel the levying of customs duties, the situation on the Transjordan border must prove to Ibn Saud a very opportune distraction for his turbulent followers.

3. Further information on the Beni Malek incident, referred to in recent reports, encourages speculation on the future of the Hejaz which, if premature, is not entirely idle, for any change is likely to be sudden. There is now reliable evidence to show that if the Beni Malek revolt had met with success the whole of the Hejaz would have joined in with them. The whole of the Hejaz does not, of course, include Jeddah and Mecca. Those two cities, like over-ripe plums already advanced in putrescence, wait to be plucked. They, the fruit of the pilgrimage with no root in the country, are the spoil of the victor. Their inhabitants are foreign and mongrel. Five times a day they are whipped into prayer, and fifty times a day would not straighten the back of one of them to turn on his aggressor. It is different with the Bedu. The Beni Malek rising failed, and the country is now supposed to be safe for ten years. Once more, say his closest supporters, the luck of Ibn Saud has held. The profits of the pilgrimage are still safe for draining through the sticky fingers of Abdullah Suleiman into Nejd. But the doubt remains as to what will happen on the day that Ibn Saud fails. Will the enigmatical Amir Saud be strong enough to hold the kingdom together, or will the Hejaz resume its separate entity from the quickly discarded Feisal?

4. The situation on the Transjordan frontier has on the whole been quieter. A further message has been addressed to the King on the subject of the crossing of the frontier by aeroplanes from Transjordan assuring him that steps are being taken to mark the track more clearly and thus prevent a repetition of these incidents. During the course of the month the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs produced a long list giving details of all the raids stated to have been committed on the Hejaz and Nejd by Transjordan tribes from September 1926 to August 1928. In addition, he has lodged protests concerning several minor raids committed more recently—up till late October—while Transjordan, on their part, have complained of two raids committed by the Shararat, of which the later, near Bair on the 30th October when 500 camels were taken, assumed considerable importance. The Mecca press maintained its high moral tone with regard to Transjordan. How many times had it not kept silent in the face of aggression? How long was the peace and security of Nejd to be at the mercy of those in Transjordan who were in league in hostility with Iraq against Nejd? Figures, which were quoted, were the strongest argument and best proof of the great losses sustained at the hands of those transgressors, while the long-suffering Nejd peacefully remained behind his own frontiers waiting in calm and quiet until the raiders should see the error of their ways and return to the path of peace.

5. It has been suggested to the King, at the instance of the Acting High Commissioner for Transjordan, that an attempt should be made to convert the truce

existing between the Palestinian Saidiyin tribe and the Beni Atiya, which are considered as belonging half to Transjordan and half to the Hejaz, into a final reconciliation. For that purpose it is proposed to hold a meeting at Chor-es-Safi in January next, when the truce is due to come to an end, and Ibn Saud has been asked to consent to the presence there of three representative sheikhs, whose security while out of Hejaz territories has been fully guaranteed. It is believed that the chiefs in question would willingly attend if allowed to do so, but it remains to be seen whether the King's attitude towards his neighbours is to be one of sweet reasonableness or dour obstruction.

6. During the month the Hejaz Government has notified the establishment of five customs posts towards Palestine and Transjordan at Qariat, Jauf, Teima, Tebuk and Dheba. These, it is explained, have been established so that Hejaz merchants may not escape the customs duties levied at the ports by importing overland.

7. On the 17th November the decision of His Majesty's Government on the subject of the interpretation of article 3 of the Uqair Protocol and the advanced desert posts in Iraq, which had formed the subject of Sir Gilbert Clayton's conversations, was communicated to Ibn Saud. His Majesty's Government maintain that the measures taken to preserve security in Iraq are not, as Ibn Saud had sought to establish, inconsistent with the terms of the Uqair Protocol, but are measures of internal administration which the Government of every country has, as a matter of fixed principle, a right to take. Assurances are given that no interference is intended with the grazing or watering rights of Nejd tribes, or with their lawful movements or migrations. His Majesty's Government accept the stipulations of article 6 of the Bahra Agreement on the pursuit of offenders across the frontier as applying to British as well as Iraqi forces, provided that aggression is not on a scale or of a nature likely to endanger the security of Iraq. Finally, in earnest of their desire for peace, and in the hope that a settlement may lead to the conclusion of formal agreements on various outstanding questions affecting Nejd, Iraq and Transjordan, such as agreements on *bon voisinage*, extradition and the appointment of diplomatic representatives, His Majesty's Government offer to submit the disputed points to arbitration.

8. Iraq produced a minor scare on the night of the 22nd November with the news that about 400 tents of the Mutair, Feisal-ed-Doweish's tribe, although their chief was not reported to have been with them at the time, had camped in Iraq territory about 30 miles from the north-eastern end of the neutral area. A message was immediately despatched to the King asking whether the Mutair had gone with his permission or not, but before a reply could be received Bagdad telegraphed that the Mutair had recrossed the frontier into Nejd.

9. In reporting that its circulation in Iraq had been prohibited, the "Um-el-Qura" struck a new note of loving condescension to its Arab brother of the north. It now recalled that it had often referred to Iraq as a brother nation whose welfare was one of its chiefest concerns, and sought consolation in the fact that the ban on moderate, frank and upright newspapers would serve to concentrate attention on those (the "Ashraf" of course) who placed obstacles in the way of neighbourly concord.

10. The same newspaper made a great display of the measures recently taken by the Hejaz Health Department. The supercilious may smile at the ingloriousness of the claim that as a result of recent improvements the first quarantine island at Jeddah now equals, if it does not surpass, other quarantine stations, and the announcement that on the application of the Amir vaccine sufficient for 5,000 had been despatched to Hail for distribution among local inhabitants. The fact remains that the boast that the present Government has accomplished more in a few years than had been done for tens and hundreds of years in the past is not completely baseless. I learn that the Dutch bacteriologist who embraced Islam last year only to leave the country on the eve of Ramadan will not be allowed to return. This is undoubtedly a victory for the Syrian intriguers, of whose medical qualifications Dr. van der Hoog did not conceal his contempt, but he was himself so unmistakably an adventurer—if a very competent specialist—as to be largely responsible for his own unsuccess. Fire and street-cleaning apparatus has been ordered for Mecca, and the hospitals improved and re-equipped, and general health organisation overhauled. It is proposed to establish a temporary quarantine station at Yambo, where a hospital is already said to be in being. The Health Department has now issued a notice inviting natives to present themselves for free vaccination. In this connexion the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has addressed to me a communication, in which

he asserts that it has been observed that many pilgrims arriving from the south suffer from smallpox during the voyage. He suggests that in order to prevent the spreading of the disease medical officers on pilgrim ships should revaccinate those whose first vaccination was unsuccessful.

11. The opening of a post office at Al Ala, on the Hejaz Railway, to handle registered and ordinary mail is announced for the beginning of the month of Rajab (13th December). It will be attached to the post office of Wejh.

12. That hardy annual, the Jeddah lighthouse scheme, has definitely been put back on its winter shelf until the return of the King next spring.

13. Abd-el-Ghani Seni, the Turkish representative, returned to Jeddah on the 15th November. He found time to quarrel with his harmless if pedestrian *remplaçant* before leaving almost immediately for Massowa on his way to the Yemen to present his credentials to the Imam, for Abd-el-Ghani takes both the Hejaz and the Yemen in his stride. Happily, on his return from the south, he expects to proceed to Beirut to undergo one of the more pressing of the operations demanded by his physical condition.

14. H.M.S. "Dahlia" put into Jeddah on the 16th November, and left the following forenoon for the north. The French sloop "Diane" was in port from the 29th to the 30th November.

15. An amendment of article 11 of the motor car companies' regulations enclosed in last month's report is attached.

16. During the period under review two slaves, one of Abyssinian and one of Eritrean origin, applied to this agency for repatriation, and were sent to their homes by way of Massowa.

Amendment to Motor Car Companies' Regulations.

Delete article 11 and substitute:—

One large spare car shall accompany from one to seven large cars, and one small spare car shall accompany from one to seven small cars. Eight to ten large cars shall be accompanied by two large spare cars, and eight to ten small cars by two small spare cars.

[E 6142/1/91]

No. 54.

Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 113.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, December 28, 1928.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs has sent me extracts from Egyptian press reports of aeroplane visit of King Feisal and his Minister of War to Iraq-Nejd frontier, when speeches were to be delivered to Iraq tribes. Nejd tribes lately taken refuge in Iraq were to be visited and Busaiya and other posts inspected.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is apprehensive of this tour, and considers presence of Nuri Said at much-disputed post likely to agitate tribes and give rise to disturbances.

He asks for His Majesty's Government's views on the subject so that Hejaz Government may take whatever steps may be necessary.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 210.)

The Health Department has now issued a notice in which it is proposed to establish a temporary vaccination station at Yeddah where a number of pilgrims are expected to arrive. The Health Department has now issued a notice in which it is proposed to establish a temporary vaccination station at Yeddah where a number of pilgrims are expected to arrive.

CHAPTER II.—SYRIA.

[E 3338/141/89]

No. 55.

Consul Hole to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 3.)

(No. 43. Confidential.)

Sir,

Damascus, June 8, 1928.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 36, Confidential, of the 27th April, relative to the elections to the Syrian Constituent Assembly, I have the honour to report that the precautions taken by the French authorities secured the election of Government candidates to the four seats remaining; Shakir-el-Qaem was replaced at the instance of the Government by a rich Christian merchant named George Sahnawi.

2. Nationalist candidates in the complementary elections, who attribute their defeat to the military measures taken by the French authorities on the polling day, will submit objections to the Constituent Assembly on its meeting; it is hardly to be anticipated that they will receive much satisfaction.

3. The opening of the Constituent Assembly, after many postponements, has been fixed for to-morrow, the 9th June. The interval has been filled with tours, meetings and tea parties in Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo. Nothing very definite has transpired. The Nationalist leader, Ibrahim Hanano, has made a *pronunciamento* on the mutual interdependence of France and Syria; Sheikh Taj-ed-Din has achieved the distrust of all political sections, including the French High Commission.

4. It seems certain that the Nationalist element has secured a majority in the Constituent Assembly; their members are estimated variously from thirty-six to forty-four (including four independents) in a Chamber of seventy. Their intention is to join battle with the Government, and the first occasion will be the appointment of the President of the Assembly. There will be a contest between Government and Nationalist candidates, and the latter, who are most optimistic as to the result, have decided immediately to move the resignation of the Government, on the ground that it does not enjoy public confidence, or alternatively that it was only nominated for the elections and should now withdraw.

5. It may be remarked that the Government is already divided among itself, and a number of quarrels have taken place which, though scarcely meriting individual record, have a collective importance which augurs ill for the future.

6. In the meantime the Nationalists seem to concentrate on the question of "Syrian unity"—the retrocession of certain fertile cazas which were adjudged to the Lebanon by General Gouraud in 1921; the French High Commission, on the other hand, has been sufficiently astute to draw a red herring across awkward issues in raising the question of the future monarchical or republican character of the State of Syria, with the well-founded hope of splitting parties into small and jealous fractions. The candidates are numerous, Sherif Zeid, Sherif Ali (sons of ex-King Hussein), Faisal-bin-Saud, Youssef Kemal, Abdul Mejid-bin-Ali Haidar, and the late Chef de l'Etat, Damad Ahmad Nami, are all canvassed as future kings, while Sheikh Taj-ed-Din and practically every Nationalist leader have hopes of the presidency of the republic.

7. Dissension is not restricted to the Syrians; M. Deléclé-Desloges, the High Commissioner's delegate in Damascus, has incurred violent criticism in French circles for his undue optimism regarding the results of the elections, and many military acquaintances of mine have expressed the strongest disapproval of the "idealistic" tendencies of the High Commissioner and his assistant, M. Maugras.

8. I do not feel that any serious progress will be made under the forthcoming Assembly.

9. I am sending copy of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Jerusalem and Bagdad, His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut, His Majesty's consul at Aleppo and the British resident at Amman.

I have, &c.

E. C. HOLE.

[E 3435/141/89]

No. 56.

Consul Hole to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 46. Confidential.)

Sir,

Damascus, June 12, 1928.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 43, Confidential, of the 8th June, regarding the political situation, I have the honour to report that the opening session of the Constituent Assembly was held on the 9th June.

2. Proceedings began with a carefully prepared speech by the French High Commissioner, of which I have the honour to enclose the complete text. His opening words emphasised the gravity of the task before the Assembly, of drawing up the Constitution and assuring the future evolution of Syria. The present circumstances of concord among Syrians themselves and the mutual confidence of the members of the Assembly and the French representatives were next touched on, and the necessity of a "large spirit of conciliation" in their labours and the respect of all rights and all interests. The elaboration of the Constitution would be followed by the negotiation of a treaty between France and Syria.

3. The speech ended on a note of tactful warning. "You will best contribute to the final solution in demonstrating that political capacity whose maturity will one day lead Syria to her place among the nations . . . I trust that you will not let any situation develop in the Assembly which might imperil the success of our common effort."

4. Nowhere in the speech was there any mention of the mandate, and the introduction of that unpopular word into the Arabic translation of M. Ponsot's speech evoked a protest from Fauzi Gazi, one of the leaders of the Nationalist party.

5. Sheikh Taj-ed-Din, President of the Council, replied in a windy allocution, of which a copy is also appended. The French High Commissioner then left and the Assembly proceeded to elect its officers.

6. The results, as had been anticipated, were a complete success for the Nationalists, the president, the two vice-presidents, two secretaries and three heads of committees all being members of that party. On a straight division for the office of president, the Nationalist candidate, Hashem Attassi, formerly Prime Minister to King Feisal, secured a three-quarters majority, a pretty accurate index of the strength of the party.

7. Subsequent elections on the 11th June also returned exclusively Nationalist officers, and the final selection of the committee of twenty-seven entrusted with the preparation of the Constitution produced to-day a further solid block of that party. Their evident preponderance will certainly provoke further accessions from the minority.

8. If the Nationalists can maintain an unbroken front and guard themselves against the intoxication of success, I see no reason why this Assembly should not mark definite progress in the execution of the mandate. For the moment, discipline inside the party is excellent, and although the French authorities regard them as extremist, I do not believe that they aspire to anything beyond the present status of "Iraq," but with a marked tendency towards a republic rather than a monarchy. It is, however, probable that when the moment comes to choose a President or a King the party will split into numerous factions, and the High Commission is undoubtedly discounting this event.

9. The results of the first session evoked noisy but harmless demonstrations by youthful patriots, but otherwise there has been no disturbance.

10. I am sending copy of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Bagdad and Jerusalem, His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut, His Majesty's consul at Aleppo, and the British Resident at Amman.

I have, &c.

E. C. HOLE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 56.

Speech of the French High Commissioner at the First Session of the Constituent Assembly, June 9, 1928.

C'EST une heure solennelle dans l'histoire de la Syrie que celle qui vous voit ici réunis pour procéder à l'élaboration de la Constitution de l'État, c'est-à-dire à l'organisation des pouvoirs publics qui auront chargé de diriger l'évolution et d'assurer l'avenir du pays.

Depuis longtemps, attentifs au progrès de l'esprit politique, nous souhaitons franchir cette étape et répondre ainsi à l'attente de la Syrie comme à celle de la France et de la Société des Nations.

L'heure est particulièrement favorable pour le faire aujourd'hui dans un sentiment à la fois de concorde entre vous-mêmes et de confiance entre les membres de l'Assemblée et les représentants de la France.

Mais le travail dans lequel nous sommes associés exige de tous une ferme décision d'aboutir à des solutions qui assurent dans un large esprit de conciliation la garantie de tous les droits, le respect de tous les intérêts.

Ma déclaration du 15 février avait énoncé dans leur succession les problèmes qui s'imposaient à notre examen. Lorsque vous aurez achevé votre tâche, le temps sera alors venu d'établir les relations de la France et de la Syrie sur des bases mieux assurées et conformes à nos communes aspirations.

La négociation d'un traité permettra d'envisager la solution de tous les problèmes qui, à un degré égal, nous préoccupent, et vous aurez d'autant mieux préparé le règlement définitif que vous aurez dès maintenant fait la preuve des capacités politiques, dont l'épanouissement doit assurer, le moment venu, à la Syrie sa place légitime auprès des autres nations.

Messieurs, je suis pleinement instruit de vos sentiments, de vos vœux, et j'espère que, certains de toujours trouver un accès facile auprès de moi, vous ne laisserez pas naître ou se développer au sein de l'Assemblée une situation qui pourrait mettre en péril le résultat de nos communs efforts. C'est avec une amicale confiance que je vous exprime tous mes souhaits pour le succès de vos travaux.

Enclosure 2 in No. 56.

Speech of the Prime Minister at the First Session of the Constituent Assembly, June 9, 1928.

Messieurs et chers Collègues,

C'EST avec une joie indicible que je salue en ce jour historique la première Assemblée constituante chargée d'établir les bases de l'édifice politique futur de la Syrie.

Une Assemblée comme la vôtre, composée d'une élite d'hommes de vertu et de sciences et douée d'un patriotisme sans défaillance, une telle Assemblée est fort qualifiée pour mener à bien cette tâche historique dont le noble peuple syrien n'a cessé depuis longtemps de préparer la réalisation.

Messieurs, il m'est nullement nécessaire de passer en revue les événements et les diverses phases auxquels, à travers notre beau pays, nous avons été tous trop intimement mêlés pour qu'il soit superflu d'y revenir.

Mais la situation commence à s'éclaircir et nous avons abordé une ère nouvelle. Il nous faut donc oublier les événements passés et poursuivre nos efforts dans la nouvelle voie que nous nous sommes tracée. Et c'est dans notre conscience et notre bon sens que nous puiserons les forces nécessaires pour nous soustraire à l'influence des préjugés. Le succès n'est-il pas l'aboutissement logique de la sagesse et de la pondération que nous emploierons dans l'examen de nos multiples problèmes?

Ce qui fortifie ma conviction dans le succès final, ce sont les sentiments que la France libérale porte à notre patrie et qui trouvent aujourd'hui leur expression dans la réunion de cette honorable Assemblée, gage d'entente et de collaboration loyale entre nos deux nations.

Soucieux de tenir les engagements déjà donnés, je crois devoir, contrairement à tous bruits tendancieux qui ont couru à ce sujet, vous déclarer qu'il n'existe aucun texte de Constitution imposé. C'est votre honorable Assemblée qui élaborera, dans la plénitude de sa liberté, la Constitution appelée à garantir au pays sa souveraineté nationale.

Appréciant dès aujourd'hui vos efforts et vos bonnes intentions, je tiens à vous affirmer que je suis tout disposé à vous faciliter la tâche éminente qui vous est confiée.

En terminant, Messieurs, je proclame du haut de cette tribune l'ouverture de l'Assemblée constituante et je fais des vœux pour votre succès complet.

[E 3436/3130/89]

No. 57.

Consul Hole to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 48. Secret.)

HIS Majesty's consul at Damascus presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit a copy of a despatch which he has addressed to the High Commissioner at Bagdad respecting the Syrian political situation.

Damascus, June 14, 1928.

Enclosure 1 in No. 57.

Consul Hole to High Commissioner, Bagdad.

(No. 76. Secret.)

Sir,

Damascus, June 14, 1928.

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 5 and 6 of the 13th and 14th June, I have the honour to transmit the text of the memorandum handed to me by Lieutenant L. D. Grand, a member of the staff of the Iraq Ministry of Defence, dealing with a conversation he had with certain Arab notables regarding the political situation in Damascus.

2. The chief point of interest in this conversation is the statement that fifty-five Nationalist Deputies have sworn to support the eventual candidature of the Emir Zeid to the throne of Syria. This assertion was entirely at variance with my own opinion, which I had already expressed in my telegram No. 4 of the 10th June and in paragraph 8 of my despatch No. 46 of the 12th June addressed to His Majesty's Foreign Secretary. However, in view of the standing of Mr. Grand's interlocutors, I had no alternative to telegraphing to you a summary of the memorandum.

3. I had the same evening the opportunity of meeting some well-informed persons, and the result of my enquiries confirmed me in my original opinion. Whatever may be the case a few months hence, the Nationalist party, which has an overwhelming preponderance in the Assembly, has now made up its mind to a republic, and I cannot think that the declarations made to the Minister of Defence were based on anything more than a desire to be agreeable.

4. It is true that in the event of a monarchy being constituted at Damascus, the Emir Zeid would be a popular candidate, and a recently formed ex-officers' group divided its allegiance between him and ex-King Ali. This group is not represented in the Assembly and will seek support directly from the people, who are of a feudal turn of mind, and mazbatas to this end are being circulated in many quarters. A manifestation of this National Royalist group is contemplated on the 15th June.

5. It must be added that French suspicions of the Hashemite family have not diminished and their consent to the candidature of the Emir Zeid might be withheld.

6. Other candidates in the field include Yussuf Kemal, of the family of the late Khedive; Feisal, son of Ibn Saud; Abdul Mejid, son of Sherif Ali Haidar; the son of the Bey of Tunis and a member of the Hussein family of Morocco. The last two are very recent competitors, and are said to have been entered by the French authorities.

7. I am sending copy of this despatch direct to His Majesty's Foreign Secretary, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem, His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut, His Majesty's consul at Aleppo and the British Resident at Amman.

I have, &c.

E. C. HOLE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 57.

Memorandum by Lieutenant Grand.

AT present four candidates for the Syrian throne have received official no-objection certificates from the French authorities. No. 1 is from Tunis; No. 2 from Morocco; No. 3, Sherif Haidar; No. 4, Feisal-bin-Saud. Nos. 1 and 2 are young and inexperienced; No. 3 a pro-Turk of local standing; No. 4 has given up the idea, and his agent left Damascus yesterday.

2. If King Feisal presents the Emir Zeid as a candidate and he receives a no-objection certificate the belief is strongly held that he will be easily successful. Failing his candidature being accepted, there will be a republic. This view (Zeid or a republic) has the support of fifty-five Deputies, who have sworn to take this line.

3. Those present stated that no definite decision would be taken for a fortnight.

4. The names of those present who supplied the above are Fares Khoury, Ibrahim Hananu, Jamil Mardamby and Nessib Hamza.

5. Local French official opinion was stated to be divided, and M. Ponsot was stated not to have made a statement but to be watching, it was believed, with a view to taking whatever line appeared to have real support locally.

6. As I have no knowledge of the standing of the names mentioned in paragraph 4, I simply give the above for what it is worth.

L. D. GRAND.

June 13, 1928.

[E 3567/3130/89]

No. 58.

Consul Hole to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 17.)

(No. 50. Secret.)

Sir,

Damascus, June 21, 1928.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 76 of the 14th June addressed to his Excellency the High Commissioner at Bagdad relative to the eventual candidature of Emir Zeid to the throne of Syria, I have the honour to report that further enquiries have confirmed my original opinion that the Nationalist party is sharply republican in tendency. Certain leaders, such as Ibrahim Hananu, have an inclination to a monarchical Constitution, and I am told that from motives of personal attachment the President of the Chamber, Hashem Attassi, might support the candidature of a Hashemite; the majority is, however, against them.

2. The masses would certainly prefer a monarchy to a republic, but they are inarticulate; certain ex-officers and clerics openly canvassed the idea and planned a demonstration, which the French authorities did not permit.

3. The presence of Nuri Pasha Seyyid in Beirut and Yassin Pasha and Rustom Haidar at Damascus is the source of some anxiety to the French authorities, and yesterday M. Veber, délégué-adjoint, enquired of me as to their movements. I replied that he had evidently come to the conclusion that they were watching developments in the interest of His Majesty King Feisal, and that nothing I might say would alter his opinion. He agreed, but expressed the view that they should not launch out into active propaganda. Apparently their frequent consultations with National leaders are causing the French some apprehension, and he asked me to convey a hint to them on that subject. I replied that Yassin Pasha and Rustom Haidar had paid me a visit of courtesy the previous day, and that in returning it I would sound them as to their intentions and, if necessary, inform them of the French authorities' attitude.

4. Yassin Pasha and Rustom Haidar had unfortunately left for Beirut when I returned their call.

5. I took the opportunity of the studiously frank attitude of M. Veber to clear up a few points of interest to myself. He stated that the French High Commission had a perfectly open mind as to the form of government to be instituted in Syria, but he was at such pains to convince me that the entire country was pining for a republic that the conclusion may safely be drawn that the High Commission's desires lie in that direction. He stated definitely that the French Government had not approved or accepted the candidature of any aspirant to the monarchy and that the High Commission proposed to maintain an attitude of complete aloofness in the matter.

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6. The general impression left in my mind by conversations with French officials is that M. Ponsot's aloofness is simply a complete incapacity to make up his mind. The military group is furious with him, and I have been told that one of the chief objects of General Vallier's short leave to France is to "disembark" the High Commissioner. A number of officers holding high positions appear to have applied for a transfer from Syria in consequence of their disapproval of M. Ponsot's supine policy, and French officials with whom I am on terms of a certain familiarity have expressed their dissatisfaction in terms of some vigour.

7. The disposition of the Nationalist *bloc* towards the Government is becoming daily clearer. They display their contempt for Ministers and the minority by holding private sessions outside of the Assembly and presenting in the Chamber a cut-and-dried proposal, which is regularly voted without discussion. This humiliation has been too much for the minority, who are talking of withdrawing from the Assembly in protest.

8. Some changes in the Ministry are in the air and there is talk of replacing Said Mahasen, Jemil Ulchi and Kurd Ali by Husni Barazi or Jemil Mardambey at the Ministry of the Interior, Fares Khoury or Mohammed Nahas at the Ministry of Finance, and Afif-el-Sulh at the Ministry of Education. The proposed new Ministers are all Nationalists, and the change is to be made either by agreement with the present Ministry or through the intervention of the High Commissioner, who has discussed the question with the Nationalist leaders in an interview lasting two hours.

9. I am sending copy of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Jerusalem and Bagdad, His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut, His Majesty's consul at Aleppo and the British Resident at Amman.

I have, &c.

E. C. HOLE.

[E 3569/3130/89]

No. 59.

Consul-General Satow to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 17.)

(No. 62. Secret.)

Sir,

Beirut, June 25, 1928.

WITH reference to the third paragraph of Damascus despatch No. 50, Secret, of the 21st June, to you, stating that the presence in Syria of Nuri Pasha Seyyid, Yassin Pasha and Rustem Haidar is a source of some anxiety to the French, I have the honour to report that yesterday, after lunch, M. Maugras, secretary-general delegate of the High Commission, having referred half-jestingly to these persons, I asked him to tell me frankly whether their presence and activities were really embarrassing. He replied that so far they had not proved embarrassing to the French, but that several of the Nationalist leaders had spoken to him on the subject and had asked why these people from outside were interfering in what is a purely Syrian affair. I asked M. Maugras to let me know if at any time the presence of these Iraq notables did seem likely to embarrass the French authorities, and he promised to do so.

2. Nuri Pasha, who did have an excuse, albeit a rather flimsy one (his wish to be at hand when his son's tonsils were removed) for being here at the present juncture, left Beirut for Damascus on the 21st June, where he intended to stay a few days before returning to Bagdad. Yassin Pasha, who has, it is said, some idea of summering at Broumana in the Lebanon, is at present in Beirut, as is Rustem Haidar. It is, however, likely that they will both soon return to Damascus. So far I have not seen either of them.

3. They are clearly here to try and further the interests of the Emir Zeid as a possible candidate for the Throne of Syria, should there be a throne, which I strongly doubt. I cannot help feeling that the French, if they do eventually object to the activities of these unofficial agents of His Majesty King Feisal, will have some real ground of complaint. It appears to me to be quite irregular that efforts should be made, as they are being made, by outsiders to influence the choice of the representatives of the Syrian people of their future form of government.

4. Copies of this despatch have been sent to Aleppo, Bagdad and Damascus.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10-1-80 BY 6032

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[E 3666/3130/89]

No. 60.

Consul Hole to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 53. Secret.)

HIS Majesty's consul at Damascus presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a despatch he has addressed to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad respecting the political situation in Syria.

Damascus, June 28, 1928.

Enclosure in No. 60.

Consul Hole to His Majesty's High Commissioner, Bagdad.

(No. 82. Secret.)

Sir,

Damascus, June 28, 1928.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 338 of the 26th June addressed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, I have the honour to report that Nuri Sayyid Pasha and Rustam Haidar inform me that they have had an interview with M. Ponsot, in which he appears to have manifested the friendliest attitude towards the Hashemite family.

2. M. Ponsot is as a rule extremely non-committal, and I believe that on this occasion he did not so much make declarations as allow inferences to be drawn.

3. The substance of the conversation was reported to me, but I thought well not to telegraph it to you, as it added little to the King's information; moreover, my movements being still the object of deep interest to the Service des Renseignements, I did not care to risk creating the impression that I was taking an active part in internal politics; and this conclusion would certainly have been drawn if Nuri's visit had been immediately followed by the despatch of a long telegram to Bagdad.

4. M. Ponsot discussed the form of government to be adopted in Syria and professed himself strongly in favour of a monarchy, although he was careful to add that he would leave the Constituent Assembly a completely free hand. He made it clear that, although the choice of the form of government was within the province of the Assembly, the selection of a King or President was very much the concern of the French Government, and he would above all be guided by the desire to avoid any action that might jeopardise cordial relations with his neighbours.

5. Certain candidates to the throne of Syria being mentioned, the High Commissioner seems to have shown scant respect for their qualifications and to have left Nuri and Rustam Haidar with the impression that he would not consider any candidate but a member of the Hashemite family. He added that the question being of an international scope should evidently be treated at Paris, and, in reply to an enquiry as to the state of French public opinion, remarked that, though it was still somewhat ill-disposed to the dynasty, that was by no means beyond remedy.

6. Nuri Pasha is this morning visiting M. Maugras, with whom he hopes to have a more open discussion, and he will doubtless inform me of its course.

7. It must be kept in mind that, although the French High Commissioner and his immediate entourage are understood to incline towards a monarchy in Syria, their attitude is far from being undisputed; M. Delelée Desloges, the delegate at Damascus, and Colonel Mortier, the head of the Service des Renseignements, are strongly in opposition to their view, and his position is not at all immune from attack. The military party is almost wholly against him and is probably conducting vigorous intrigues in Paris.

8. With regard to the attitude of the Assembly itself, I have as yet little reason to modify my opinion that its sentiment is definitely republican. It is possible that if the mandatory Power made a pronouncement to the effect that if the Assembly decided on a monarchy the throne would be reserved for the Emir Zeid, the personal popularity of the Hashemite family would override intellectual preferences for a republic, and it would be difficult to ignore the public support that such an announcement would engender. But I cannot see how it would be possible for the French Government to make any such declaration.

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9. So far as I can see, Nuri Pasha and Rustam Haidar are exercising the greatest discretion in their mission, and strictly avoiding anything that might be construed as propaganda.

10. I am sending copy of this despatch direct to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem, His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut, His Majesty's consul-general at Aleppo and the chief British representative at Amman.

I have, &c.
E. C. HOLE.

[E 3928/141/89]

No. 61.

Consul, Damascus, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received August 8.)

(No. 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Damascus, August 7, 1928.

THERE is some danger of acute situation developing over the Constitution. French Government, which had given High Commissioner full authority in Syria, has at last become alarmed at sweeping concessions made to Nationalists and instructed him to apply curb and even veto Constitution which has been drawn up with his cognisance and more or less with his approval. Least consequence of such eleventh-hour intervention will be Nationalist boycott and gravest [? group omitted] another revolt.

Situation is aggravated by movement of Jebel, where Mbrash dissatisfaction with proposed Constitution may raise standard against French and Nationalists alike.

In anticipation of trouble, French commandant has cancelled all leave, recalled officers of gendarmerie and ordered all troops to stand by.

(Repeated (by post) to Bagdad, No. 99, and Jerusalem, No. 52.)

[E 3938/141/89]

No. 62.

Consul, Damascus, to Lord Cushendun.—(Received August 9.)

(No. 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

Damascus, August 9, 1928.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

This morning's Assembly met to discuss draft Constitution, and High Commissioner formulated modifications in articles directly affecting the mandate. Assembly rejected them by small majority.

(Paraphrase by post to Bagdad, No. 100; Jerusalem, No. 53.)

[E 3947/155/65]

No. 63.

Consul Monck-Mason to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received August 10.)

(No. 61. Confidential.)

Sir,

Aleppo, July 31, 1928.

WITH reference to Mr. Consul Hough's despatch No. 70 of the 24th October last on the subject of the Bozanti-Alep-Nissibine et Prolongements Railway (B.A.N.P., formerly known as the Bagdad Railway), I have the honour to report that the prolongation of the line from Derbessieh to Nissibin is now completed. Service trains have run on the new stretch at a speed exceeding 20 miles per hour, which seems to indicate that Mr. Folliet's cheaper scheme of reconstructing, referred to in Mr. Hough's despatch No. 24 of the 15th March, 1927, has proved satisfactory.

2. The railway company had announced the official opening of the Derbessieh-Nissibin extension for the 17th instant; the new line, which runs in Turkish territory along the Syrian frontier for its whole distance of 60 kilom., cannot, however, be opened pending the inspection of the same by Major Kadri Bey and Semouhi Bey, the chief Turkish commissioners for the Bozanti-Alep-Nissibine et Prolongements

Company and the Anatolian Railways respectively. This inspection is likely, I understand, to be delayed for as long as possible for reasons not unconnected with the Turkish desire to create difficulties for French military traffic.

3. I am sending copy of this despatch direct to His Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople, His Majesty's High Commissioner, Bagdad, His Majesty's consul-general, Beirut, and His Majesty's consul, Damascus.

I have, &c.

ARTHUR MONCK-MASON.

[E 4149/141/89]

No. 64.

Consul Hole to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received August 20.)

(No. 62. Confidential.)

Sir,

Damascus, July 27, 1928.

MY last despatch on the general political situation (No. 46, Confidential, of the 12th June) dealt with the opening of the Constituent Assembly and the election of the various committees entrusted with elaborating a Constitution, enquiring into the validity of the secondary elections and preparing rules of procedure. Since that date the Assembly has held nine or ten sessions, of which five were devoted to the study of parliamentary procedure and three to swearing the fifty odd members against whose election no protest had been made. Another session was held to elect a further committee to draw up an Electoral Law.

2. The only session holding any interest is the last, held a few days ago when the committee presented its report on the validity of the secondary elections at Damascus. The measures taken by the Government to assure the return of its four candidates, which were the subject of my despatch No. 36, Confidential, of the 27th April, had aroused strong feeling, and the National block had announced its intention of vigorously attacking the Government and expelling incontinent the four offending members. The campaign, directed ostensibly against the Government, scarcely veiled the desire to administer a snub to the mandatory authorities who had nominated the Government. If the committee had acted immediately on its appointment, there is little doubt that the elections would have been declared invalid; but it proved impossible to maintain the enthusiasm and solidarity of the first days over the five weeks' deliberations of the committee.

3. The findings of the committee set forth that the elections were undoubtedly irregular, unconstitutional and illegal; but on the grounds that the Government and not the candidates committed the abuses, the elections were ratified by the usual compact majority.

4. This decision is symptomatic of the evolution of the National party since its triumph at the polls. It has discovered that it is easier to conduct an oppressed Opposition than a party with an assured majority in the Chamber, and the few weeks of its ascendancy have sufficed to produce numerous fissures in the party.

5. The most important cleavage may be traced to the split in the Syro-Palestinian Congress in Egypt, reported on by His Majesty's Minister at Cairo in his despatch to the Foreign Office No. 640 of the 29th October, 1927. The Nationalist leaders have made strenuous efforts to prevent its extension to Syria, but with only partial success. In the case under review, Fozi Bakri, one of the four Deputies whose election was under discussion, is a supporter of Dr. Shahbandar; the Nationalist nominee, Afif-el-Solh, is not; and the president of the committee was able to carry three out of the seven members with him in favour of Bakri, the consequence being the curious compromise related above.

6. A few weeks ago another division appeared to be developing on the question of the future form of the government of Syria, but an understanding seems to have been reached in favour of a republic. For the presidency there are three candidates: Hashem Attassi, Ibrahim Hanano and Shaykh Taj; and the last-named, in his journal, the "Mersad," has been busy promoting dissension between supporters of Attassi and Hanano, in the hope of himself getting in on a split vote.

7. The Government, on the other hand, is not without its own squabbles. The Minister of Instruction has been attacking the Prime Minister in his brother's organ, the "Muqtabas," but the difference has been composed, and the Minister of Instruction has now proved the sincerity of his change of heart by moving the Minister of the Interior to suspend the "Muqtabas" sine die.

8. The question of changes in the Ministry, reported on in paragraph 8 of my despatch No. 50 of the 21st June, has continued to agitate the Assembly. The three Ministers have been pressed to resign but have refused, stating that they would only bow to the orders of the French High Commissioner, who had appointed them and might dismiss them, the High Commissioner maintaining his attitude of aloofness. At present there is a proposal that they should take sick leave for two months, a solution which may be accepted as saving everybody's face.

9. On the other hand, distinct progress seems to have been made as between the Nationalist party and the French. The Constitution is nearly complete, and is said to reaffirm the principal aspirations of Syria, among others, the return of the kazas, proportional representation, a national army, a consular service and freedom of the press. In a recent speech to the Young Nationalists, Ibrahim Hanano gave it to be understood that he had assurances from M. Ponsot that nine-tenths of their proposals were acceptable to France.

10. The frontiers of Syria have not been fixed, so as not to exclude the eventual absorption of Palestine and Transjordan.

11. It remains to be seen whether the National block can hold together long enough to pass the Constitution, and whether M. Ponsot, on his side, will be able to maintain himself against the growing military opposition. The various elements in the party have been induced to sign a kind of formal truce for a month, and M. Ponsot has adjourned his return to France until after that date; but the horizon is far from cloudless.

12. I am sending copy of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Jerusalem and Bagdad, His Majesty's acting consul-general at Beirut, His Majesty's consul at Aleppo and the British Resident at Amman.

I have, &c.
E. C. HOLE.

[E 3944/141/89]

No. 65.

Consul Hole to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received August 10.)

(No. 64. Confidential.)

Sir,

Damascus, July 31, 1928.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 62, Confidential, of the 27th July on the political situation, I have the honour to report that the draft of the Syrian Constitution is now ready and will be laid before the Assembly on the 2nd August. The following notes on its composition have been obtained from a private and usually authoritative source:—

2. The draft Constitution consists of 116 articles, of which the majority, dealing with questions of administration, judicature, education and the like are an amalgam of a dozen Constitutions of other countries and offer few features of immediate interest.

3. The first three articles cover the controversial ground. The first lays down the independence and sovereign status of Syria, the head of the State being elsewhere assigned power of concluding treaties and appointing Ambassadors. The second deals with the boundaries of the State, much as I forecasted in the tenth paragraph of my despatch under reference, so as to reserve the claims of Syria to territories incorporated in other States.

4. The third article provides for a republican form of government, the President to be a Moslem. A later article lays down that the official language shall be Arabic.

5. The national flag is next dealt with. It is a horizontal tricolour, green, black and white, with an obtuse triangle of red next the hoist bearing three stars. This is the flag of King Feisal's régime, but for the difference in the number of stars. The present provisional Syrian flag embodies the French tricolour in the first quarter.

6. Legislation will be entrusted to a single Chamber elected for four years; the President has the right to dissolve Parliament, but must proclaim new elections within two months of the dissolution.

7. The formation of a national army and tribal government will be the subjects of special legislation. Pious foundations are to be the province of the head of each sect.

8. The last article provides that the first President of the Republic shall be elected by the Assembly for a term of two years. The normal term of office will be three years.

9. Of the three candidates mentioned in paragraph 6 of my despatch under reference, Hashem Attassi withdraws; there will be a straight contest between Ibrahim Hanano and Sheikh Taj, which is generally expected to be close, although I should anticipate an easy success for the former. Sheikh Taj's present position, however, allows him to stimulate the affection of hesitant voters by lavish promises of preferment.

10. Relations between the High Commissioner and the Nationalists appear to be very friendly, and they are frequently in conference. It is confidently expected that the draft Constitution will be accepted as it stands by the High Commissioner, who seems to have given assurances to that effect.

11. I am sending copy of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Bagdad and Jerusalem, His Majesty's acting consul-general at Beirut, His Majesty's consul at Aleppo and the British Resident at Amman.

I have, &c.
E. C. HOLE.

[E 4390/141/89]

No. 66.

Consul Hole to Lord Cushendun.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 67. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Damascus, August 9, 1928.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 64, Confidential, of the 31st July, and my telegrams Nos. 4 and 5 of the 7th and 9th August, I have the honour to report that a sudden crisis has developed within the last week on account of a sudden change in the policy of the French Government.

2. As I reported in my despatch under reference and earlier despatches, the relations between the High Commission and the National party had assumed a distinctly sympathetic colouring, and there seemed every reason to believe that France was on the point of granting a most liberal Constitution to the State of Syria, although it was understood that the treaty following the Constitution would contain full reserves on the points concerning the relations between the two countries. M. Ponsot and his counsellor, M. Maugras, had been in frequent and friendly conference with the Nationalist leaders, and Ibrahim Hananu had made a public statement that he had assurances that the French Government would accept the draft Constitution almost as it stood.

3. This, indeed, I believe to have been the case, and the changed attitude of the Quai d'Orsay seems to be entirely independent of the High Commission. I commented on the growing military opposition to the High Commissioner's liberal tendencies as early as the 21st June, and in my despatch No. 62 of the 27th July I expressed the doubt whether M. Ponsot would be able to remain in power long enough to pass the Constitution. It appears that the efforts of the military party at Paris have at last been crowned with success, and the French Government has decided to set a limit to M. Ponsot's concessions.

4. Six articles in the draft Constitution are considered unacceptable. They concern Syrian territorial claims, the formation of a national army and the power of the President of the Republic to conclude treaties, receive Ambassadors, grant pardons and declare martial law. It will be readily understood from the attached translation of these articles that the mandatory Power could scarcely accept them in their present form and without the restraint of a treaty; on the other hand, it is surprising that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs should only now awake to the fact.

5. It is indeed unfortunate that events were allowed to go so far before the French Government intervened. The explanation offered by the High Commission is that the committee engaged in drawing up the Constitution was asked by M. Maugras not to table it until the six points had been submitted to Paris, whereupon they published it at once. Even so, the manner of this morning's intervention was of a nature to precipitate a critical decision and to arouse unnecessary passion. M. Ponsot might have required the adjournment of the debate until the six articles had been the subject of further negotiation, or that a committee should consider recasting them with specific reference to the anticipated treaty, which would have

clearly enunciated the French reserves. On the contrary, I am informed on excellent authority that he actually refused to consider a proposal on these lines made by the Nationalist leaders, and his demand that the offending articles should be simply erased from the Constitution left no alternative to a straight vote for acceptance and rejection, and was in fact rejected all but unanimously.

6. The President of the Council, Sheikh Taj-ed-Din, made a speech recommending the acceptance of the French demands, and provoked a vigorous attack on the Government by Fakhri Baroudi, who accused him, *inter alia*, with squandering the public revenues for his personal ends. It is indeed notorious that he has done so, but the accusation in full Assembly was too much for him, and he left the Chamber in high dudgeon.

7. There will be another session on the 11th August, when the Constitution will probably be passed in the teeth of French opposition. French opinion, on the other hand, anticipates a show of resistance followed by capitulation.

8. I have the honour to enclose the French text of M. Ponsot's note to the Assembly, and a translation of its reply, together with the six articles to which exception was taken.*

9. I am sending copy of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Bagdad and Jerusalem, His Majesty's acting consul-general at Beirut, His Majesty's consul at Aleppo and the British Resident at Amman.

I have, &c.

E. C. HOLE.

Enclosure in No. 66.

Articles 73, 74, 75, 110, 112 and 2 of the Draft Constitution.

(Translation.)

ARTICLE 73. The President of the Republic has the right to grant individual pardon, but cannot declare a general amnesty without a law being passed.

Article 74. The President of the Republic is authorised to conclude international treaties. Treaties affecting the safety of the country, or public finance, commercial treaties, or any other treaty which cannot be denounced year by year, shall not come into force without the sanction of the Parliament.

Article 75. The President of the Republic will choose the Prime Minister and will appoint Ministers on his advice and accept their resignations. He is authorised to appoint political representatives and receive foreign political representatives, and appoint civil officials and judges, and preside official ceremonies, within the limits of the law.

Article 110. The formation of any army which will be established will be provided for by a special law.

Article 112. On the advice of the Cabinet the President of the Republic may declare martial law in places where there are disturbances. He is to inform the Chamber of his action, and if the Chamber is not sitting he can at once convene a special session.

Article 2. The Syrian territories which were severed from the Turkish Empire have an indivisible political unity, and no account is taken of their division after the end of the general war.

[E 4391/141/89]

No. 67.

Acting Consul-General Ellison to Lord Cushendun.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 65. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Beirut, August 14, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Lebanese Cabinet resigned on the afternoon of the 9th August after a stormy meeting of the Chamber of Deputies had rejected a vote of confidence.

2. The history of the crisis is as follows: Some weeks ago a group of Deputies started an agitation for an increase in the number of Ministers from three to five.

* Not printed.

The nominal reason given was that with only three Ministers the various religious communities were not represented as provided for in the Lebanese Constitution. In fact, however, the motive was pure place-hunting. The reduction of the Ministry from seven to three, which took place last January, however advantageous on grounds of economy, unpleasantly reduced the number of prizes within the reach of ambitious politicians. A further reason was the personal unpopularity amongst the Deputies of Dr. Eyoub Tabet, who, though a capable and honest man, is completely lacking in tact. After a good deal of intrigue a majority was secured by the malcontents, who petitioned the President of the Republic for an extraordinary session of the Chamber, which he was bound by the Constitution to grant.

3. On the 9th August the session took place. Amid stormy scenes M. Bechara-el-Khoury put the question of confidence, and after the sitting had been adjourned in disorder, in the afternoon session, the motion was lost. The Ministry then resigned.

4. Endeavours have since been in progress to form a new Cabinet. Days of unsubstantiated rumour followed. Finally, a new Cabinet has been constituted as follows:—

- (1.) President of the Council, Minister for Public Health and Minister for Public Instruction: Habib Pasha-el-Saad.
- (2.) Minister of Interior: Moussa Nammour.
- (3.) Minister of Finance: Sobhi Haidar.
- (4.) Minister of Public Works and Minister of Agriculture: Hussein Ahdab.
- (5.) Minister of Justice: Shoukri Kardahi.

5. Habib Pasha-el-Saad is the well-known Maronite leader, who has held office both before and since the war. He is about 65, and is generally considered to be suffering from advancing years, and no longer a suitable man for the post. He is a typical representative of the Turkish old régime.

Moussa Nammour was the leader of the malcontents who overthrew Bechara-el-Khoury's Government. He is a Maronite. He was President of the Chamber of Deputies before its amalgamation with the Senate. He is a clever lawyer, and has a strong following in the Chamber. He is probably too clever to be dishonest, and is a considerable strength to the new Cabinet.

Soubhi Haidar is a Shiah Moslem of good family. His qualifications, especially for the Ministry of Finance, are negligible, and he may be considered a nonentity, but his personal prestige amongst the Deputies is considerable.

Hussein Ahdab was Minister for Finance and Public Works in Bechara-el-Khoury's Cabinet, and previously Administrator of Beirut. He is a Sunni Moslem, and clever, though his honesty is not above suspicion.

Shoukri Kardahi is a Greek Catholic, who held the Ministry of Justice in the last Cabinet but one. He is a capable judge, and said to be honest, but as he is at present in Paris, it is quite possible that he will refuse to hold office.

6. It is impossible to estimate how long the new Cabinet will last. It has, at present, a firm majority in the Chamber, but may at any time be overthrown by intrigues similar to those which placed it in power.

7. The general impression in the country is one of disgust. The previous Cabinet had been unexpectedly successful, and their programme of reforms was in good train; roads had been improved; considerable reforms had been made in the gendarmerie and police; excellent work was done for public health. Outside the circle of politicians and their supporters in the press, no one has any sympathy with their overthrow for purely personal reasons.

8. The attitude of the French High Commission was neutral, although their delegate tried at one time to use his influence to postpone the crisis.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to Bagdad and Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

R. ELDON ELLISON,

Acting Consul-General.

[19083]

M

[E 4405/155/65]

No. 68.

Consul Monck-Mason to Lord Cushendun.—(Received September 4.)

(No. 68.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, August 22, 1928.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 61, Confidential, of the 31st July, on the subject of the Derbessieh-Nissibine section of the Bezanti-Alep-Nissibine et Prolongements Railway, I have the honour to report that Kadri Bey informed the Direction d'Exploitation at Aleppo on the 5th instant that the Turkish Commissariat of Public Works agreed with him that the new line could not be opened until a number of technical defects had been put in order.

2. The French company, in reporting the matter to headquarters in Paris, and asking for fresh credits, explained that the Turkish Public Works attached great importance to the homogeneity of the line as a whole, apart from any political considerations. The company expressed its anxiety to conclude the work as soon as possible, on account of the growing interest taken in the Nissibine route by the commerce of Iraq. (Reference, Aleppo despatch No. 63, dated the 1st August, 1928.)

3. I am sending copy of this despatch direct to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad, His Majesty's consul at Damascus, and to the acting British consul-general at Beirut.

I have, &c.

A. MONCK-MASON.

[E 4488/141/89]

No. 69.

Consul Hole to Lord Cushendun.—(Received September 11.)

(No. 68. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Damascus, August 15, 1928.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 67, Confidential, of the 9th August, I have the honour to report that on the 11th August the Constituent Assembly again met and was adjourned for three months by decree of the High Commissioner. Some demonstrations followed and speeches were made, not of an inflammatory nature, and the crowd allowed itself to be dispersed by Syrian police. The scene now shifts to Paris.

2. This was the only possible solution in the circumstances, and it is a pity that the French did not follow this line on the 9th August instead of exposing themselves to an adverse vote in the Assembly. The reason for this lamentable tactical error is apparently the High Commission's confidence in Sheikh Taj, who assured them he had a majority ready to vote for acceptance of the French demand; also a large number of Deputies had given them assurances of their own votes, without any intention of keeping their promise. This is by no means the first time this has occurred, and M. Ponsot's ingenuousness is almost beyond belief.

3. High feeling was aroused by the sudden reversal of M. Ponsot's policy, and the tension has been greater than at any time since the rebellion. The French Command confined all troops to barracks and held a battalion ready for immediate action. The Nationalist leaders have shown considerable wisdom in refraining from exciting the population, and feeling is beginning to subside. The general effect, however, of the French action has been thoroughly bad.

4. M. Ponsot now proceeds to Paris, and no one expects him to return. Marshal Franchet d'Esperey is already canvassed as his successor; if appointed, he will be the eighth High Commissioner in as many years. The Nationalists propose to send a delegation to Paris; its composition is not yet quite definite, but from what I have seen it is moderate and competent.

5. Certain local newspapers attempted to father His Majesty's Government with responsibility for the French change in policy; it was asserted that the vague wording of article 2 regarding the frontiers of Syria excited British apprehension concerning Palestine and Transjordan and that His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had obliged the French Government to refuse the Syrian Constitution. I was myself

credited with making a strong protest to the High Commissioner. A Beirut newspaper has taken upon itself to make a full enquiry into the truth of these allegations and has been kind enough to acquit both His Majesty's Government and myself.

6. I have the honour to transmit a copy of the High Commissioner's decree of the 11th August adjourning the Assembly.*

7. I am sending copy of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioners for Palestine and Iraq, His Majesty's acting consul-general at Beirut, His Majesty's consul at Aleppo and the British Resident at Amman.

I have, &c.

E. C. HOLE.

[E 4825/141/89]

No. 70.

Sir W. Tyrrell to Lord Cushendun.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 1663.)

My Lord,

Paris, October 3, 1928.

WITH reference to Mr. Consul Hole's despatch No. 68 of the 15th August, I have the honour to inform you that a member of the Embassy recently took the opportunity of a conversation with the head of the Levant and African Department at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to make a personal enquiry as to the truth of the rumours respecting the possible recall of M. Ponsot, the French High Commissioner in Syria.

2. M. de Saint-Quentin stated that it was true that there was, on the part of certain elements in Syria, and even in French military circles, a tendency to criticise M. Ponsot's policy. M. de Saint-Quentin said that there was nothing surprising in this, and that there was always a section of opinion, particularly in military circles, which was in favour of a more vigorous policy in Syria. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs had, however, taken advantage of M. Ponsot's presence in Paris to discuss with him the whole situation in Syria, and they—and, M. de Saint-Quentin stated, also the French Government—were very satisfied with the action he had taken and was taking. In these circumstances, M. de Saint-Quentin said that he thought that any rumours as to M. Ponsot's approaching recall might be discounted.

I have, &c.

W. TYRRELL.

[E 5116/155/65]

No. 71.

Consul Monck-Mason to Lord Cushendun.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 77.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, October 15, 1928.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 68 of the 22nd August, relative to the Bozanti-Alep-Nissibine et Prolongements Railway, I have the honour to inform you that the Derbessieh-Nissibine section has been opened to-day for goods traffic only. Stations from Mersina to Aleppo and those on the Toprak Kale-Alexandretta line may now accept slow and fast freight merchandise for the newly opened section.

2. I have informed the High Commissioner, Bagdad, by telegram, and am sending copies of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade, His Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople, His Majesty's High Commissioner, Bagdad, and to His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut, Damascus and Mersina.

I have, &c.

A. MONCK-MASON.

* Not printed.

[19083]

M 2

[E 5338/141/89]

No. 72.

Consul Monck-Mason to Lord Cushendun.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 93. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, October 30, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the gist of a "proclamation" which was affixed in the Moslem quarters of Aleppo a few days ago and forthwith removed by the police. This effusion is said to be the work of the Nationalist extremists in Damascus, and to have been circulated throughout Syria and the Lebanon; it is also suggested that it emanates from Sultan-el-Atrache. The high serial number is intended no doubt to convey to the ignorant the impression that the "committee" is active and influential.

2. Seeds of Nationalist propaganda sown in Aleppo are unlikely to bear much fruit in organised disaffection, though it is quite possible that the economic position in Northern Syria, resulting, among other causes, from a bad farming year, may encourage a little brigandage. The Moslem of Aleppo is not a fighter by nature.

3. The Armenian question is a burning one with the inhabitants of Aleppo, for, out of an estimated population of 300,000, not less than 50,000 are Armenians. The easy-going Mahometan can easily foresee that within a few generations the energetic prolific Armenian, if allowed to multiply naturally, will dispossess him.

4. It may be noted that in the "proclamation" Turks are not mentioned specifically in the strictures against "foreigners," though that race is strongly represented not only in Aleppo (where a Turkish newspaper is published), but especially in the Sanjak of Alexandretta.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Damascus.

I have, &c.

A. MONCK-MASON.

Enclosure in No. 72.

Proclamation.

(Translation.)

SYRIANS and dear countrymen, the French deluded us at the beginning with promises that they would make us happy and free, but they have broken their promises. Daily we record acts of oppression and inhuman treatment.

The principles of Wilson and the decision of the League of Nations are mere words, masking intrigues for the dominion of the weak nations by the strong. The French policy in this country is a policy of murder, fire and destruction, growing more and more violent since 1919. Syrians have a duty of honour to leave no stone unturned to have these wrongs redressed.

Syrians, the French have ruined the prosperity of the country, one of the richest in the world, and have spread death and misery wherever they have gone. Their armies, recruited from every kind of savages, have burnt and destroyed, and their drunken soldiers have shamed our wives and daughters. The French have burnt down Damascus and slain its peaceful population; we cannot forget what happened at Damascus in this civilised 19th century, and we will surely revenge our martyrs.

Not satisfied with these acts of oppression, they have recently introduced into our land 100,000 Armenian refugees, of whom many have been raised to high rank. We Syrians, who bravely withstood the Turks, seem now to be the prisoners of these Armenians. On every side foreign communities have grown up: Circassians, Kurds and others have been more favoured than we whose land they live in. All our commerce and finance have gone to these usurpers.

Syrians, revolt against oppression is ordered by God, and death for freedom's sake is better than a life of slavery. Let us meet under the flag of honour, and before long we shall have our reward.

(Seal.)

Committee for the Independence and
Liberation of Syria.

[E 5339/155/65]

No. 73.

Consul Monck-Mason to Lord Cushendun.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 94.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, October 30, 1928.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 68 of the 22nd August relative to the Bozanti-Alep-Nissibin and Prolongements Railway, I have the honour to report that the latter company have shown considerable willingness to fall in with Turkish ideas as regards the homogeneity of the line, as well as in other respects. It is realised that diplomatic action would involve much loss of time and lead to no definite result. One of the high officials of the company interviewed the Turkish Minister of Public Works at Angora recently, and appears to have succeeded in gaining a number of concessions.

2. It is evident that the company is anxious for traffic; and I have a suspicion that the High Commission may have made up their minds to support the railway more than they have done hitherto, in their efforts to obtain it, with the object, to quote the words used by the "Times" correspondent at Basra in his article of the 17th October ("Times" of the 18th October), of "securing for Syria the extensive wool and wheat traffic of Kurdistan, which is now being carried on with Iraq by means of camel and motor transport."

3. I understand that the Turkish authorities are not taking much trouble to punish the nomads in Turkish territory who carry off railway material or otherwise among the company's workmen on the line.

4. I am sending copy of this despatch direct to the Department of Overseas Trade, His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad, His Majesty's consuls at Damascus and Mersina and to the acting British consul-general at Beirut.

I have, &c.

A. MONCK-MASON.

[E 5535/230/89]

No. 74.

Consul Monck-Mason to Lord Cushendun.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 98.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, November 8, 1928.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 87 of the 23rd ultimo, relative to Franco-Turkish relations, I have the honour to report that there has been a considerable increase of banditry on the western Turco-Syrian frontier recently.

2. It is stated in the press that a number of men "wanted" by the French authorities in Syria have fled into Turkey, where they recruit sympathisers to raid the Syrian frontier region. The Kaza of Kurd Dagh is especially exposed to attacks of this nature, which take place principally in the Nahié of Radjun, where little resistance is met with. An unknown bandit is said to have fallen upon and killed the brother of the Deputy for Kurd Dagh. The complaint is made that the Nahié of Radjun is very insufficiently protected; in the whole of the Kurd Dagh there are only forty-two gendarmes, of which three gendarmes and a lieutenant are allotted to the Radjun Nahié.

3. The Syrian gendarmerie post of Kameshlie (Kaza of Der-az-Zor), the "Kern" or "Keron" of Mr. Consul Hough's despatch No. 91 of the 17th September, 1926, is often attacked by mounted Turkish brigands, with occasional loss of life. In spite of much provocation, the French have kept loyal to the Angora Convention, in preventing the local Arab chiefs from carrying the war into the enemy's country.

4. Representations having been made to the mandatory authorities by tribes inhabiting the border, as well as in the Syrian press, Colonel Armand, the French frontier commandant was recently sent to Killis to discuss the recent frontier activity with the Turkish frontier commandant Mumtaz Bey. It is understood that fresh promises have been made on both sides with a view to the loyal execution of the terms of the Angora Convention by collaboration against bands and surrender of prisoners taken. Turkish grievances against the Syrian customs administration are to be submitted to the favourable consideration of the French High Commissioner.

5. As a result of the meeting at Killis, a Franco-Turkish Commission is to be formed, with the object of studying the question of the control of the frontier districts. If the control exercised by the French authorities over the border region is not very effective, at least the Turkish side of the frontier is no better policed. Local tribes do not seem to be discouraged from going on foray over the border; while desertion from the Turkish forces are not infrequent. Some of these deserters join the Légion étrangère, and others are allowed to settle in Syria.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople, His Majesty's High Commissioner, Bagdad, and to His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut, Damascus and Mersina.

I have, &c.

A. MONCK-MASON.

[E 5631/853/44]

No. 75.

Consul Hole to Lord Cushendun.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 88. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Damascus, November 14, 1928.

WITH reference to Mr. Monck-Mason's despatch No. 93 of the 30th October relative to anti-Armenian agitation in Aleppo, I have the honour to report that while no similar proclamation has appeared in Damascus, strong feeling has been excited by a somewhat belated announcement by the Havas Agency that France was contemplating the settlement of 50,000 Armenians in Syria. Protests were made by newspapers and the religious communities, and the excitement has only partially subsided with the issue of an official *démenti*.

2. This project has preoccupied the French Administration for at least a year, under varying forms, and while the philanthropic aspect of the scheme has uniformly received the greatest publicity, its principal object has always been to create an Armenian enclave in a centre of internal disaffection or on an exposed frontier. For some time the Jebel Druse was widely canvassed as the future Armenian home; this plan has now been abandoned and the Antioch-Aleppo district is under consideration. The existing settlement at Beirut has grown up quite independently of French design, and the French Administration is considering its transplantation to Tyre, which is incidentally an extremely malarial site.

3. The Armenian is regarded in Damascus and Southern Syria with very sincere abhorrence, and curiously enough what I believe to be the principal reason is not mentioned in the "proclamation" under reference. When Cilicia was abandoned by the French, a large number of Armenian refugees found their way to Damascus and were on the whole well treated. Municipal ground was given them for settlement, and a certain amount of public hospitality—possibly voluntary—was shown them by the community. During the recent troubles, the French recruited them as irregular levies, together with the Circassians and the Kurds, and they did most of the guerrilla fighting in the Ghouta. The manner in which those operations were carried out will be within your recollection; and the Arabs' natural hatred of foreign mercenaries is accentuated by what they consider a foul abuse of their hospitality.

4. I have serious doubts as to the political expediency of the planting of these colonies, which would certainly excite local resentment and so strengthen the hands of the parties opposed to the French administration; moreover, their eventual loyalty to France is highly problematical. It may be observed that in the late elections the Armenians voted Nationalist.

I have, &c.

E. C. HOLE.

[E 5766/141/89]

No. 76.

Sir W. Tyrrell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 2016.)

Sir,

Paris, December 3, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that during the discussion of the War Ministry estimates in the Chamber of Deputies on the 30th November a Socialist Deputy proposed the abandonment of the Syrian mandate by France.

2. In opposing this proposal, the President of the Council informed the Chamber that, were France to abandon her mandate, "the League of Nations would have no difficulty in finding a successor, and it would not be only French prestige which would be endangered, but also French good faith and the general interest. Good faith because we entered into an undertaking not merely towards the League, but also towards the interested populations themselves, and because we promised to lead them to independence. This undertaking was entered into and has been continuously renewed not only *vis-à-vis* the League, but also *vis-à-vis* the populations of Syria and of the Lebanon. Are you sure that other mandatories would fulfil this undertaking as faithfully as France? Are you sure that in the future the new nation to which the League of Nations had recourse would show the same magnificent disinterestedness in preparing these populations for independence and for full sovereign rights, with no desire other than that of maintaining with them friendly relations? Would you not be afraid that one day Powers with imperialist designs would instal themselves in the midst of these populations which we are protecting, and that those Powers would seek to dominate them? The danger which I am pointing out is by no means impossible, and I am amazed that, at a time such as this, proposals of this kind can be made from the Socialist benches. . . . No Government could accept the proposal which has just been made. As for this Government, which is at the moment responsible for French interests at home and abroad, it rejects the proposal unreservedly and makes the division thereon one of confidence."

3. The Government secured a majority of 354 votes against 216. The Socialists and Communists voted in the minority with 80 of 125 Socialist Radicals and some 20 members of the other Left groups.

4. There is a tendency in certain circles here to assume that, in referring to "Powers with imperialist designs," M. Poincaré was thinking of Italy.

I have, &c.

W. TYRRELL.

[E 5785/141/89]

No. 77.

Consul Hole to Lord Cushendun.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 92. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Damascus, November 24, 1928.

THE three months that have elapsed since my last political report (Damascus despatch No. 68 of the 15th August), while unusually free from incident, have witnessed the slow subsidence of the feeling aroused by the sudden *volte-face* of the French Administration in rejecting a Constitution which had been elaborated under the personal inspiration of the High Commissioner and M. Maugras. This had created an atmosphere of tension comparable only to the period of the rebellion, and French troops were kept in readiness for immediate action. Nationalist leaders, however, studiously avoided giving any provocation, and feeling slowly simmered down.

2. In September a small party of brigands showed some activity in the Ghouta. This band is composed of well-known professional thieves, of the Qittat, or Cat, family. The French Administration at once adopted measures utterly disproportionate to the importance of the affair, and for a fortnight or more the whole of the troops in the Damascus area spent their days and nights in first-class field manoeuvres in the Ghouta. For five days the population of certain villages in the contaminated area were confined to their homes, on pain of being shot at sight, and irrigation was rendered impossible. Many villagers in panic removed their belongings to Damascus. The futility of these proceedings was demonstrated by the

occurrence of a series of highway robberies, which were subsequently brought home to Capitaine Collet's own Circassians.

3. It is a little difficult to determine the motive underlying the extraordinary measures taken by the French, whether they were really convinced that the Qittat crimes were the prelude to a new revolt, or whether they found in them a convenient pretext for a display of military force calculated to discourage any such dispositions; I incline to the latter alternative.

4. The collection of rifles in the Jebel Druse, reported in my despatch No. 71 of the 29th August, has been proceeding and has provoked a vigorous protest from Abdul Ghaffar Pasha-el-Atrash. A succession of bad harvests have reduced the Druses of the Mountain to a condition of extreme want and set up a strong current of emigration to the less unfortunate districts of the Hauran and the Lebanon. Large numbers also came to Damascus to obtain work as day-labourers on certain road and tramway repairs, now approaching completion. Those who remained are said to have been obliged to sell everything they had to buy arms from Transjordan for surrender to the French.

5. At Damascus, Sheikh Taj-ed-Din has been endeavouring to consolidate his position by various devices, and has succeeded so far that he is now regarded with a mixture of indifference and resignation. When the mandatory Power finds it convenient to drop him he will not be mourned.

6. An attempt was recently made to introduce new and vigorous blood into his Cabinet in the person of Riza Pasha Rikabi, formerly King Feisal's Prime Minister and subsequently Prime Minister in Transjordan. It was hoped that he would serve as Minister of the Interior, where his undoubted administrative capacity would have been of great value. Efforts to patch up the long-standing feud between them have achieved a partial success, and the combination is now at least conceivable.

7. A certain amount of discreet agitation for a monarchy continues; meetings are held, but the supporters seem to be more numerous than articulate.

8. The question of the Constitution preoccupies public attention. The return of M. Ponsot revives hopes that his policy has been approved and that the Constituent Assembly will be given some opportunity of collaboration. On the other hand, the renewed adjournment of the Assembly suggests an eventual dissolution, and may be considered the anaesthetic before the amputation. A nominated Chamber on Lebanese lines would then approve whatever Constitution would be put before it.

9. It is to be hoped that France will make no more experiments before settling on a policy. The economical situation is frankly bad, and the one thing indispensable to its improvement is stability. Syria would have been far happier if France had made a Protectorate of it in the first place and kept to it. It is the continual changes of policy that aggravate France's difficulties in Syria and drive the Syrians to desperate courses.

10. Copies of this despatch are being sent direct to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Bagdad and Jerusalem, the British Resident at Amman, and His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Aleppo.

I have, &c.
E. C. HOLE.

[E 5976/853/44]

No. 78.

Consul-General Satow to Lord Cushendun.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 84. Confidential.)
My Lord,

Beirut, November 23, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to call attention to certain statements made in a confidential despatch, No. 88, addressed to you on the 14th November by His Majesty's consul at Damascus, relative to the question of the settlement of Armenian refugees in the Lebanon and in Syria, which are, at any rate so far as this consular district is concerned, incorrect, and therefore misleading.

2. I do not consider that Mr. Hole's suggestion that the French authorities in tackling, somewhat belatedly, the problem are actuated by motives of a political nature is correct. The refugees have been here ever since the French evacuation of Cilicia, but it is only since the appointment of Dr. Duguet as Inspector-General of Health Services at the High Commission some two and a half years ago that really active steps have been taken to alleviate the conditions in which the refugees have

been living here and elsewhere. This officer is both keen and efficient, and I feel sure that in dealing with the refugees question he has had no political *arrière-pensée*. In any case, there has for some time past been here, in connexion with the settlement of the refugees, a M. Burnier, who is the delegate of the International Labour Office at Geneva. He works in close touch with Dr. Duguet, who also collaborates with the Rev. Harold Buxton, the representative of the Lord Mayor's Fund, with the director of the American Near East Relief, and with others. The whole question is therefore being dealt with on an international basis, although the main direction is, as is only natural, in the hands of the French.

3. As regards what is actually being done in Beirut with such funds as are available, the main object is the breaking-up of the "camp," which for a long time was in the nature of a scandal and is still a potential danger, not only from the standpoint of public health, but also owing to the fact that it is composed of flimsy wooden buildings which would burn like tinder. On a high-lying site on the outskirts of the town small houses which should take about 200 families have during the past summer been under construction. They should be ready for occupation early next year. Funds do not permit of more buildings being erected, but a large plot of land has been purchased in the vicinity of the new settlement on which Armenians from the camp will be allowed to reside on the condition that they themselves within some given time erect proper houses. By these two schemes it is estimated that 700 families will be provided for.

4. There is no intention to transplant the Beirut settlement to Tyre. An attempt was made to start a small agricultural colony near that place, but it failed and the idea has been abandoned. The reason for the failure was mainly that an attempt was made to run the colony on "métayer" (profit-sharing) lines.

5. There are already some ten Armenian agricultural colonies in the Antioch district. This is a suitable region, as even before the war there were a fair number of Armenian villages in the vicinity. Both Dr. Duguet and Mr. Buxton consider that the scheme is proving successful, and it is intended, as funds permit, to extend it. The idea is to form settlements of people who formerly lived in the same places or regions in Anatolia. In view of what has happened in the past, it is considered undesirable that Armenians should be settled in the interior far from the sea. It is therefore very unlikely that there was ever any serious intention of settling Armenians in the Jebel Druse, far from possible help and in the midst of a wild and potentially hostile population. Certainly, I have never heard of any such scheme, nor has Mr. Buxton. Dr. Duguet told me recently that from Bab and Membidj, between Aleppo and the Euphrates, requests had been received that Armenian settlers might be sent. Mr. Buxton appeared to consider this unlikely to happen for the reasons referred to above.

6. I feel that an honest attempt, much hindered by lack of money, is being made to deal with the question of the Armenian refugees at Beirut, Aleppo, Alexandretta and elsewhere. A good many of them have left for the Americas, but more than enough remain to be embarrassing. Considerable vested interests have grown up in the camps, and the dwellers in them are reluctant to leave. This creates an additional complication.

7. There is no doubt that the Armenian is for a variety of reasons, of which Mr. Hole mentions one, extremely unpopular. At the same time, the refugees have proved to be of real value to the country, as they are intelligent, skilled and hard-working. They have largely contributed by their labour to the rebuilding of the old and ruined quarters of Beirut, which without them would not have advanced as rapidly as it has. At the same time, their very qualities render them distasteful to the native population.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to Aleppo (No. 53) and Damascus (No. 71).

I have, &c.
H. E. SATOW.

CHAPTER III.—IRAQ.

[E 4362/94/65]

No. 79.

Mr. Chilton to Lord Cushendun.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 1541.)

My Lord,

Washington, August 18, 1928.

WITH reference to Sir Esme Howard's despatch No. 167 of the 24th January last, I have the honour to inform you that, according to an announcement appearing in American newspapers of recent date, the organisation of the Near East Development Corporation has now been completed. The corporation has been chartered under the laws of the State of Delaware as a holding company to take over 23.75 per cent. of the shares of the Turkish Petroleum Company allotted to five American oil companies, namely, the Atlantic Refining Company, the Gulf Oil Corporation, the Pan-American Petroleum and Transport Company, the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and the Standard Oil Company of New York. Mr. Walter C. Teagle, president of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, has been elected president of the new corporation, and its other officers are as follows:—

Vice-president, C. S. Davison of the Gulf Oil Corporation.

Treasurer, Howard E. Cole of the Standard Oil Company of New York.

Secretary, C. Stuart Morgan.

The directorate consists of the president, vice-president and treasurer, together with Mr. W. M. Irish of the Atlantic Refining Company and P. G. Stewart of the Pan-American Petroleum and Transport Company.

I have, &c.

(For the Chargé d'Affaires),

J. JOYCE BRODERICK.

[E 4547/112/65]

No. 80.

Note by Sir R. Lindsay.

THE Turkish Ambassador called to-day and handed to me the attached note about a frontier incident between the Assyrians and Turkish troops in the neighbourhood of Amadia. I read to Ferid Bey the account of this incident which we had received in Iraq Intelligence Report No. 17, and pointed out to him that this was nothing but an ordinary frontier incident. I told him of the action which had already been taken, from which he could see that two of his specific demands had already been met, and I suggested to him that the best way for treating this business would be to refer it to the Frontier Commission and allow it to receive its normal settlement in that manner.

The Ambassador laid great emphasis on the request that the Assyrians should in general be removed altogether from the frontier and planted down somewhere else. He maintained very strongly that so long as they were in the neighbourhood of the frontier we would have constant disturbances and a multiplication of difficulties. I said in reply that I would forward his suggestion to the Colonial Office, but I did not encourage him to expect any favourable reply. I said that these people had to live in high mountains and it was very difficult to find ground suitable for them in other parts of Iraq, and that I thought that there was just every bit as much danger of frontier disturbances from Kurdish tribes like the Goyans, who, like the Assyrians, had also been chased out of Turkey in the past.

September 11, 1928.

R. C. L.

Enclosure in No. 80.

*Ferid Bey to Lord Cushendun.**Ambassade de la République turque,**Londres, le 11 septembre 1928.*

M. le Ministre,

LE 13 août dernier, un certain nombre de Nestoriens se trouvant dans le voisinage de la zone d'Ashuta, franchissaient avec leurs troupeaux la frontière turco-irakienne, entre les poteaux portant les Nos. 36 et 39, et s'avançaient à plus de 1 kilom. dans l'intérieur du territoire turc.

Invités par notre poste-frontière à se retirer immédiatement, loin d'obéir aux injonctions qui leur étaient adressées, ils firent feu sur les soldats turcs, qui se virent ainsi contraints de riposter. Attirés par les détonations, une centaine de Nestoriens, armés de fusils et de fusils automatiques, vinrent bientôt se joindre aux agresseurs et attaquèrent notre poste-frontière comprenant d'ailleurs un nombre restreint de soldats. Trois de ces derniers furent tués, deux furent blessés et deux autres emportés prisonniers par les agresseurs au delà de la frontière. Dans la précipitation de la fuite, les assassins ne purent emmener avec eux deux troupeaux qui leur appartenaient et qui furent laissés sur le territoire turc.

Ainsi que votre Excellence se souviendra parfaitement, mon Gouvernement avait à maintes reprises signalé au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté les dangers que présentait, au point de vue de la sécurité de la frontière, l'installation en masse et à proximité du territoire turc, de ces bandes de Nestoriens armés. L'événement très pénible qui s'est déroulé à la frontière et qui a coûté la vie à trois soldats turcs, événement dont la gravité ne saurait échapper à votre Excellence, démontre une fois de plus combien les inquiétudes et les démarches antérieures du Gouvernement de la République étaient fondées.

Votre Excellence conviendra sans peine que les agissements réitérés et intolérables de ces bandes criminelles armées de fusils et de mitrailleuses, qui continuent à violer la sécurité de la frontière en dépit des stipulations expresses du Traité d'Angora et des assurances formelles qui nous ont été données à plusieurs reprises, sont de nature à porter atteinte aux relations de bon voisinage que le susdit traité visait à établir entre les deux États voisins.

C'est dans le but de prévenir cette situation fâcheuse que, d'ordre de mon Gouvernement, je prie votre Excellence de vouloir bien agir auprès des autorités irakiennes aux fins :

1. D'éloigner le plus tôt et le plus loin possible de la frontière les bandes de Nestoriens susvisées.
2. De punir les assassins et les coupables d'une manière exemplaire.
3. De faire relâcher immédiatement les deux soldats qui ont été emportés prisonniers et d'assurer la restitution des équipements volés.
4. Et de faire payer une indemnité adéquate pour les trois soldats assassinés, victimes de leur devoir.

Veuillez, &c.

FERID.

[E 4892/112/65]

No. 81.

*Ahmed Ferid Bey to Lord Cushendun.—(Received October 10.)**Ambassade de la République turque, Londres,*
le 8 octobre 1928.

M. le Ministre,

LA question ayant trait à l'installation des Assyriens à proximité de la frontière turco-irakienne et aux conséquences regrettables qui en ont résulté au point de vue des relations de bon voisinage entre les deux pays, avait été l'objet de mes nombreuses démarches auprès de votre Excellence.

Notamment dans mon aide-mémoire, daté du 14 novembre 1927, je signalais l'installation dans la région d'Amadiéh et Zakho des groupements d'Assyriens qui ont manifesté à diverses reprises leur hostilité envers la Turquie, et j'ajoutais que ce rassemblement n'était pas fait pour contribuer au maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité tant désirés par les signataires du Traité d'Angora.

[19083]

Dans la note responsive que votre Excellence avait bien voulu me transmettre, vous confirmiez nos informations concernant l'installation des Assyriens dans les régions d'Amadiéh et Zakho, tout en déclarant que cette colonisation ne s'effectuait pas dans le voisinage immédiat de la frontière. Les agressions dont nos postes-frontières ont été l'objet et que j'ai relatées dans ma note du 11 septembre dernier ont prouvé le bien-fondé de nos inquiétudes et la justesse de nos démarches.

Tout récemment encore, mon Gouvernement a été informé que 8,000 autres familles de Nestoriens ont été dirigées sur la zone de la frontière située au sud de Héréki, en vue d'être colonisées dans la région de Kias Kesh et Houston. Le rassemblement continu et toujours croissant de ces éléments de trouble dans la région-frontière est de nature à créer dans cette zone un état perpétuel d'insécurité et d'agitation, susceptible de causer les plus grands torts à l'harmonie et à la bonne entente qui devraient régler les relations des deux pays voisins.

A ce propos, je ne saurais assez insister sur les termes de l'article 10 du traité signé à Angora le 5 juin 1926, qui, pour l'application des dispositions du chapitre consacré au "Bon Voisinage," prévoit la création d'une zone-frontière de 75 kilom. de profondeur de part et d'autre de cette frontière. La lettre et l'esprit du traité visaient incontestablement à débayer ces régions de tout élément subversif apte à s'adonner au banditisme ou à la propagande anti-turque tant nuisibles à la paix et à la sécurité de la frontière. Il suffit, d'ailleurs, de remarquer la place réservée au susdit article du traité dans le chapitre II précité relatif au "Bon Voisinage," la façon même dont il a été rédigé, ainsi que les précautions minutieuses prévues par les négociateurs en vue de maintenir à tout prix un état de sécurité absolue dans la zone-frontière, pour se rendre compte combien cette paix et sécurité, ainsi que l'harmonie des relations mutuelles basées sur la bonne entente réciproque, leur tenaient à cœur.

Votre Excellence conviendra sans aucune peine que le rassemblement des éléments subversifs dans cette même zone, qu'on a pour ainsi dire voulu isoler, est peu compatible avec les stipulations et le but du Traité d'Angora.

Je viens donc prier votre Excellence d'intervenir de la façon la plus efficace auprès des autorités irakiennes en vue de faire rapporter les mesures de colonisation nouvellement prises en ce qui concerne les 8,000 familles susvisées, et, se rendant aux suggestions formulées dans ma note du 27 avril dernier, de faire éloigner au moins de 75 kilom. vers le sud de la frontière les Nestoriens antérieurement colonisés dans la région d'Amadiéh et de Zakho.

2. Dans mon aide-mémoire précité du 14 novembre 1927, j'avais également signalé à l'attention de votre Excellence les propagandes qui se faisaient, sous l'instigation des Gouverneurs irakiens et de quelques officiers britanniques, à Amadiéh, Zakho, Akra, Zibar et Dehok, pour former dans ces régions des associations kurdes ayant pour tâche de réveiller chez les Kurdes le sentiment du nationalisme et d'assurer l'expansion de ce courant.

Dans votre note responsive vous vouliez bien me communiquer que cette question avait été discutée lors de la cinquième session de la Commission permanente de la Frontière, session au cours de laquelle les délégués irakiens auraient réfuté l'existence d'un système organisé de propagande anti-turque dans les régions kurdes au nord de l'Irak.

Or, mon Gouvernement vient de m'informer que, malgré les assurances données par les délégués irakiens au cours de la cinquième session de la Commission permanente de la Frontière, une activité intense de propagande anti-turque, à laquelle prend part Seïd Taha, continue de sévir à Revandiz, centre de l'organisation révolutionnaire kurde. Les démarches faites par les délégués turcs, au cours de la session précitée de la Commission de la Frontière, en vue de mettre fin à ces propagandes et à l'activité de Seïd Taha, n'ont pas abouti à un résultat heureux, et, finalement, les délégués irakiens ont suggéré que la question soulevée ne pourrait être résolue que par la voie diplomatique.

D'ordre de mon Gouvernement, je prie donc également votre Excellence de vouloir bien intervenir aux fins d'éloigner du centre d'agitation le principal instigateur Seïd Taha, et mettre une fin définitive à ces propagandes fâcheuses qui continuent à exciter les passions contre la Turquie et les Turcs.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

FERID.

[E 5470/94/65]

No. 82.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to M. de Fleuriau.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, November 28, 1928.

ON the 16th November you enquired, with reference to the negotiations which have recently been taking place between the Iraqi Government and the Turkish Petroleum Company, whether His Majesty's Government had intervened in order to oblige the company to take upon themselves the construction of a railway between Haifa and Bagdad.

2. In reply to this enquiry I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the position in this matter is as follows:—

3. The period within which the Turkish Petroleum Company was obliged, under article 5 of its convention with the Government of Iraq, to select its plots was due to expire, after certain extensions had been granted, on the 14th November, 1928. The company has attached great importance to obtaining the consent of the Iraqi Government to a further considerable extension of this period, and has for some time been negotiating with the Government for that purpose. As the result of these negotiations the company has now put forward a draft agreement, which, if accepted by the Iraqi Government, will require the approval of the Iraqi Parliament. Under this agreement, if so approved, the period allowed to the company for the selection of its plots will be extended for two years. As a consideration for this extension, the company will undertake, among other things, to survey the line of a railway from Bagdad to the Mediterranean, to investigate the technical and financial problems involved in the construction of such a railway, and (within the period of two years) to submit to the Iraqi Government a complete project for the construction of such a railway. The company further proposes to undertake, in a letter addressed to the Iraqi Government, that this contemplated survey shall be made in the first instance between Bagdad and Haifa, and a scheme submitted for the construction of a railway on that route.

4. The proposed agreement further provides that the company shall receive an option (valid for two years) to consider and frame a proposal to construct the Iraqi section of a Bagdad-Mediterranean railway, and that, if the Iraqi Government conclude with the company or its nominees an agreement to construct the Iraqi section of such railway, the company shall receive in part consideration an extension for a further three years of the period for the selection of its plots.

5. His Majesty's Government consider that the Iraqi Government are fully justified in obtaining some consideration in return for the valuable concession made by them in the extension of time granted to the Turkish Petroleum Company, and do not consider that there is any objection to the agreement, the main lines of which, in so far as they affect the railway proposals, have been indicated above. Under the proposed agreement it would remain open to the Turkish Petroleum Company, if it does not wish to undertake the construction of the railway, either itself or through its nominees, to refrain from exercising its option and to abandon its right to the final three years' extension.

I have, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 5709/112/65]

No. 83.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Ferid Bey.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, December 4, 1928.

WITH reference to your Excellency's note of the 8th October, on the subject of a concentration of Assyrians stated to have been effected in the neighbourhood of the Turco-Iraqi frontier, I have the honour to inform you that the various incidents referred to therein have been under examination by His Majesty's Government and the Government of Iraq.

2. Before alluding to the result of the investigations which have been carried out in this matter, I desire to draw your attention to the fact that, as direct diplomatic relations have now been established between the Governments of Turkey

and Iraq, the complaints contained in your note might conveniently have been addressed, in accordance with normal diplomatic procedure, to the Iraqi Government through the Turkish diplomatic representative at Bagdad. A copy of your Excellency's note will accordingly be communicated to the Iraqi Government, who will doubtless reply to the Turkish Government's allegations through the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad or through the Iraqi Minister at Angora. There are, however, certain points in that note which call for independent comment on the part of His Majesty's Government.

3. In the first place, it has been ascertained from His Majesty's High Commissioner in Iraq that there is no foundation for the statement that there have been preliminary concentrations of Assyrians in the neighbourhood of the frontier, and in particular that 8,000 Nestorian families have been concentrated with a view to their settlement in the region south of Harki. The anxiety apparently felt on this score by the Turkish Government is therefore groundless. As I had the honour to inform you in my note of the 5th March last, a scheme for the settlement of Assyrians in the Baradost area has for some time been under consideration. No progress has as yet been made with the carrying out of this project, but it is possible that some sixty families may be settled in that area early next year.

4. As was explained orally to you by Sir R. Lindsay on the 11th September, the reports which reached the Turkish Government in regard to the skirmish between Assyrian shepherds and Turkish frontier detachments on the 12th August had evidently been much exaggerated. Further enquiries have shown that there was no aggressive or criminal intention on the part of the Assyrians concerned in the incident, which clearly arose out of a misunderstanding on one side or the other. The skirmish in question actually originated in an attempt made by certain Turks to drive off from the Iraqi side of the frontier a flock of sheep belonging to the Assyrians, who in the darkness mistook the aggressors for transborder robbers, and therefore carried out a counter-attack.

5. As no basis can be found for the suggestion that this incident constituted an act of aggression on the part of the Assyrians of a nature likely to endanger the peace of the frontier, the question of the removal of the Assyrians from the frontier zone cannot, in the considered opinion of His Majesty's Government, be held to arise.

6. There is a further point to which I take leave to call your Excellency's serious attention. His Majesty's Government cannot but resent the renewed allegations against British officers contained in the second part of your note under reference. His Majesty's Government observe that no evidence is adduced in support of these allegations, which they are themselves satisfied are devoid of foundation, and I shall be glad to learn on what grounds the Turkish Government have thought it necessary to bring them forward.

7. In conclusion, I have the honour to inform you that within the last few weeks His Majesty's Government have received reports of a number of raids into Iraq originating from the Turkish side of the frontier. They are concerned to learn, not only that these incidents have lately shown a tendency to become more frequent, but that the Iraqi Government are in possession of evidence which goes to prove that on several occasions the raiding parties were accompanied by uniformed Turkish soldiers. The Iraqi Government will doubtless be prepared to supply the Turkish Government with copies of this evidence, which takes the form of sworn statements of Iraqi police and other eye-witnesses.

8. His Majesty's Government cannot but feel that the improvement of the situation on the frontier, which is so earnestly desired by both Governments, might more speedily be realised if the Turkish Government would examine more closely the value of the reports which appear to reach them regarding alleged transgressions by Iraqis, and would at the same time impress upon the Turkish local authorities the importance of preventing incursions by Turkish nationals, evidence of which has frequently been brought to their notice.

I have, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

of a concentration of Assyrians stated to have been made in the neighbourhood of the frontier. I have the honour to inform you that the various incidents mentioned in your note have been under consideration by His Majesty's Government and that they are being dealt with as they arise.

2. Before alluding to the result of the investigation with a view to the improvement of the situation on the frontier, which is so earnestly desired by both Governments, I desire to draw your attention to the fact that the various incidents mentioned in your note have been under consideration by His Majesty's Government and that they are being dealt with as they arise.

[E 5752/94/65]

No. 84.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir W. Tyrrell (Paris).

(No. 2728.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 5, 1928.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 2672 of the 29th November, respecting the representations made by the French Ambassador in connexion with the proposed construction of a railway between Haifa and Bagdad, I have to inform your Excellency that M. de Fleuriat called here on the 1st December and said that my note of the 28th November did not reply exactly to the question which he had asked on the 16th November. This question was, as you will remember, whether His Majesty's Government had intervened with the Turkish Petroleum Company in order to oblige that company to take upon themselves the expense of constructing a railway between Haifa and Bagdad.

2. His Excellency went on to say that the explanation given in my note of the position of the Turkish Petroleum Company *vis-à-vis* the Iraqi Government indicated that His Majesty's Government approved the attitude adopted by the president of the company. It was consequently possible to conclude that it was on their advice that Sir J. Cadman had modified the draft letter approved by the board of the Turkish Petroleum Company in such a way as to offer the Government of Iraq to survey, in the first instance, the route of a pipe-line or railway between Iraq and Haifa.

3. His Excellency further observed that the intervention of His Majesty's Government in this matter necessitated a similar intervention on the part of the French Government, who could not admit that any action on the part of either the mandatory Power in Iraq or of the Iraqi Government with the Turkish Petroleum Company, that is to say, an action of a political character, should establish a priority in favour of one particular *tracé* for a pipe-line and railway—a *tracé* which might well, after technical examination, be found to be incompatible with the interests of the company. The French Government would be justified by motives of a similar political character in claiming a detailed survey, from a technical point of view, for laying a pipe-line by the shortest route to a terminus situated on the Syrian coast.

4. And above all, his Excellency added, the French Government, basing themselves on the San Remo Agreement, had the right to protest against the construction at the expense of the Turkish Petroleum Company of a railway between Iraq and Haifa; for the cost of the construction and maintenance of such a railway, which would impose on the company additional and useless expenditure, would increase the price of the Mesopotamian oil, a share of which had been granted to France.

5. M. de Fleuriat concluded by recalling the spirit of mutual trust and collaboration which had led to the San Remo Agreement, and asked that His Majesty's Government would intervene with the Iraqi Government in order to induce that Government to abandon its requirements, which were injurious to the Turkish Petroleum Company and to French interests.

6. His Excellency was informed that the matter would be further examined, and that the result would be communicated to him as soon as possible.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

J. H. G.

[E 5919/94/65]

No. 85.

Memorandum from French Embassy.—(Received in Foreign Office, December 14.)

PAR sa note en date du 28 novembre 1928, le Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires étrangères a bien voulu exposer l'économie du projet d'accord entre l'Irak et la Turkish Petroleum Company, qui avait fait l'objet de la démarche de l'Ambassadeur de France, en date du 16 novembre.

Le Gouvernement britannique a donné, à ce sujet, les précisions suivantes :

"La période pendant laquelle la Turkish Petroleum Company était obligée, d'après l'article 5 de sa convention avec l'Irak, de choisir ses lots devait expirer, après que certaines prolongations eurent été accordées, le 14 novembre 1928. La compagnie a attaché une grande importance à obtenir le consentement du Gouvernement irakien à une importante prolongation ultérieure de cette période

et a, pendant quelque temps, négocié avec ce Gouvernement dans ce but. A la suite de ces négociations, la compagnie a maintenant mis sur pied un projet d'accord qui, s'il est accepté par le Gouvernement irakien, doit recevoir l'approbation du Parlement irakien. D'après cet accord, et s'il est approuvé, la période accordée à la compagnie pour le choix de ses lots sera prolongée de deux ans. En considération de cette prolongation, la compagnie doit entreprendre, entre autres choses, d'étudier la ligne d'un chemin de fer allant de Bagdad à la Méditerranée, d'examiner les problèmes techniques et financiers que comporte la construction d'un tel chemin de fer et (dans la période de deux ans) de soumettre au Gouvernement irakien un projet complet pour la construction d'un tel chemin de fer.

"De plus, la compagnie propose de s'engager, par une lettre adressée au Gouvernement irakien, à ce que l'étude projetée soit faite en premier lieu entre Bagdad et Haïffa et qu'un projet soit soumis pour la construction d'un chemin de fer sur ce tracé.

"Le projet d'accord prévoit, d'autre part, que la compagnie recevra une option (valable pour deux ans), pour étudier et mettre sur pied une proposition pour la construction de la section irakienne d'un chemin de fer Bagdad-Méditerranée, et que, si le Gouvernement irakien conclut un accord avec la compagnie ou ses représentants, la compagnie devra recevoir, comme compensation partielle, une prolongation pour trois nouvelles années de la période de choix de ses lots."

En priant l'Ambassadeur de France d'accuser réception au Foreign Office de ces indications, dont il prend bonne note, le Gouvernement français l'a chargé d'exprimer le regret que la lettre du 28 novembre ne réponde pas exactement à la question posée le 16 novembre par M. de Fleuriau. Il croit, toutefois, pouvoir conclure de l'approbation donnée par le Gouvernement britannique, à la décision prise par le Président de la Turkish Petroleum Company, que c'est sur l'avis du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté que Sir John Cadman, qui s'est d'ailleurs autorisé à cet effet de la nécessité d'obtenir l'appui de la Puissance mandataire, a modifié la lettre annexée au projet d'accord et approuvée par le Conseil de la Turkish Petroleum Company, dans des conditions qui assurent une priorité à l'établissement d'un trajet de chemin de fer aboutissant à Haïffa.

Le Gouvernement français estime que les questions soulevées par la production et le transport des huiles de la Turkish Petroleum Company sont purement techniques et doivent, à ce titre, être exclusivement discutées par cette société. Aussi, ne serait-il pas intervenu dans les tractations que la Turkish Petroleum Company a engagées avec le Gouvernement irakien, en vue d'obtenir une prorogation du délai fixé pour le choix de ses lots en échange de l'étude des tracés de chemin de fer susceptibles de relier l'Irak à la Méditerranée, si la compagnie avait pu poursuivre ses négociations en toute liberté. Mais la prétention de l'Irak d'exiger qu'une préférence soit donnée à l'étude d'une voie aboutissant à un point dont la désignation n'offre pas d'intérêt direct pour cet Etat, puisqu'il est extérieur à son territoire, et l'intervention dans le même sens du Gouvernement britannique auprès du Président de la Turkish Petroleum Company alors que cette compagnie s'était prononcée dans un sens contraire, obligent le Gouvernement français à intervenir à son tour et à préciser son point de vue.

Le Gouvernement français rappelle qu'il tient des Accords de San-Remo une part des pétroles de Mésopotamie libre de toutes charges autres que celles qui sont afférentes à leur exploitation. Il a transféré ses droits à la Compagnie française des Pétroles, membre de la Turkish Petroleum Company. Il estime, en conséquence, que toute action exercée sur la Turkish Petroleum Company, soit par la Puissance mandataire en Irak, soit par le Gouvernement irakien, tenu en l'occurrence de prendre conseil de la Puissance mandataire, et ayant pour effet de grever d'une charge politique les exploitations de cette compagnie, constitue un manquement aux Accords de San-Remo.

Il ne saurait admettre, notamment, que soit imposée à la Turkish Petroleum Company la construction d'un chemin de fer et, par voie de conséquence, la pose d'un pipe-line suivant un tracé qui ne serait pas reconnu comme étant le plus conforme aux intérêts de la compagnie. Une telle solution imposerait, en effet, des charges supplémentaires et inutiles, qui augmenteraient le prix des pétroles mésopotamiens revenant à la France.

Or, le Gouvernement français est dans l'obligation de constater que l'intervention du Gouvernement britannique a, d'ores et déjà, eu pour résultat

d'amener la Turkish Petroleum Company à se départir de la position qu'elle avait prise à l'unanimité, pour admettre, en dehors de toute considération d'ordre économique, en faveur de l'étude d'un projet de voie ferrée Bagdad-Haïffa, une priorité qui tend à préjuger de la construction d'un chemin de fer et de l'établissement d'un pipe-line suivant ce tracé.

Il insiste, en conséquence, de la façon la plus pressante, pour que la question soit replacée sur le terrain économique où elle aurait dû être maintenue, et pour que la Turkish Petroleum Company, tout en prenant l'engagement de procéder à l'étude des différents projets de voie ferrée réalisables, y compris celui de Bagdad-Haïffa, soit dispensée de donner une préférence à ce dernier tracé. Ainsi ramené à sa forme première, cet engagement sera dégagé de tout caractère politique, sans que soit d'ailleurs réduite pour cela la contre-partie offerte à l'Irak.

Fidèle à l'esprit de confiante collaboration qui a présidé à la conclusion des Accords de San-Remo et qu'il entend apporter à leur application, le Gouvernement de la République a le ferme espoir que le Gouvernement britannique acceptera d'intervenir auprès du Gouvernement irakien pour assurer le respect de ces accords.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 13 décembre 1928.

The undersigned has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the letter of the 28th November 1928, from the French Government, and to inform you that the same has been forwarded to the British Government for their consideration. The British Government has been informed of the contents of the letter, and has expressed its regret that the letter of the 28th November does not exactly answer the question put on the 16th November by M. de Fleuriau. It is, however, considered that the approval given by the British Government to the decision taken by the President of the Turkish Petroleum Company, which is based on the advice of the British Government, shows that it is on the basis of the necessity of obtaining the support of the Mandating Power that the modification of the letter has been made. The British Government is, therefore, satisfied that the letter of the 28th November, as modified, is in accordance with the spirit of the San Remo Agreements, and that it does not constitute a breach of the same. The British Government is, however, unable to accept the demand of Iraq for a preference to be given to the study of a line of railway terminating at Haifa, as this would be a purely political question, and is not one which can be decided by the Mandating Power. The British Government is, therefore, unable to accept the demand of Iraq for a preference to be given to the study of a line of railway terminating at Haifa, as this would be a purely political question, and is not one which can be decided by the Mandating Power. The British Government is, therefore, unable to accept the demand of Iraq for a preference to be given to the study of a line of railway terminating at Haifa, as this would be a purely political question, and is not one which can be decided by the Mandating Power.

CHAPTER IV.—PALESTINE.

[E 3993/42/44]

No. 86.

Foreign Office to President of the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt.

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 16, 1928.

I AM directed by Lord Cushendun to invite a reference to your letter of the 30th April regarding the proposals made by the Government of Palestine for the settlement of their liabilities for the portions of the Ottoman Public Debt allocated to that territory under the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne.

2. As regards the reserve made in that letter concerning the participation of Palestine in the premia and redemption of the Turkish Lottery Bonds and in the Reserve and Tripoli Funds, I am to invite your attention to the letter addressed to you on the 31st May. The remainder of the suggestions made in your letter under reply have been accepted by the Palestine Government except in one particular, viz., the amount of the interest to be allowed to Palestine in respect of the payments made by the Palestine Government in 1923. The Palestine Government are unable to agree that the rate of interest to be allowed on this payment should be less than $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. They understand that this rate of interest has, in fact, been allowed by one of the banks to whom the payments were distributed, and, in view of the long period of time which has elapsed since the payment was made, they have considered whether they would not be justified in pressing for an even higher rate of interest. They do not, however, desire to protract the negotiations further, and they have, therefore, decided to accept a rate which cannot be more than the rate which the banks would have had to have given had the sums in question been deposited "at night."

3. The memorandum enclosed with your letter under reply has accordingly been revised in this particular and the note in regard to the Reserve and Tripoli Funds has been deleted. According to the calculations made by Mr. Caribian, the sum now due on the 1st March, 1928, by the Palestine Government to the council was £68,071 6s., and instructions are being issued to the Crown Agents for the Colonies to pay this amount, together with interest at the rate of $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. from the 1st March, 1928, on the 20th August to the credit of your account with the Ottoman Bank in London. The bonds and coupons which are to be handed over to the council on behalf of the Government of Palestine will be retained until the council have given an indication of their wishes as to the inspection of these documents.

4. The memorandum as revised by the Palestine Government is enclosed.

I am, &c.

H. J. SEYMOUR.

Enclosure in No. 86.

Memorandum.

WITH reference to the memorandum attached to the Foreign Office letter of the 17th January, 1928 [E 252/42/44], regarding the proposals of the Palestine Government for the settlement of the share incumbent upon them in respect of the Ottoman Public Debt, the Palestine Government are now able to define their offers in the attached tables as follows:—

I.—Capital and Annuities in Respect of Loans.

The Government of Palestine intend to settle their share of the Debt on the 1st March, 1928. Table 1 indicates (a) the amount due, on the same date, in respect of capital and annuities; (b) the nominal value of the bonds and coupons which are to be delivered to the Debt Council for compensation against item (a); (c) the balance to be met by a cash payment on the currency basis laid down by the Debt Council.

II.—Arrears in Respect of Loans.

Arrears incumbent upon the Government of Palestine are due (a) to other States; (b) to the bondholders or the creditors.

Item (a) is to be met by a cash payment on the basis of the present value of twenty annuities with accrued interest since the 6th August, 1924. Table 2 indicates the cash amount to be paid in this respect.

Item (b) is compensated with coupons of the appropriate maturity dates, and the present value of the balance due is also met by a cash payment on the above basis (see Table 3).

III.—Advances.

The total amount due by the Palestine Government on the 1st March, 1928, in respect of Advances indicated in Part B of the table annexed to the Treaty of Lausanne is met by a cash payment (see Table 4).

IV.—Summary.

Table 5 gives a summary of the bonds and coupons to be delivered and of the sum in cash to be paid on the 1st March, 1928.

	£
The latter amounts to	258,836-65
There are, however, some deductions to be made as stated previously, viz.:—	
(a) The amounts paid by the Palestine Government in 1925 to the Council and by the latter to the various Banks for the service of the Loans, the Debt Council being authorised by the Palestine Government to get back the funds already paid into the Banks ...	164,424-70
(b) The interest on the sums above, calculated at $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. ...	11,398-66
(c) The share of the Palestine Government in the Reserve Fund on its valuation on the 1st March, 1924 ...	13,006-13
(d) The share of the Palestine Government in the Tripoli Fund on its valuation on the 1st March, 1924 ...	1,935-86
Net amount	190,765-35
	68,071-30

The above sum of £68,071-30 sterling was due for payment the 1st March, 1928, and the Palestine Government are prepared to pay interest at $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. for the number of days that may have elapsed since the said date.

2. In making the above offer, the Palestine Government renounce, in favour of the special Reserve Fund to be constituted in accordance with the decision of the Commission for the distribution of the nominal capital of the Debt, or for such purposes as the Debt Council may think fit, the share due to Palestine under (a) the interest of the Reserve Fund and the Tripoli Fund, for the period the 1st March, 1920–1st March, 1928, in so far as this interest has been paid into the general receipts of the Debt Council or set aside by the Debt Council in a suspense account, instead of being used to increase the two funds in question; (b) the excess which the Reserve Fund and the Tripoli Fund may eventually realise on the 1st March, 1928, over their valuations on the 1st March, 1924; (c) the premia and redemption payments which the Palestine Government has made to the Council or which the latter may in future receive, on account of the Turkish Lottery Bonds purchased by the Council up to the 6th August, 1924; (d) finally, any sum which might fall due to Palestine in the Ottoman Public Debt.

[19083]

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4. In view of the fact that the share of the Palestine Government in respect of the Loans on account of which a cash payment has been made is only a small fraction, and that the actual payment of this small fraction to the interested creditors might raise complications, the Palestine Government charge the Debt Council to deal with their share in the same manner as the Council will have to deal in future in respect of the share incumbent upon Turkey.

5. In making this offer, the Palestine Government stipulate that no other debtor State shall profit either directly or indirectly by this settlement, all possible profits being paid into the special Reserve Fund to be constituted or used by the Debt Council for such purposes as they may think fit.

6. The Palestine Government realise, lastly, that the reception and the checking of the Bonds and Coupons delivered will impose some expenditure on the Debt Council. They are, however, prepared to meet this expenditure when most convenient to the Council.

August 1928.

the fact that the

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125-126

STATEMENT No. 1.

OTTOMAN PUBLIC DEBT: CONTRIBUTIVE SHARE OF PARTICIPANTS

[19063]

STATEMENT No. 1.

OTTOMAN PUBLIC DEBT: CONTRIBUTIVE SHARE OF PALESTINE.

Summary.

Settlement Date: March 1, 1928.

Loans and Advances.	Bonds and Coupons to be Delivered.		Cash Payment in respect of—				Observations.
	Number of Bonds.	Attached or Detached Coupons	Capital and Annuities, per Statement No. 2.	Arrears—			
				Due to other States, per Statement No. 3.	Due to the Bondholders, per Statement No. 4.	Total.	
(1.)	(2.)	(3.)	(4.)	(5.)	(6.)	(7.)	(8.)
A.—Loans.							
Dette unifiée	38,273	Mar. 1923 and following ..	£ 1,071·90	£ 20,050·74	£ 47,804·85	£ 68,927·49	(1) Actually no coupons, talons only. Bonds stamped "Coupons de sept. 1916 à mars 1920 payés," "Coupons de sept. 1920 à sept. 1922 payés."
Lots turcs.	28,267	4,084·35	1,394·56	2,719·02	8,197·93	
Osmanie	704	Mar. 1923 and following (1)	20,077·38	1,682·03	8,709·70	30,469·11	
Priorité Tombac	266	Feb. 1915	3,974·29	..	2,825·65	6,799·94	(2) No coupons. Bonds stamped "Coupons de mai 1915 à mai 1920 payés," "Coupons de nov. 1920 à mai 1922 payés."
40 millions de fr. (Chemins de fer Orientaux)	1,608	Jan. 1915	1,335·78	..	420·87	1,756·65	
5 pour Cent 1896	2,318	July 1922	6,325·89	839·80	4,639·96	11,865·65	
Douanes 1902	8,438	July 1921	61·19	250·70	4,665·08	4,976·97	(3) Bonds of original value of £ T. 22 each, bearing each three coupons: No. 4, due Sept. 1914, representing interest 6s. and repayment of capital £3 6s. 8d.; No. 5, due March 1915, representing interest 4s. and repayment of capital £3 6s. 8d.; No. 6, due Sept. 1915, representing interest 2s. and repayment of capital £3 6s. 8d.
4 pour Cent 1903 Pêcheries ..	2,340	May 1920	3,065·58	..	2,630·49	5,696·07	
Bagdad, Série I	2,595	Mar. 1920	25·24	..	67·50	92·74	
4 pour Cent 1904	2,782	July 1920	24·64	..	369·91	394·55	
4 pour Cent 1901-1905	5,327	Jan. 1923	38·63	848·97	4,483·28	5,370·83	
Tedjizat Askerié	2,542	Mar. 1920	24·85	..	164·56	189·41	
Bagdad, Série II	5,233	Jan. 1920	42·78	..	112·23	155·01	
Bagdad, Série III	5,755	Jan. 1920	841·97	..	635·96	1,477·93	
4 pour Cent 1908	4,895	Jan. 1920	35·50	108·42	44·38	188·30	
4 pour Cent 1909	6,778	June 1920	50·30	..	1,577·87	1,628·17	
Soma-Panderma	1,884	Oct. 1914	14·75	..	69·75	84·50	
Hodeida-Sanaa	1,035	Apr. 1915	8·10	..	78·33	86·43	
Douanes 1911	6,694	Jan. 1920	49·00	..	633·01	682·01	
Bons du Trésor 5 pour Cent 1911	22,042·73	22,042·73	
Irrigation de la plaine de Koniah	22,782·43	..	4,531·49	27,313·92	
Docks, Arsenaux et Constructions navales	
5 pour Cent 1914	29,183	Nov. 1922 and following (2)	274·71	6,767·67	15,797·55	22,839·93	
Avance Régie des Tabacs	1,273·27	1,892·43	..	3,165·70	
Bons du Trésor 1912	1,198	Sept. 1914 and following (2)	31·38	31·38	
Bons du Trésor 1913—	8,896·98	8,896·98	
Emission directe	31·30	31·30	
Périer et Cie.	3,625	June 1915 and following	
Total	161,740	96,484·92	33,835·32	103,041·39	233,361·63	
			Per State-ment No. 5.				
B.—Advances.							
Société de Bagdad	
Administrations des Phares	1,909·83	1,909·83	
"	267·50	267·50	
Société du Câble Constanza	283·98	283·98	
Société du Tunnel	
Caisse des Orphelins	
Deutsche Bank	
Administration des Phares	23,013·71	23,013·71	
Société du Chemin de fer d'Anatolie	
Total	25,475·02	25,475·02	
Grand Total	161,740	121,959·94	33,835·32	103,041·39	258,836·65	

(1) Actually no coupons, talons only. Bonds stamped "Coupons de sept. 1916 à mars 1920 payés," "Coupons de sept. 1920 à sept. 1922 payés."

(2) No coupons. Bonds stamped "Coupons de mai 1915 à mai 1920 payés," "Coupons de nov. 1920 à mai 1922 payés."

(3) Bonds of original value of £ T. 22 each, bearing each three coupons: No. 4, due Sept. 1914, representing interest 6s. and repayment of capital £3 6s. 8d.; No. 5, due March 1915, representing interest 4s. and repayment of capital £3 6s. 8d.; No. 6, due Sept. 1915, representing interest 2s. and repayment of capital £3 6s. 8d.

Net Cash Payment.

Total to be met by a cash payment £ 258,836·65

To be deducted—

Payment on Mar. 1, 1925 .. 66,901·83

" " Aug. 6, 1925 .. 20,455·45

" " Sept. 1, 1925 .. 77,067·42

164,424·70

Interest at 2½ per cent. per annum—

On the payment made on Mar. 1, 1928 .. 5,144·12

Ditto, Aug. 6, 1925 .. 1,340·89

Ditto, Sept. 1, 1925 .. 4,913·65

11,398·66

Palestine's share of—

Reserve Fund, £527,497 1s. 4d. 13,006·13

Tripoli Fund, £78,513 15s. 9d. 1,935·86

190,765·35

Net payment to be made on Mar. 1, 1928 .. 68,071·30

STATEMENT No. 2.

OTTOMAN PUBLIC DEBT: CONTRIBUTIVE SHARE OF PALESTINE.

Capital and Annuities Due.

Settlement Date : March 1, 1928.

Loans.	Capital Due on March 1, 1928.								Annuities Due on March 1, 1928.										Coupons partly due on March 1, 1928.			
	Capital Due.			Bonds Delivered.			Balance.		Annuities Due in respect of the period August 6, 1924 to March 1, 1928.					Coupons to be Compensated					Maturity Dates.	Fractions.	Total Value of Coupons.	
	Nominal Capital due on Aug. 6, 1924.	Nominal Capital to be Amortised by Drawings between Aug. 6, 1924, and Mar. 1, 1928.	Balance to be Compensated by the Delivery of Bonds.	Number of Bonds delivered.	Nominal Capital of each Bond.	Total Nominal Capital of Bonds delivered.	Surplus of Nominal Capital to be abandoned.	Deficit of Nominal Capital to be met by a Cash Payment.	Interest.	Amortisation by Drawings.	Commis-sion.	Sundry Expenses.	Total.	Coupons fully Due in the Period August 6, 1924, to March 1, 1928.			Value of each Coupon.	Total Value of Coupons.				
														Maturity Dates.	Number of Bonds delivered.	Coupons on each Bond.						Total Number of Coupons.
(1.)	(2.)	(3.)	(4.)	(5.)	(6.)	(7.)	(8.)	(9.)	(10.)	(11.)	(12.)	(13.)	(14.)	(15.)	(16.)	(17.)	(18.)	(19.)	(20.)	(21.)	(22.)	(23.)
1. Loans prior to October 17, 1912.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.					Pt.	Ltqs.			Ltqs.
Dette unifiée	841,987	..	841,987 00	38,273	22	842,006 00	19 00	..	133,422 56	..	833 89	345 20	134,601 65	Sept. 14, 1924-Sept. 14, 1927..	38,273	7	267,911	44	117,880 84	March 14, 1928	168/182	15,544 73
Loti turcs	232,043	7,220 69	224,822 31	28,267	7 03584	224,822 39	0 08	22,096 80	138 11	49 32	22,284 23	..	28,267
Omanie	35,664	20,181 69	15,482 31	704	22	15,488 00	5 69	..	4,296 48	20,181 69	61 20	..	24,539 37	Sept. 14, 1924-Sept. 14, 1927..	704	7	4,928	44	2,168 32	March 14, 1928	168/182	283 93
Priorité Tombac	9,793	3,355 16	6,437 84	266	22	5,832 00	14 16	..	1,336 07	3,955 16	26 46	..	5,317 69	Aug. 14, 1924-Feb. 14, 1928..	266	8	2,128	44	936 32	August 14, 1928	15/182	9 65
40 millions de fr. (Chemins de fer Orientaux)	36,701	1,332 19	35,368 81	1,608	22	35,376 00	7 19	..	5,297 68	1,332 19	16 57	4 92	6,631 36	Jan. 1, 1925-Jan. 1, 1928..	1,608	7	11,256	44	4,932 64	July 1, 1928	59/182	229 36
5 pour Cent 1896	37,176	6,199 59	30,976 41	2,318	22	30,996 00	19 59	..	9,965 01	6,199 59	40 41	..	16,205 01	Jan. 14, 1925-Jan. 14, 1928..	2,318	7	16,226	55	8,924 30	July 14, 1928	46/182	322 23
Donanes 1902	185,623	..	185,623 00	8,438	22	185,638 00	13 00	..	20,925 53	..	67 31	..	20,992 84	Jan. 14, 1925-Jan. 14, 1928..	8,438	7	59,066	44	25,989 04	July 14, 1928	46/182	938 38
4 pour Cent 1903, Pêcheries	54,535	3,064 42	51,470 58	2,340	22	51,480 00	9 42	..	8,160 76	3,064 42	28 06	4 96	11,258 20	Nov. 1, 1924-Nov. 1, 1927..	2,340	7	16,380	44	7,207 20	May 1, 1928	120/182	678 86
Bagdad, Série I	57,088	..	57,088 00	2,395	22	57,090 00	2 00	..	9,134 08	..	22 84	4 92	9,161 84	Sept. 1, 1924-Mar. 1, 1928..	2,395	8	20,760	44	9,184 40
4 pour Cent 1904	61,183	..	61,183 00	2,782	22	61,204 00	21 00	..	8,874 90	..	22 18	4 92	8,902 00	Jan. 14, 1925-Jan. 14, 1928..	2,782	7	19,474	44	8,568 56	July 14, 1928	46/182	309 38
4 pour Cent 1901-1903	117,177	..	117,177 00	5,327	22	117,194 00	17 00	..	16,997 10	..	42 49	..	17,039 59	Jan. 14, 1925-Jan. 14, 1928..	5,327	7	37,283	44	16,407 16	July 14, 1928	46/182	592 41
Tedjizet-Askerie	55,918	..	55,918 00	2,542	22	55,924 00	6 00	..	8,946 88	..	22 37	4 96	8,974 21	Sept. 1, 1924-Mar. 1, 1928..	2,542	8	20,336	44	8,947 84
Bagdad, Série II	115,111	..	115,111 00	5,233	22	115,126 00	15 00	..	16,853 30	..	42 14	4 92	16,900 36	Jan. 2, 1925-Jan. 2, 1928..	5,233	7	36,631	44	16,117 64	July 1, 1928	58/181	737 82
Bagdad, Série III	127,396	802 69	126,593 31	5,755	22	126,610 00	16 69	..	18,606 86	802 69	48 52	4 92	19,462 99	Jan. 2, 1925-Jan. 2, 1928..	5,755	7	40,285	44	17,725 40	July 1, 1928	58/180	811 42
4 pour Cent 1908	107,682	..	107,682 00	4,895	22	107,690 00	8 00	..	15,619 80	..	39 05	..	15,658 85	Jan. 14, 1925-Jan. 14, 1928..	4,895	7	34,265	44	15,076 60	July 14, 1928	46/182	544 57
4 pour Cent 1909	149,116	..	149,116 00	6,778	22	149,116 00	22,181 10	..	55 33	..	22,186 43	Dec. 14, 1924-Dec. 14, 1927..	6,778	7	47,446	44	20,876 24	June 14, 1928	77/183	1,251 86
Soma-Panderma	41,444	..	41,444 00	1,884	22	41,448 00	4 00	..	6,486 10	..	16 22	..	6,502 32	Oct. 1, 1924-Oct. 1, 1927..	1,884	7	13,188	44	5,802 72	April 1, 1928	151/183	684 00
Hodeïla-Sanaa	22,764	..	22,764 00	1,035	22	22,770 00	6 00	..	3,562 63	..	8 91	..	3,571 54	Oct. 1, 1924-Oct. 1, 1927..	1,035	7	7,245	44	3,187 80	April 1, 1928	151/183	375 77
Donanes 1911	147,249	..	147,249 00	6,694	22	147,268 00	19 00	..	21,538 56	..	53 90	..	21,612 46	Jan. 2, 1925-Jan. 2, 1928..	6,694	7	46,858	44	20,617 52	July 1, 1928	58/181	943 82
Bons du Trésor 5 pour Cent 1911	22,955	..	22,955 00	22,955	1,292 00	1,292 00
2. Loans issued between October 17, 1912, and November 1, 1914.																						
Irrigation de la plaine de Koniah	21,053	..	21,053 00	21,053	4,007 67	4,007 67
Docks, Arsenaux et Constructions navales	Nov. 14, 1924-Nov. 14, 1927..	29,183	7	204,281	55	112,354 55	May 14, 1928	107/182	9,456 37
5 pour Cent 1914	642,018	..	642,018 00	29,183	22	642,026 00	8 00	..	121,789 40	..	304 47	..	122,093 87
Avance Régie des Tabacs	5,594	..	5,594 00	5,594	1,352 98	1,352 98
Bons du Trésor 1912	13,169	..	13,169 00	1,198	11	13,178 00	9 00	..	639 36	..	31 52	..	673 88	Sept. 1914-Sept. 1915	1,198	3	3,594	..	790 68
Bons du Trésor 1913—
Emission directe	8,006	..	8,006 00	8,006	1,780 68	1,780 68
Périer et Cie.	79,738	..	79,738 00	3,625	22	79,750 00	12 00	..	11,953 15	..	29 88	4 55	11,987 58	June 1915-Dec. 1917	3,625	6	21,750	55	11,962 50
Total	3,248,183	43,256 43	3,204,926 57	161,740	..	3,147,550 59	231 82	57,608	480,990 64	57,632 54	1,854 83	433 59	541,011 60	..	161,740	..	931,297	..	435,628 27	33,699 36

Total (Cols. 20 and 23).	Balance.		Total, to be met by a Cash Payment (Cols. 9 and 23).	Equivalent in £.	
	Surplus of Interest to be abandoned.	Deficit of Annuities to be met by a Cash Payment.		Currency and Rate of Conversion.	Equivalent.
(24.)	(25.)	(26.)	(27.)	(28.)	(29.)
Ltqs.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.		£
133,425·57	3·01	1,179·09	1,179·09	£ .. £20=Ltqs. 22	1,071·90
..	..	22,284·23	22,284·23	French frs. Frs.124=Ltqs.1·10	4,084·35
2,454·25	..	22,085·12	22,085·12	£ .. £20=Ltqs. 22	20,077·38
945·97	..	4,371·72	4,371·72	£ .. £20= "	3,974·29
5,182·00	..	1,469·36	1,469·36	Swiss frs. £20= "	1,335·78
9,246·53	..	6,958·48	6,958·48	£ .. £20= "	6,325·89
26,927·42	1·89	67·31	67·31	£ .. £20= "	61·19
7,886·06	..	3,372·14	3,372·14	Reichmarks £20= "	3,065·58
9,134·40	0·32	27·76	27·76	£ .. £20= "	25·24
8,877·94	3·04	27·10	27·10	£ .. £20= "	24·64
16,999·57	2·47	42·49	42·49	£ .. £20= "	38·63
8,947·84	0·96	27·33	27·33	£ .. £20= "	24·85
16,855·46	2·16	47·06	47·06	£ .. £20= "	42·78
18,536·82	..	926·17	926·17	£ .. £20= "	841·97
15,620·97	1·17	39·05	39·05	£ .. £20= "	35·50
22,131·10	..	55·33	55·33	£ .. £20= "	50·30
6,486·72	0·62	16·22	16·22	Ltqs. gold £20= "	14·75
3,563·57	0·94	8·91	8·91	Ltqs. gold £20= "	8·10
21,561·34	2·78	53·90	53·90	£ .. £20= "	49·00
..	..	1,292·00	24,247·00	£ .. £20= "	22,042·73
..	..	4,007·67	25,060·67	Swiss frs. £20= "	22,782·43
121,790·92	1·52	304·47	304·47	£ .. £19 17s.=Ltqs. 22	274·71
..	..	1,352·98	6,946·98	French frs. Frs.124=Ltqs.1·10	1,273·27
790·68	151·32	34·52	34·52	£ .. £20=Ltqs. 22	31·38
..	..	1,780·68	9,786·68	£ .. £20= "	8,896·98
11,962·50	9·35	34·43	34·43	£ .. £20= "	31·30
469,327·63	181·55	71,865·52	129,473·52		96,484·92

STATEMENT No. 4.

OTTOMAN PUBLIC DEBT: CONTRIBUTIVE SHARE OF PALESTINE.

Arrears (Part II) due to Bondholders.

Settlement Date: March 1, 1928.

Loans.	Amount due to the Bondholders.			To be Deducted.			Net Amount Due.			Coupons to be Compensated.						Balance to be met by a Cash Payment.			Value on August 6, 1924, of Twenty Annuities payable without interest.				Value on March 1, 1928.					
	Payable in various Currencies.	Payable in French Francs.	Total.	Fraction of the First Payment due after August 6, 1924.		Assortment Fund for Purchases in respect of Period, March 1, 1920-August 6, 1924.	Total.	Payable in various Currencies.	Payable in French Francs.	Total.	Maturity Dates.	Number of Bonds.	Number of Coupons.	Total Number of Coupons.	Value of each Coupon.	Total Value of Coupons to be Compensated.	Payable in various Currencies.	Payable in French Francs.	Total.	Rate.	In respect of Column 18.	In respect of Column 19.	Total.	In respect of Column 22.	In respect of Column 23.	Total.	In respect of Column 25.	
				In respect of Interest.	In respect of Drawings.																							Currency and Rate of Conversion.
(1.)	(2.)	(3.)	(4.)	(5.)	(6.)	(7.)	(8.)	(9.)	(10.)	(11.)	(12.)	(13.)	(14.)	(15.)	(16.)	(17.)	(18.)	(19.)	(20.)	(21.)	(22.)	(23.)	(24.)	(25.)	(26.)	(27.)	(28.)	
1. Loans prior to October 17, 1912.																												
	Ltqs.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.				Pt.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.	Per cent.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.	
Debt milide ..	179,764-48	..	179,764-48	13,771-85	..	48,198-00	61,269-83	117,794-63	..	117,794-63	March 1923-March 1924	38,273	3	114,819	44	50,520-36	67,274-27	..	67,274-27	4	45,713-97	..	45,713-97	52,585-33	..	52,585-33	£	£20= Ltqs. 22
Lots turcs	20,579-13	20,579-13	..	7,160-61	2,794-00	2,633-39	..	17,946-04	17,946-04	17,946-04	13,349-39	13,349-39	..	14,834-96	
Omanid ..	15,563-04	221-18	15,784-22	562-09	1,859-38	..	2,421-47	13,141-37	221-18	13,362-75	March 1923-March 1924	704	3	2,112	44	929-28	12,212-29	221-18	12,433-47	4	8,298-45	150-30	8,448-75	9,545-81	172-89	9,718-70	£	£20= Ltqs. 22
Priorité tunisie ..	5,491-63	..	5,491-63	187-26	401-90	..	589-16	4,902-47	..	4,902-47	Aug. 1920-Feb. 1924	266	8	2,128	44	926-03	3,976-44	..	3,976-44	4	2,702-06	..	2,702-06	3,108-21	..	3,108-21	£	£20= "
40 millions de fr. (Chemins de fer Orientaux) ..	8,394-02	..	8,394-02	151-20	..	1,510-12	1,667-32	6,726-70	..	6,726-70	July 1920-July 1924	1,608	9	14,472	44	6,154-43	592-27	..	592-27	4	402-46	..	402-46	462-96	..	462-96	Swiss francs	£20= "
5 pour Cent 1896 ..	13,622-46	..	13,622-46	178-67	99-12	..	277-79	13,344-67	..	13,344-67	July 1922-July 1924	2,318	5	11,590	55	6,374-50	6,970-17	..	6,970-17	5	4,343-19	..	4,343-19	5,169-96	..	5,169-96	£	£20= "
Douanes 1902 ..	40,701-61	..	40,701-61	488-57	..	7,639-18	8,147-55	32,554-06	..	32,554-06	July 1921-July 1924	8,438	7	59,066	44	25,989-04	5,565-02	..	5,565-02	4	4,461-04	..	4,461-04	5,131-59	..	5,131-59	£	£20= "
4 pour Cent 1905, Pecheries ..	13,057-62	..	13,057-62	573-00	197-02	..	772-02	12,285-60	..	12,285-60	May 1920-May 1924	2,340	9	21,060	44	8,583-79	3,701-81	..	3,701-81	4	2,515-44	..	2,515-44	2,893-54	..	2,893-54	Reichsmarks	£20= "
Bagdad, Série I ..	10,676-30	..	10,676-30	983-12	..	463-98	1,447-10	9,229-40	..	9,229-40	Sept. 1920-March 1924	2,395	8	20,760	44	9,134-40	95-00	..	95-00	4	64-55	..	64-55	74-25	..	74-25	£	£20= "
4 pour Cent 1904 ..	13,565-79	..	13,565-79	159-89	..	2,181-73	2,344-62	11,221-17	..	11,221-17	July 1920-July 1924	2,782	9	25,038	44	10,700-61	520-56	..	520-56	4	333-73	..	333-73	406-90	..	406-90	£	£20= "
4 pour Cent 1901-1903 ..	20,334-00	..	20,334-00	306-74	..	4,342-64	4,649-38	15,684-62	..	15,684-62	Jan. 1923-July 1924	5,327	4	21,308	44	9,375-52	6,309-10	..	6,309-10	4	4,287-14	..	4,287-14	4,931-55	..	4,931-55	£	£20= "
Tedjizat-Askerie ..	13,051-30	..	13,051-30	977-12	..	2,894-75	3,871-87	2,179-43	..	9,179-43	Sept. 1920-March 1924	2,542	8	20,336	44	8,947-84	231-59	..	231-59	4	157-37	..	157-37	181-02	..	181-02	£	£20= "
Bagdad, Série II ..	21,332-27	..	21,332-27	449-45	..	752-78	1,202-21	20,130-06	..	20,130-06	July 1920-July 1924	5,233	9	47,097	44	19,972-13	157-93	..	157-93	4	107-32	..	107-32	123-45	..	123-45	£	£20= "
Bagdad, Série III ..	23,462-59	..	23,462-59	495-81	107-41	..	603-22	22,859-37	..	22,859-37	July 1920-July 1924	5,755	9	51,795	44	21,964-39	894-98	..	894-98	4	608-15	..	608-15	699-56	..	699-56	£	£20= "
5 pour Cent 1908 ..	22,497-94	..	22,497-94	279-77	..	3,327-72	3,607-49	18,890-45	..	18,890-45	July 1920-July 1924	4,895	9	44,055	44	18,828-00	62-45	..	62-45	4	42-44	..	42-44	48-82	..	48-82	£	£20= "
4 pour Cent 1909 ..	38,337-90	..	38,337-90	935-51	..	3,612-17	10,547-68	27,790-22	..	27,790-22	June 1920-June 1924	6,778	9	61,002	44	25,569-73	2,220-49	..	2,220-49	4	1,508-86	..	1,508-86	1,735-66	..	1,735-66	£	£20= "
Soua-Panderna ..	7,815-98	..	7,815-98	581-97	..	963-75	945-72	6,870-26	..	6,870-26	April 1920-April 1924	1,884	9	16,956	44	6,772-11	98-15	..	98-15	4	66-70	..	66-70	76-73	..	76-73	Ltqs. gold	£20= "
Hodeida-Sanaa ..	4,511-60	..	4,511-60	522-60	..	338-44	681-04	3,830-56	..	3,830-56	April 1920-April 1924	1,053	9	9,315	44	3,720-34	110-22	..	110-22	4	74-90	..	74-90	86-16	..	86-16	Ltqs. gold	£20= "
Douanes 1911 ..	38,623-48	..	38,623-48	590-09	..	11,594-52	12,184-52	26,438-96	..	26,438-96	July 1920-July 1924	6,694	9	60,246	44	25,548-15	890-81	..	890-81	4	603-32	..	603-32	696-31	..	696-31	£	£20= "
Bons du Trésor 5 pour Cent 1911
2. Loans issued between October 17, 1912, and November 1, 1914.																												
Irrigation plaine de Koniah ..	6,720-32	..	6,720-32	6,720-32	..	6,720-32	6,720-32	..	6,720-32	5	4,187-90	..	4,187-90	4,384-64	..	4,384-64	Swiss francs	£20= "
Docks, Arsenaux et Constructions navales
5 pour Cent 1914 ..	109,849-66	6,202-72	116,052-38	7,543-68	..	15,758-15	25,301-83	86,547-83	6,202-72	92,750-55	Nov. 1922-May 1924	29,183	4	116,732	55	64,202-60	22,345-23	6,202-72	28,547-95	5	13,223-55	3,864-98	17,888-53	16,574-05	4,600-72	21,174-77	£	£19.17.9 "
Avance Régie des Tabacs
Bons du Trésor 1912
Bons du Trésor 1915—Emission directe
Périer et Cie.
Total ..	607,374-19	37,003-23	634,377-52	29,540-08	4,495-78	118,820-83	143,865-25	466,142-35	24,369-94	490,512-29	719,887	..	324,193-25	141,949-10	24,369-94	166,319-04	..	94,421-14	17,364-87	111,789-01	109,516-50	19,608-57	129,125-07

Equivalent in £.

Equiv- alent.	In respect of Column 26.		Equiv- alent.	Total.
	Currency and Rate of Conversion.			
(29.)	(30.)		(31.)	(32.)
£			£	£
47,804.85	47,804.85
..	French frs.	Frs. 124=Ltqs. 1.10	2,719.02	2,719.02
8,678.01	"	"	31.69	8,709.70
2,825.65	2,825.65
420.87	420.87
4,699.96	4,699.96
4,665.08	4,665.08
2,630.49	2,630.49
67.50	67.50
369.91	369.91
4,483.23	4,483.23
164.56	164.56
112.23	112.23
635.96	635.96
44.38	44.38
1,577.87	1,577.87
69.75	69.75
78.33	78.33
633.01	633.01
..
4,531.49	4,531.49
..
14,954.31	French frs.	Frs. 124=Ltqs. 1.10	843.24	15,797.55
..
..
..
..
99,447.44	3,593.95	103,041.39

STATEMENT No. 5.

OTTOMAN PUBLIC DEBT: CONTRIBUTIVE SHARE OF PALESTINE.

Advances indicated in Part B of Table annexed to the Treaty of Lausanne.

Settlement Date: March 1, 1928.

Advances.	Rate of Interest.	Amount Due.		Paid on Account.		Balance Due.		Currency.	Rate of Conversion.	Equivalent of Column 7.
		Value, August 6, 1924.	Value, March 1, 1928.	Value, August 6, 1925.	Value, March 1, 1928.	Value, March 1, 1928.				
(1.)	(2.)	(3.)	(4.)	(5.)	(6.)	(7.)	(8.)	(9.)	(10.)	
1. Advances prior to October 17, 1912.	Per cent.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.	Ltqs.	Ltqs. gold	Pt. 110 = £1	£	
Société de Bagdad ..	6	1,756.46	2,162.96	53.50	62.15	2,100.81	Ltqs. gold	Pt. 110 = £1	1,909.83	
Administration des Phares ..	7	238.01	303.12	7.15	8.87	294.25	"	Pt. 110 = £1	267.50	
Administration des Phares ..	4	279.31	321.29	8.06	8.91	312.38	Swiss francs	Pt. 110 = £1	283.98	
Société du Cable Constantin	
Société du Tunnel	
Caisse des Orphelins	
Deutsche Bank	
2. Advances concluded between October 17, 1912, and November 1, 1914.	7	20,476.62	26,077.86	640.87	762.78	25,315.08	Ltqs. gold	Pt. 110 = £1	23,013.71	
Administration des Phares	
Société du Chemin de fer d'Anatolie	
Total	22,750.40	28,865.23	709.88	842.71	28,022.52	25,475.02	

[E 4539/407/91]

No. 87.

Government of Palestine to Colonial Office.—(Communicated to Foreign Office,
September 12.)

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Jerusalem, August 14, 1928.

IN continuation of my telegram No. 114 of the 7th August on the subject of the Hejaz Railway Conference. I have the honour to enclose, for your information, a report by the Acting General Manager, Railways, on the proceedings at Haifa.

2. The position at present is that the conference stands adjourned *sine die* pending the receipt of any further instructions. Dr. Damluji is proceeding to the Lebanon on a holiday of some weeks and would be available to resume attendance at the conference should circumstances render its resumption possible.

I have, &c.

H. C. LUKE,

Officer Administering the Government.

Enclosure in No. 87.

Acting General Manager, Palestine Railways, to Chief Secretary,
Palestine Government.

(Confidential.)

Haifa, August 10, 1928.

THE conference opened at Haifa on the 6th August under my chairmanship, and was attended as under:—

Government of Syria represented by—

M. Hopenot, Chief of the Bureau diplomatique.
M. Vasselet, Adviser for Public Works.
Djemil Bey, Traffic Superintendent.

Government of Hejaz represented by—

Dr. Damluji, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Khaled Bey, Technical Adviser.
Mohammed Effendi Rida, Secretary.

Government of Palestine represented by—

Lieutenant-Colonel G. M. Campigli, Acting General Manager.
Mr. H. A. Cotching, Acting Assistant General Manager.
Mr. L. F. Williams, Secretary.

Mr. J. E. Abbyad, Interpreter.

The object of the conference having been explained, Dr. Damluji immediately requested information on the following points:—

- (a.) What lines constituted the Hejaz Railway.
- (b.) What are the rights of the Hejaz Railway.
- (c.) Who owned the Hejaz Railway.

With regard to (a), Khaled Bey stated that, in addition to the existing lines at present administered by the Governments of Syria and Palestine, the lines which, during the war, extended from Wadi Surar to Beersheba, and within a short distance from Gaza, were part of the Hejaz Railway. I informed him that those latter lines were no longer existent, and that as far as I was aware they were constructed by the Turks during the war, and therefore could not very well be regarded as being part of the old Hejaz Railway. He, however, wished to press the point, but Dr. Damluji agreed that it could be dealt with as a separate question and the conference could proceed.

With regard to (b), Khaled Bey stated that among other rights, such as the El Hamme Baths, the Hejaz Railway owned the port at Haifa. I informed Dr. Damluji that I was not in a position to discuss this question, and M. Hopenot expressed a similar view. Dr. Damluji agreed to this question being treated similarly to (a).

With regard to (c), I explained that this was quite outside the scope of the conference, the terms of reference of which limited discussions to purely technical matters. Dr. Damluji maintained that a decision on the three questions raised by him was of fundamental importance and *sine qua non* to discussion of the technical points indicated in the terms of reference. M. Hopenot drew attention to the fact that the presence of the Syrian delegates was simply in connexion with the technical discussions and that he was not prepared to enter into any discussion which was of a political nature. He considered, however, that the questions raised by Dr. Damluji came within the latter category and that the conference should not concern itself with them. Dr. Damluji agreed, but emphasised that the sections of the railway in Syria, Palestine and Transjordan were Wakf property, and that His Majesty Ibn Saud required the restitution to himself of these sections and for the line to be administered as a whole by a special committee to be appointed.

I then endeavoured to get the delegates to discuss the technical matters, and asked Dr. Damluji if he could inform the conference in regard to the condition of the line between Medawara and Medina. It was thought that information in respect of this would be available, having regard to paragraph 6 of the *aide-memoire*, but Dr. Damluji stated he was not aware that any examination had been made of this section of the railway, though all particulars could be supplied when the ownership of the railway as a whole had been settled.

As regards the method of operating the through-train services, Dr. Damluji stated that His Majesty Ibn Saud required that the railway should be administered as a separate entity, instead of Syria and Palestine operating the sections within their respective spheres of influence, and that the technical discussions should be based accordingly. As Dr. Damluji persisted in referring to the rights of His Majesty Ibn Saud in regard to the railway as a whole, it was realised that no useful purpose would be served by continuing the discussion that morning, and I therefore suggested that in view of the situation which had arisen it would be better for Dr. Damluji, M. Hopenot, and me to arrange to see his Excellency the Officer Administering the Government at Jerusalem and place the facts before him. M. Hopenot was not disposed to proceed to Jerusalem. I telephoned the Acting Chief Secretary, and it was arranged for Dr. Damluji and me to have an interview with Mr. Luke and the Acting Chief Secretary on the morning of the 7th August. It was clearly shown at this meeting that Dr. Damluji had come on a mission which was entirely contrary to the specific purpose for which the conference had been convened, and I was instructed by Mr. Luke that there was no alternative but to adjourn the conference *sine die*. The conference reassembled at Haifa on the morning of the 8th August, and I acquainted the delegates accordingly. M. Hopenot wishes to make it clear that adjournment of the conference devolved entirely upon the Hejaz delegates.

The discussions throughout were conducted in a very cordial spirit, and Dr. Damluji and M. Hopenot expressed their appreciation of the welcome and hospitality extended to them by this Administration.

G. M. CAMPIGLI.

CHAPTER V.—GENERAL.

[E 4365/3269/65]

No. 88.

Sir G. Clerk to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 402.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, August 29, 1928.

THE Iraq Chargé d'Affaires tells me that he called on the Turkish Foreign Minister upon the latter's recent return from abroad, and that Tewfik Rushdi Bey informed him that he had seen His Highness Taimourtache. Tewfik Rushdi Bey had asked the Persian Minister of Court to tell him what the trouble was between Persia and Iraq, as he intended to offer the mediation of Turkey. Taimourtache had replied that there were various differences, but that they were not insoluble, and in repeating this the Turkish Minister assured Sabih Bey that all would be settled in six months.

2. Tewfik Rushdi Bey then went on to tell Sabih Bey that he was going to Persia before long, and, in reply to a hope expressed by the Iraq Chargé d'Affaires, he promised to see whether he could not visit Bagdad on his way. He added that he still attached great importance to concluding an agreement with Iraq, which, in conjunction with those existing already with Persia and Afghanistan, would create a sort of quadruple *entente*.

3. His Excellency then turned to the Turco-Syrian frontier, and said that Turkey meant to have the extreme north-east tip of the territory now claimed by Syria—the "bec du canard"—and presumed that Iraq would have no objection. Sabih Bey laughingly replied that Iraq was so happy to be neighbours with Turkey that she would like their common frontier to extend to the Mediterranean.

4. Finally, Tewfik Rushdi Bey spoke of foreign judicial privileges in Iraq, and, in his airy way, assured Sabih Bey that the Iraq Government need not bother about that question. The Iraq Government had only to appoint a few more British judges and Turkey would be perfectly satisfied with the equality of treatment which would then be accorded her.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 4410/917/89]

No. 89.

Lord Cushendun to Sir W. Tyrrell (Paris).

(No. 2049.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 12, 1928.

WITH reference to Sir Austen Chamberlain's despatch No. 489 of the 1st March last and previous correspondence relative to the proposed revision of the Syria-Iraq frontier, I have to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government have now reconsidered the question in view of the note of the 9th December from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and Sir H. Dobbs's comments thereon, and I shall be glad if you will address them on the subject on the following lines.

2. The French Government point out in the first place that the convention of the 23rd December, 1920, was signed eight months after the conclusion of a provisional local agreement, known as the Leachman Agreement, in which the frontier line was drawn considerably to the west of that laid down in the convention; and they argue that as the Leachman line was subsequently abandoned by His Majesty's Government when they signed the convention, it cannot be contended that the more easterly line of the convention was fixed in ignorance of local conditions.

3. This argument appears to be based on a double misconception. In the first place, it is clear from the records in the possession of His Majesty's Government that that general *tracé* of the line between the Tigris and the Euphrates, as embodied in the convention, did not form the subject of detailed discussion at the time when the

convention was negotiated, but was simply that agreed upon at San Remo in April 1920, which in turn was based on a line agreed upon between the late Marquess Curzon and M. Berthelot some months previously.

4. Apart from this, however, the text of the Leachman Agreement cannot be invoked in support of the thesis maintained in the French note. It ran as follows:—

"In the village of Al 'Ashsharah.

"Provisional agreement concluded between Kaïmakam 'Ali Jaudat Bey and the Assistant Military Governor at Dair-al-Zor, Muzhar Bey, the accredited representative of the Military Governor, Dair-al-Zor, of the one part, and Political Officer Lieutenant-Colonel Leachman, of the other part.

"In accordance with orders received by him from the commander-in-chief at Bagdad, the colonel requested that the provisional boundaries between the west [sic] Arab Government and the British Government may be: between Abu Kamal and Al Qaim, between Al Hara village and Haziba village on the right bank of the Euphrates, and between Al Baghuz and Al Rabt on the left bank; and that the British army shall retire behind this provisional boundary and hand Abu Kamal over to the Arab Government.

"At the above request, 'Ali Jaudat and Muzhar Bey, the accredited representatives of the Military Governor Dair-al-Zor, agreed to this provisional boundary.

"MUZHAR ARISLAN,

"Assistant Accredited Representative of the
Military Governor.

"COLONEL LEACHMAN,

"Political Officer.

"'ALI, Kaïmakam.

"May 5, 1920.

"The first party, 'Ali Jaudat Bey and Muzhar Bey, reserve their rights in respect of the original (or fundamental) boundary of Dair-al-Zor, which is Wadi Hauran, between 'Anah and Hit, and they consider this boundary a provisional one.

"MUZHAR ARISLAN, Assistant.

"'ALI, Kaïmakam."

5. It will be seen from this text that the agreement only dealt with the frontier between Abu Kamal and Al Qaim on the Euphrates, and contained no reference whatever to the north-easterly portion of the frontier in the region of the Khabur and the Jebel Sinjar. Apart, therefore, from the fact that the line eventually laid down in the convention of the 23rd December, 1920, was agreed upon before the Leachman Agreement of May 1920 was negotiated, the question of a "Leachman line in the Khabur region" having been abandoned does not arise, since no such line ever existed.

6. The French Government, basing themselves on the assumption (which, for the reasons indicated above, His Majesty's Government cannot accept) that a definite territorial concession was made to them in the region of the Jebel Sinjar between May and December 1920, proceed to contend that this concession was intended to form part of the compensation offered to France in return for her abandonment of her claim, under the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, to the Vilayet of Mosul.

7. The records in the possession of His Majesty's Government show, however, that this claim was abandoned in return for concessions of a purely economic character—i.e., the grant to France of a 25 per cent. interest in the Turkish Petroleum Company, which was agreed upon at San Remo in April 1920. Economic compensation of this nature was, in fact, all that M. Berthelot asked for in the note communicated by him to Lord Curzon on the 12th December, 1919, in which he stated that the French Government were ready to abandon their claim to Mosul in return for "strict equality in the exploitation of the oil in Mesopotamia and Kurdistan," and no question of further compensation to France in this respect arose in connexion with the negotiations which led to the conclusion of the 1920 convention.

8. In reply to the British argument that a strict maintenance of the 1920 convention line would create difficulties by dividing the homogeneous Yezidi population of Jebel Sinjar between two administrations, the French Government contend that the Yezidis are divided into autonomous tribes united by the loosest of bonds and possessing no common political organisation. This view is not, however, borne out by the report

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of the League of Nations commission on the Turco-Iraqi frontier question (League Paper C 400, 1925, VII), on p. 49 of which the following passage occurs:—

"Puis, c'est en tout cas un élément de la population nettement distinct des autres, très uni comme organisation, et . . . , dans le désert de l'ouest, il forme presque la seule population sédentaire en masse compacte."

The Yezidis do in fact owe allegiance not only to one common religious head, who resides, not in the Sinjar, but in a village north of Mosul, but also to one paramount sheikh, who is recognised as such by the Iraqi Government. It is true that dissensions exist among them and that the authority of the paramount sheikh would be difficult to sustain were it not supported by official recognition; but such dissensions would obviously be accentuated by the existence of an artificial frontier such as would be created by rigid adherence to the letter of the 1920 convention. There would be continual attempts to play off one Government against another, and malcontents from the territory of one State would inevitably seek refuge in the territory of the other. Difficulties would be experienced similar to those which have arisen between the Syrian and Iraqi sections of the Shammar tribe, and they would indeed be intensified in the case of a compact body of people like the Sinjar Yezidis. Never yet in the course of their history have the Sinjar Yezidis been divided between two administrations. It is true, as the French note of the 9th December observes, that this argument, taken by itself, can be invoked in favour of attaching the whole of the Jebel Sinjar to Syria instead of to Iraq; but the Jebel is connected with Iraq by a chain of villages and separated from Syria by miles of desert. Its associations, commercial, religious, social and historical, are with Mosul and not with Dair-az-Zor. It is true that in 1870 the Jebel, which had previously always been administered from Mosul, was attached to the Dair-az-Zor mutessariflik, but the experiment was a failure and was abandoned in 1879, when the Sinjar was restored to the Mosul Vilayet.

9. For the foregoing reasons His Majesty's Government are still of opinion that it is most desirable, in the best interests both of Syria and of Iraq, and for the sake of the future relations between those territories, that certain modifications, not necessarily in favour of Iraq alone, should now be made in the line indicated in the 1920 convention. The necessity of such modification exists, indeed, in other portions of the line besides that in the regions of the Khabur and Jebel Sinjar.

10. Apart from the well-known desire of the French authorities in Syria for a modification of the line on the Euphrates in the neighbourhood of the town of Abu Kemal, a difficult situation has recently arisen in Transjordan, where the French authorities occupy a considerable area to the south of the 1920 convention line between Nazib and Imtan. The British authorities of Transjordan did not raise any objection to the occupation of this area, since they had no wish to embarrass the French authorities in their military action for the suppression of the Druze revolt. The French occupation has, however, recently been extended further south to such places as Semme and Umm-el-Jemal, and this movement has created in Transjordan considerable excitement which the British authorities find it increasingly difficult to allay. His Majesty's Government recognise that a frontier fixed in strict conformity with the 1920 convention in this neighbourhood might be a source of much embarrassment to the French Administration; and they are fully prepared to consider in the most friendly spirit, in conjunction with the general question of amending other portions of the line where local experience has shown such modifications to be desirable, any proposals which the French Government may wish to make with a view to the final delimitation of the Syria-Transjordan sector.

11. The French Government will no doubt agree with His Majesty's Government that a permanent settlement of the whole frontier is eminently desirable in the interest of all three territories concerned; and it seems evident that, in view of the circumstances described above, a discussion between the two Governments regarding the nature of the modifications to be made in the various sectors must take place before the final frontier-line can be delimited on the ground. His Majesty's Government therefore feel confident that the French Government will be willing to reconsider their view that such a discussion is superfluous, and to appoint suitable delegates for the purpose.

(Confidential.)

12. It seems possible that the reluctance of the French Government to agree to such a discussion has been due to their being unaware of the fact that His Majesty's Government are prepared to urge the Iraqi Government to offer to the

French authorities in Syria, as partial compensation for a modification of the line in favour of Iraq at the western end of the Jebel Sinjar, certain concessions in other portions of the Syria-Iraq frontier. It is not yet possible to make any definite statement of this point, which must be subject to the consent of the Iraqi Government. You are, however, authorised, if you consider it desirable, to intimate to the French Government that His Majesty's Government would have no objection, for instance, to such modifications at the north-eastern end of the line as would afford the French authorities a better access than they possess under the 1920 convention to the Tigris and to the region known as the "Duck's Beak," adding that His Majesty's Government fully appreciate how important it is for the French authorities to possess satisfactory means of communication with that region.

13. A copy of the note which I am addressing to the French Ambassador in reply to his Excellency's note of the 9th May (a copy of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 1143 of the 19th May) regarding the delimitation of the Syria-Transjordan frontier, is enclosed herein for your information.

I am, &c.
CUSHENDUN.

Enclosure in No. 89.

Lord Cushendun to M. de Fleuriau.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, September 13, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the question of delimiting the boundary between Syria and Transjordan, which was dealt with in your note of the 9th May, has engaged the attention of His Majesty's Government.

2. His Majesty's Government would have preferred, for reasons of local convenience, to see some provisional agreement made between His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan and the French High Commissioner for Syria as to a *de facto* line separating the two administrations. They recognise, however, the force of M. Ponsot's objections to the conclusion of such an agreement, and are now prepared in certain circumstances to consider the permanent delimitation of the frontier.

3. Meanwhile, His Majesty's Government have for some time been in correspondence with the French Government, through His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris, regarding certain modifications which are in their opinion necessary, in the best interests of the two countries concerned, in the frontier between Syria and Iraq as laid down by the convention of the 23rd December, 1920. They are now instructing His Majesty's Embassy in Paris to suggest to the French Government a discussion, between delegates to be nominated for the purpose, of the modifications which require to be made in the 1920 convention line before a delimitation commission can be set to work; and also to propose that the frontier between Syria and Transjordan (and more especially the sector between Nasib and Imtan, which has formed the subject of the present correspondence with you), shall be discussed at the same time.

I have, &c.
CUSHENDUN.

[E 5619/230/89]

No. 90.

Sir G. Clerk to Lord Cushendun.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 497.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, November 20, 1928.

THE French Ambassador, who broke his sojourn in Angora in order to attend the French armistice celebrations here, was good enough to call upon me on the eve of his return to the capital, to give me a confidential account of the present stage of his negotiations regarding the Turco-Syrian frontier.

2. M. de Chambrun said that his instructions from Paris were explicit, not to budge an inch from the frontier line laid down by the commission under General Ernst. Nevertheless, if he found in the course of his discussions with Tewfik Rushdi Bey that an agreement could be reached by some slight concession on the

[19083]

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part of France, he intended to urge his Government to yield to that extent. M. de Chambrun appears to have discovered near Nissibin some Kurdish villages which he is ready to cede to the Turks, a sacrifice which may prove less welcome than he anticipates to both Turk and Kurd.

3. M. de Chambrun had no exaggerated hopes of an immediately successful issue to his negotiations, and was prepared for the moment when it would be necessary to admit that agreement was not at present possible and to suggest that the question should be left in abeyance for a few months. His only fear was that during this interval the Turks might work up a serious incident, but, as I said to him, I think that they are too intelligent to create a situation which would render it impossible for the French Government to make any concessions at all.

4. M. de Chambrun said that he had told me everything that was in his mind, for one reason, because he meant to be always completely open with me, and for another, because he would welcome any views of mine as to the wisdom of the line he was adopting.

5. I said that I fully reciprocated his desire for complete frankness between us, and would answer him in that spirit. Naturally, I looked upon his discussions with the Turkish Government from a more general point of view than he could perhaps do. So far as I could gauge the present trend of Turkish policy, one of its objects seemed to be the formation of what I might call a Central Eastern bloc, consisting of Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, with the direction thereof firmly settled at Angora. I did not even shut out the possibility of there being a vague idea of the eventual inclusion of the Georgians. So long as the British and French mandates over Iraq and Syria existed, Turkey had not a free hand; but those mandates would not last for ever, and she was probably working for the day when they expired. There was not necessarily any aggressive intention underlying this Turkish conception, which might almost be called a natural effort on the part of Turkey to consolidate her position, nor, indeed, need it be altogether disadvantageous to either of our two countries, should our relations with Turkey remain friendly and cordial. Most of the fuss the Turks were making over the Syrian frontier seemed therefore to me designed with an eye to the eventual exercise of Turkish influence over a nominally independent Syria.

6. To come to the concrete question of the actual point at issue between M. de Chambrun and Tewfik Rushdi Bey—the Nissibin-Jezireh frontier line—there seemed to me two reasons for the curiously intense anxiety of the Turks to obtain a few more square kilom. of what I gathered was entirely stones and desert. It was very probable that the Turks would prefer a line running from Nissibin to Khamik at the junction of the Tigris and the Khabur River, rather than to Jezireh, and they might hope by working up sufficient agitation to obtain such a concession from France. Alternatively, as M. de Chambrun had doubtless himself already noticed, hints were frequently appearing in the press to the effect that the Turco-Syrian line on the west was inequitable. (I enclose a copy of a rather violent article* by Yunus Nadi Bey in the "République" of the 20th November, of this nature, and I would also refer to the second paragraph of Mr. Knox's despatch No. 150 of the 7th March last.) It might be that Tewfik Rushdi Bey was manoeuvring for a position where he could suggest that, as the Nissibin-Jezireh frontier was unalterable, some compensation for the Turks could perhaps be found, in the interests of general good relations, to the west.

7. In any case, so far as my humble opinion went, his Excellency was well advised in his intention to keep the present discussion strictly confined to its original limits, while prepared to offer at the suitable moment, if his Government allowed him to do so, the slight concession which he had mentioned to me. I had no doubt that his Excellency would not let himself be too much perturbed by the attacks on France in the press, the purpose of which was obvious.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 5866/230/89]

No. 91.

Mr. Edmonds to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 10.)

(No. 524. Confidential.)

Sir,

Angora, December 4, 1928.

SHORTLY before my arrival at Angora, the Iraq Minister called at the Embassy and acquainted Mr. Roberts, in confidence, of a conversation which he had recently had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom he had had occasion to visit to discuss the direct interchange of health reports between the Turkish and Iraq authorities.

2. Dr. Tevfik Rushdi had spoken to Sabih Bey of his recent conversations with the French Ambassador over the delimitation of the Turco-Syrian frontier between Nisibin and the Tigris. Sabih Bey has formed the impression that neither Turkey nor France is disposed to yield, and that a settlement is not, therefore, to be anticipated in the near future. The Minister for Foreign Affairs hinted that, as already indicated in paragraph 2 of Mr. Knox's despatch No. 150 of the 7th March, the Turkish Government would be more ready to make concessions if they were dealing with an independent Government in Syria, similar to that established in Iraq.

3. Dr. Tevfik Rushdi asked Sabih Bey whether the Syrian-Iraq frontier was fixed, to which the latter replied in the affirmative. The Minister for Foreign Affairs then said that the French Ambassador had told him that an agreement had been concluded between France and Great Britain whereby Iraq would cede to Syria a strip of territory opposite a point on the "duck's beak," at which Syrian territory would be constricted into a dangerously narrow neck if the French conceded the Turkish claims.

4. Sabih Bey told the Minister for Foreign Affairs that he had no knowledge of any agreement between France and Great Britain, such as his Excellency suspected, and at the latter's request he undertook to address an enquiry to his Government, which he has done. Mr. Roberts, who had not seen Lord Cushendun's despatch No. 2049 of the 12th September to Sir W. Tyrrell, which appeared in the Confidential print (Eastern) as section 1 of that date, replied that he also was unaware of any such negotiations, and he was therefore inclined to agree with Sabih Bey's view that the French Ambassador had probably made no such statement as that attributed to him, and that this was a *ballon d'essai* on Dr. Tevfik Rushdi's part.

5. I gather from the despatch quoted above that the primary subject of the conversations with the French Government is a modification in favour of Iraq of the existing Syro-Iraq frontier at the western end of Jebel Sinjar, against which His Majesty's Government might be prepared, subject to the consent of the Iraq Government, to make certain concessions in favour of Syria on other points of the frontier, as, for instance, in the "duck's beak" area. I should be grateful if I might be furnished with a copy of any subsequent correspondence which may have been exchanged on this subject, and if I might be informed, for my guidance in speaking to Sabih Bey when he reverts to the subject, how far, if at all, the Iraq Government have been taken into the confidence of His Majesty's Government.

6. Yesterday Sabih Bey sent to the Embassy his secretary, Fuad Bey, with information as to what he believed to be the Turkish Government's final proposals. He also sent a sketch map, which shows exactly what is involved, and of which I have the honour to enclose a copy.* The map is said to be based upon a decision just taken by the Turkish General Staff, the shaded areas being those from which Turkey would, in the last resort, be prepared to withdraw; in no circumstances would she yield a single foot more. The westernmost of these two areas contains a military post, and Turkish withdrawal from this area would apparently be dependent upon acceptance of certain military conditions, by which apparently is meant an undertaking not to fortify this post, or, at any rate, to limit its garrison. The base of the triangle formed by the easternmost area is said to be about 12-15 miles long. Too little is known of the progress of the Franco-Turkish negotiations for it to be possible to assess the value of the information received by Sabih Bey.

I have, &c.

W. S. EDMONDS.

[E 6057/58/91]

No. 92.

Consul-General Satow to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 22.)

(No. 88.)

Sir,

Beirut, December 8, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a return of Moslem pilgrims passing through this port in 1928.

2. The publication from which this is extracted states that the number leaving in 1928 (3,819) showed a decrease of 579 as compared with 1927 (4,398), and attributes the decrease to the refusal of the Persian Government to allow its pilgrims to pass through Iraq. It will be noticed that the number of returning Persians was more than ten times that of those leaving. The sanitary condition of the returning pilgrims was good, and no case of contagious disease was detected on any steamer arriving here.

3. It will be noticed that the percentage of pilgrims using the land route was, for departure and return combined, just under 25 per cent.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to Bagdad and Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW

Enclosure in No. 92.

Return of Moslem Pilgrims passing through Beirut in 1928.

Race.	Departure.		Return.	
	By Land.	By Sea.	By Land.	By Sea.
Iraqis	540	1,053	326	936
Persians	91	168	1,229	1,549
Syrians	61	1,191	43	1,244
Turks	39	299	21	153
Afghans	27	157	2	100
Hedjazis	2	29	..	2
Moroccans	19	..	125
Senegalese	53	..	56
Algerians	34	1	34
Tunisians	32	..	5
Indians	11	19	7
Kurds	60
Various	1	12	1	19
Totals	761	3,058	1,642	4,390
	3,819		6,032	

[E 6078/230/89]

No. 93.

Mr. Edmonds to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 541.)

Sir,

Angora, December 18, 1928.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 524 of the 4th instant regarding the Franco-Turkish dispute over the Syrian frontier, I have the honour to report that these negotiations have come to a momentary standstill owing to the illness of the French Ambassador. Meantime the Turks have been employing their usual tactics against the French. A good instance of administrative pin-pricks is the Turks' refusal to allow the French railway company to run traffic on the newly-opened section between Deir Bessieh and Nissibin (see despatch No. 103 of the 21st ultimo from His Majesty's consul at Aleppo). The press loses few chances of making the French feel that they are unpopular. It contrasts relations on the Iraq frontier with those on the Syrian frontier. It complains of constant raids from Syria and of the harbouring of Kurdish agitators by the French authorities. It contrasts British

colonial policy with French policy in Syria. It contrasts intellectual France with political France, declaring that it will always welcome French technicians and men of learning, but will have no more priests and nuns. It complains of the treatment accorded to Turkish property in Syria. As a foil to all this the press holds up Turco-Italian relations. Signor Mussolini and all Italian institutions receive a surprising amount of praise. The Turco-Italian pact, it declares, is founded on a real community of interests, and therefore grows stronger daily. It is making a great fuss over Signor Grandi's visit to Angora.

2. To enquirers, the Minister for Foreign Affairs explains that Turkey wants only two things: Order on the frontier, and the adoption of the "old road" as the boundary on the Nissibin-Jezireh sector of the frontier. As regards the latter, he asserts that the wording of the Turco-Syrian Convention of the 30th May, 1926 (*cf.* "abornement" in article 2), does not justify the neutral president of the Boundary Commission in making an award, but that the dispute must be settled by diplomatic means. The stubbornness of the Turkish Government is generally explained here as inspired by the General Staff, which, it is true, often carries extraordinary weight in the counsels of the Government. The staff is said to insist on a territorial settlement in the "duck's beak," which would, firstly, leave to Turkey some twenty villages belonging to the Kurdish chief Hajjo, the head of the Haverki tribes, while impeding communication between Syria and Kurdish districts north-east of Jezireh, and would, secondly, give Turkey easier access to the flat country south of Faishkhabur, on the Iraq side of the Tigris. These strategic objects hardly seem to warrant the use of the heavy guns the Turks are employing. A satisfactory arrangement as regards the Kurds could evidently be more easily obtained as part of a general settlement, and there is no question of the better access to Iraq being of more than remote potential value.

3. The attitude of the Turkish Government continues to lend colour to the suggestion made by His Majesty's Ambassador in his despatch No. 497 of the 20th ultimo that the real objective of Turkey may be something more extensive, such as territorial concessions in the neighbourhood of Aleppo and Alexandretta, or even a change of régime in Syria. The importance attached by the Turkish Government to its railway system is well known, and the advantage of an all-Turkish line from Adana to Nissibin is obvious. Alternatively, it is just possible that the Turkish Government would not be altogether sorry to keep the Syrian question open, hoping to see disorder in that country increase—and perhaps to encourage it in other ways—until France should make up her mind to abandon the mandate. According to this view, the Turkish Government does not trust the French Government to observe the same friendly attitude in Syria as it believes His Majesty's Government to be obliged by self-interest to maintain in Iraq. Even if France were not immediately succeeded in Syria by some tractable republic, the reversion to Italy of the mandate over such a hornets' nest as Syria would absorb the expansionist energies of Italy for many years to come. Such a policy, if indeed it were contemplated, would be a gamble, but a gamble is not repugnant to the Turk.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the British High Commissioner at Bagdad.

I have, &c.

W. S. EDMONDS.

[E 6131/155/65]

No. 94.

Consul Monck-Mason to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 110.)

Sir,

Aleppo, December 13, 1928.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 87, Confidential, of the 23rd October, 1928, relative to the prohibition of the entry of foreigners into the Turkish provinces east of the Euphrates River, I have the honour to report that the Syrian railway staff on the part of the line running inside Turkish territory has been replaced by Turkish nationals, diplomatic negotiations having led to no result.

2. The technical defects complained of by the Turkish Commissariat of Public Works, mentioned in my despatch No. 68 of the 22nd August, have been remedied, and the Turkish Government will be notified accordingly. By agreement with the International Wagons-Lits Company, it is hoped to extend sleeping-car facilities as far as Nissibin as soon as the line is allowed to be opened to passenger traffic.

4. It is proposed shortly to make trial consignments of carpets from Tabriz by the overland route over Khanikin, Mosul and Alexandretta, by rail where possible, to Europe and the United States, in view of the economy in time and cost, in comparison with the present route adopted via Basra.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade, His Majesty's Embassy, Constantinople, His Majesty's High Commissioner, Bagdad, and to His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut, Damascus, Tabriz and Mersina.

I have, &c.

A. MONCK-MASON